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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The most rapidly evolving trust territories in Africa have been 
French and British Togolands, even though native organizations and par­
ties have supported such diverse political goals as Togoland unification, 
tribal unification, the continuation of the present administrative 
arrangement and the integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast. 
In 1957 British Togoland was united with the Gold Coast as the independ­
ent state of Ghana, a milestone in trusteeship history marking the first 
time that the United Nations' goals of self-government or independence 
for trust territories had been reached; and at present French Togoland 
enjoys self-government with the promise of independence in I96O.I
The political evolution of the Togolands has been largely a re­
sult of the conflicting pressures by the native groups of the Togolands 
and the Administering Authorities, Britain and France, upon the United 
Nations in an effort to influence that organization's decisions concern­
ing the two Territories' future. IVhile the demands of these pressure 
groups have been answered only in varying degrees, their active agita­
tion prompted the United Nations to continue searching for a solution to 
the Togolands' problems. These consisted primarily of severe boundary
^New York Times. October 3> 1958, p. 5.
1
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restrictions between the two Togolands and the diametrically opposed 
goals of various native groups pertaining to the future of British and 
French Togolands*
But the native forces would never have had an opportunity to 
place pressure upon the United Nations if the trusteeship system had not 
supplied the United Nations with different goals than those found under 
the mandates system. Indeed, the political development of British and 
French Togolands is one of the primary examples of the processes that 
are taking place under the trusteeship system which, unlike the mandates 
system, allows the natives to petition the United Nations directly and 
has the goals of "self-government or independence."^
The vigorous political activity in the Togolands, with its dia­
metrically opposed native movements, was the result of historic factors 
reaching back to 1884. In that year Germany established a protectorate 
on the West African coast of Guinea between the British colony of the 
Gold Coast to the west and the French protectorate of Dahomey to the 
east.3 This formed the basis for German Togoland. In 1899 the final 
boundaries were established^ and remained permanent until 1914, when the 
colony was seized by the French and British in the opening days of World
^Yearbook of the United Nations. 1946-47. Dept, of Public Infor­
mation, Ü.N. Doc. 1947.1 .1 8 (LaicV Success : 1947), pp. 840-41.
^Halford Lancaster Hoskins, European Imperialism in Africa (New 
York : Henry Holt and Co., 1930), p. 58.
^"Togoland," James S. Coleman, International Conciliation. Sep­
tember, 1956, p. 5«
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War I, with Britain gaining control of most of the territory.^
While the Germans ruled Togoland for only fifteen years after 
the colony had been expanded to its full extent, they were successful in 
developing the economy and in constructing a partial transportation sys­
tem of roads and railroads. In many respects Togoland was a model colo- 
ny. In later years, after France and Britain permanently divided the 
area, the name "Togoland" came to symbolize the ideal community to south­
ern Togolanders, the lost "Golden Age."? Many of them had either forgot­
ten or ignored those aspects of policy and administration which were far 
from ideal and associated all that was desirable with the historic "Togo­
land. " Part of the political activity since World War II was centered 
around a desire to return to a united Togoland.
Actually there were many things about German Togoland which were 
not utopian. The boundaries were one of these. They had been estab­
lished arbitrarily, without regard for tribal divisions. The Togoland- 
Gold Coast boundary cut across two large tribal areas, the Dagorabas of 
the North and the Ewes of the South.® This caused a good deal of dis­
content, enough that British and French occupation was well received at 
first by these and other small tribes divided by the Gold Coast-Togoland 
border. Britain controlled most of the country and those groups which
^Sir Charles Lucas, The Partition and Colonization of Africa 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), p. 179.
^George Louis Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Confer­
ence (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1923), p. 22.
?Coleman, loc. cit.
®Hoskins, op. cit.. p. 417.
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had been divided by the boundary found themselves under one administra­
tion. The Dagombas were completely reunited and the Ewes enjoyed almost 
complete unity for the first time since the intervention of Europeans.^ 
Even tribes which had not been split by the border were fairly content. 
British and French rule was not as harsh as German rule, and from 1914 
until 1920 the two powers did not establish any real boundary between the 
two sectors under their control. In the field of currency, for example, 
the British sterling flowed freely through both sectors and became para­
mount.^® It was only when Togoland was redivided that disillusionment 
with British and French rule began.
Unfortunately, the British and French reapportioned Togoland 
after World War I in preparation for its transfer to the mandates system. 
Britain retreated westward allowing France to control nearly two-thirds 
of the c o l o n y . A s  a result the large Ewe population of nearly a mil­
lion was cut almost in half, leaving three-fifths of their total popula­
tion under British administration in the Gold Coast and British Togoland 
and two-fifths under French control.
The British decision to relinquish most of Togoland came as a 
result of secret negotiations and was apparently a conciliatory measure.
^Coleman, op. cit., p. 8.
^®Raymond Leslie Buell, The Native Problem in Africa (New York; 
The Macmillan Co., 1928), II, p. 310.
l^Coleman, op. cit., p. 6.
^^Hoskins, loc, cit.
^^Buell, op. cit.. p. 363.
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Britain had profited extensively elsewhere, securing all of Tanganyika, 
and the relinquishment of most of Togoland was an excellent diplomatic 
gesture. It gave France control of a well developed colony with a rich 
cocoa economy and very good transportation routes, as compared to most 
of Africa at that time.
It was not practical, however, for Britain to relinquish all of 
Togoland, Such a step would weaken its control over the Volta River, 
which formed the boundary between the Gold Coast and Togoland for some 
distance and which had good power potential.Further, it would incur 
the wrath of the large Dagomba tribal nation in the North^^ which would 
be under one administration so long as Britain kept the western edge of 
Togoland, as well as the Ewes who were irritated at the prospect of 
Britain withdrawing from any part of the Ewe area it then controlled. 
Under the circumstances, Britain found it feasible to allow France con­
trol over most of Togoland, but not all of it.
This decision created strong resentment among those groups to be 
divided by the new boundary. Angriest were the Ewes, who had enjoyed 
almost complete unification during the short time that Britain controlled 
most of Togoland, As Togoland was to become part of the mandates system, 
the final decision on the division of the colony needed the League of 
Nations' endorsement. Appeals were made to the League and the United 
States to prevent the division. In April of 1921, President Harding
Dudley Stamp, Africa; A Study in Tropical Development (New 
York : John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953)* p. 302.
Ethnic Map, p. 6,
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received a cable from southern Togoland stating vividly that Togoland 
was being "handed to /_the/ French contrary /.to/ Wilson's fourteen points 
against /.the/ wishes /of the/ natives. We still protest French manda­
tory. Intervene immediately. Save us,"^^
Despite the protests and agitation of the Ewes of the South, 
French control of the capital city, Lom^, and most of Togoland was con­
firmed by the League of Nations in 1 9 2 2 . The League was not in a 
position to reject British and French plans for the former German colony.
It was only with difficulty that any form of mandates system was devised
1 ftin the first place, so strongly was the concept opposed.
Though agitation continued after the boundary settlement, the 
border actually constituted no real barrier and goods and peoples crossed 
with little difficulty. Agitation would probably have disappeared com­
pletely had it not been for two continual sources of irritation, one 
stemming from the boundary delimitation and the other from taxation.
When the final boundary between the French and British Territo­
ries was determined, some farms and villages were divided. To correct 
this, Britain and France stipulated that inhabitants living on either 
side of the boundary could move their property to the territory of their 
choice, providing they declared their intent within six months after the
^^Buell, op. cit.. p. 361.
"Minutes of the 19th Session of the Council, July 18, 1922," 
League of Nations Official Journal. 3rd Year (1922), p. 793.
^®William Edward Du Bois, Black Folk Then and Now; An Essay in 
the History and Sociology of the Negro Race (New York : Henry Holt and
Co., 1939), p. 338.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rG R R IT O R lE S O F  T H E  T O G O L A N D S  
9SS'
JCAL MAP
pHsmct
ro«dl f Cif T»pr*l ly f»A.fA4bI« 
tT t r o v t9 h A u t  y e « r^
«n*> «/ >«i»c
T R U S
UOMETRtS.
#»Kc«r* E N C H
1
r
U  t N  E A
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8
boundary delimitation.Where lands were split by the border this 
would mean selling some land and buying new, an idea contrary to tradi­
tion for many natives. Among the Ewes, for example, land owned by a
20family was considered a sacred trust, not to be sold or mortgaged.^ 
Therefore, the controlling authorities' proposal for easing the situa­
tion offered no solution, and divided villages and lands were a source 
of irritation as late as 1936.^^ Even though the British-French Togo­
land border was not difficult to cross, it symbolized administrative 
separation.
A second source of constant irritation to the natives was the 
export tax. Because trade routes between British Togoland and the Gold 
Coast were poor and British Togoland had no seaport,^2 most of the cocoa 
from the upper southern area of British Togoland was shipped via the 
French Togoland railroad to the seaport of Lome. The railroad had origi­
nally been built by the Germans to reach the cocoa-rich uplands of Togo­
land. British Togoland cocoa growers who shipped to Lome were forced by 
the British to pay the same export tax as those who used the Gold Coast 
seaports. Since native growers in French Togoland were not subject to a
^^Report on British Mandated Sphere of Togoland for 1920-1921. 
Cmd. 1698 (London, H.M.S.O., 1922), pp. 25-26.
^®Madeline Manoukian, The Ewe-Speaking People of Togoland and 
the Gold Coast. Part VI of the Ethnographic Survey of Africa: West
Africa (London: International African Institute, 1952), p. 12.
_ ^^Minutes and Reports of the Thirtieth Session. Oct. 27. 1936
/Permanent Mandates Commission/, L. of N. Doc. 1936.VIA.2 (Geneva: 
1936), p. 72.
22gee Political Map, p. 9.
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tax, the growers on the British side felt they were being treated un­
fairly.^3
While there was discontent, no serious problems arose from the 
administrative separation of Togoland until World War II. Then the 
French Vichy Government, which controlled French Togoland from 1940 to 
1942, closed the b o r d e r . T h i s  created an economic crisis in British 
Togoland. Having no seaport, the Territory was now left dependent upon 
the seaports of the Gold Coast, which meant transporting goods over un­
developed routes leading across the unbridged Volta River, At the same 
time, the closed border also prevented normal trade movement, made it 
impossible for natives to farm lands which did not lie in the sector 
where they resided, and severed relations between segments of those 
tribes which were separated by the boundary.
After the Vichy Government lost control, the border was reopened, 
but severe restrictions were put on the transfer of goods and money. As 
late as 1949 the United Nations found that the different economic sys­
tems, exchange control and customs difficulties imposed constraints 
which the frontier population did not easily bear.^^
"Hie importance of conditions in the Togolands during and after 
World War II can hardly be overemphasized. Along with the influences
^^Buell, op. cit.. p. 363.
^^"Consideration of Petitions Presented," Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records. Second Session: First Part. 12th Meeting, 9 December
1947, no. 34, p. 353.
"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Ter­
ritories in West Africa," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Seventh 
Session. Supplement, no. 2 (1950), p. 81.
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rendered by the growth of nationalism throughout the world since World 
War II and the important position of the United Nations in trusteeship 
affairs, conditions in the two Territories have given a tremendous stim­
ulus to political activity. At the outbreak of World War II no major 
political organizations existed in British and French Togolands, By 
1955 there were seven of major significance and two of minor signifi­
cance.
These political groups can be divided into three major forces : 
the integration movement, the status quo movement and the unification 
movement. The unification movement was prompted by dissatisfaction with 
the Togoland partition and the hardships it created during and after 
World War II, It was divided into two camps. Ewe unificationists and 
Togoland unificationists, both wanting union under one administration. 
Ewe unification was favored by those Ewe tribal members wanting to unify 
their tribal area, which stretched continuously across the southern re­
gions of French and British Togolands and the southeastern sector of the 
Gold Coast, The move for Togoland unification was largely supported by 
southern tribes of both Togolands who saw certain advantages to uniting 
the two Territories, and included many Togoland Ewes,
The Ewe unificationists were the first to organize a party. In 
1939 the Cœiit^ de 1'Unité Togolaise was formed in the southern area of 
French T o g o l a n d . I t  has been the only major political party in that 
Territory to represent unification. While it originally adhered to Ewe 
unification, the party shifted its position in 1952 to support Togoland
Z^lbid.. p. 77,
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unification. This was a tactical maneuver worked in cooperation with 
the closely allied All-Ewe Conference and brought about by the feeling 
that Ewe unification was a futile cause, whereas Togoland unification 
was a real possibility,^7
The All-Ewe Conference was a pan-Ewe cultural organization which 
originally advocated the ultimate unity of all Ewes under one government, 
and was not a political p a r t y . I t  held its inaugural session at Accra 
in the Gold Coast on July 9, 19^6, and claimed to be comprised of repre­
sentatives from the various Ewe unions in the Togolands and the Gold 
Coast, in addition to the headchiefs who were the traditional rulers of 
all the local "states" of French Mandated Togoland, British Mandated 
Togoland and the Gold Coast Ewe area.^^ While its strength was not 
actually this extensive, it was the major Ewe organization during the 
early years after World War II,
Ewe unificationists turned to history for support of their posi­
tion. They stated that the Ewe tribe should not be divided by bounda­
ries as it had a common historical origin. Many centuries ago the Ewes 
migrated from east of the Niger^® to the town of Nautja in southern
^^Coleman, op. cit., p. 33.
"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Ter­
ritories in West Africa," op. cit.. p. ?6,
^^Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under Brit­
ish Administration; Petition from the All-Ewe Conference Dated 9 August 
19^7.~u7n. Doc. T/Pet.6/5, T/Pet,7/6 (Lake Success : 1947), p. 5* Taken
from Readex Microprint, referred to as (R.M.) in following footnotes,
^®W, E. F, Ward, A History of the Gold Coast (London: G. Allen
and Unwin, 1948), p. 126,
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French Togoland, where they lived as a tribal unit until three hundred 
years ago when many migrated to escape the rule of a despotic chief.
The pro-Ewe unification groups further substantiated their demand for 
Ewe unification by pointing out that the Ewes spoke the same language, 
had practically the same local customs and enjoyed essentially the same 
cultural background.
These statements were not entirely true though there was support 
for the Ewe unification position. The Ewes did have a common historical 
background and a sufficiently high degree of cultural uniformity to 
justify calling them a tribe. However, dialects varied from one sub­
tribe to another, and Ewes from the West sometimes had difficulty under­
standing those from the East and vice versa. Further, certain religious 
cults and rituals were peculiar to particular sub-tribes. Moreover, 
after leaving Nautja three hundred years ago, the Ewes had split into 
small independent political units which numbered more than a hundred at 
the end of the nineteenth c e n t u r y . ^3
Until the Comité̂  de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference 
changed their platforms from Ewe unification to Togoland unification in 
1952, Togoland unification was chiefly a British Togoland concept. The 
original instrument for support of Togoland unification was the Togoland
^^Manoukian, loc. cit.
^^U.N. Doa T/Pet.6/5i T/Pet.7/6, op. cit.. p. 2.
^^Joan Coyne MacLean, ed., Africa: The Racial Issue ("The Ref­
erence Shelf," Vol. XXVI, No. 1; New York : Wilson Co., 1934), pp. 9-10.
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Union Party created in 1943.^ Before the advent of the Togoland Con­
gress, it was the only party of significance in the British Territory, 
This gave it an excellent opportunity to spread its doctrines. In 1951 
the party was replaced in a sense by the Togoland Congress, which was 
formed as an umbrella organization embracing the Togoland Union and the 
smaller Togoland National Farmers' Union and Togoland Youth Organization, 
all of British Togoland, It also included representatives from the 
Comité" de l'Unité Togolaise of French Togoland,
There were two other Togoland unification parties, both of minor 
significance, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise and the Mouvement 
Populaire Togolaise, The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise was estab­
lished in 1951 by young men who were former members of the Comité de 
l'Unité Togolaise. They had rejected that party because they felt it 
did not show enough dynamism in its actions,Unlike the Comité de 
l'Unité Togolaise, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise favored Togo­
land unification from the time of its conception, though Togoland unifi­
cation remained primarily a British Togoland idea until the Comité de 
l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference altered their positions in
1952.
The Mouvement Populaire Togolaise was not organized until 1954,
^Coleman, op. cit.. p, 33.
"Hearing of the Representative of the Togoland Congress," 
Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Eighth Session. 3^3rd Meeting,
15 March 1951, p. 242.
^^Special Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust 
Territories in West Africa. 1952. on the Ewe and Togoland Unification 
Problem. U.N. Doc. T/1034 (New York; 1952), p. 68, (R.M.)
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when a group of former Parti Togolaise du Progrès members who had re­
jected the status quo position of that party joined together.Like 
the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, the Mouvement Populaire Togo­
laise very actively supported Togoland unification.^®
Though Togoland unificationists did not always work together, 
they generally supported their position with the argument that Togoland 
had been arbitrarily divided without the consent of its people. Togo­
land separation had destroyed the community of interest and the harmony 
which the Togolanders had had during the long period they were under 
German rule. Further, it prevented the Togoland people from enjoying a 
common cultural and political association and injured their economic 
position, Togoland unification would satisfy British Togoland's need 
for the railroad transportation system of French Togoland and would 
bring together two territories with similar problems stemming from a 
one-crop economy based on cocoa.
The Togoland unificationists* arguments were not entirely sub­
stantiated by fact. The Togoland unification movement began apparently 
as a result of the severe border restrictions imposed since 1940 and 
was based on an idealized concept of the old German s t a t e . vfliile mem­
bers of the movement could legitimately point to practical reasons for
Coleman, op. cit.. p. 31.
"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory under British Administration," Trustee­
ship Council, Official Records. Fifth Special Session. Supplement, no, 
2 (1955). p. 54.
^^Coleman, op. cit.. p. 5.
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Togoland unification, there was little historical support for the con­
cept. Togoland existed as a complete unit only from 1899 to 1914, and 
was composed of a great diversity of tribes. The most desirable aspects 
of Togoland unification would be the resulting unity of a large number 
of Ewes and some smaller tribes and the formation of a sounder economic 
unit.
The second of the major movements in the Togolands, the status 
quo group, was composed of those people in French Togoland who favored a 
continued close relationship with France. Drawing adherents from both 
the northern and southern sectors of the Territory, the movement gener­
ally opposed both Togoland and Ewe unification, though there was appar­
ently some willingness to accept Togoland unification under French admin­
istration. In southern French Togoland the move to maintain the status 
quo can be traced to France's effort to develop an elite administering 
class. This elite group enjoyed a privileged status as government offi­
cials, Along with others who had profited under French rule they were 
in a position to lose a great deal should France relinquish control of 
French Togoland, or if Togoland were united under anything but French 
rule. Their argument was that the French Territory would profit in 
terms of economic and social development through close association with 
F r a nce.This class of people formed the Parti Togolaise du Progrès in
1946 to oppose unification.^^
^ Addendum to Petition from the Togoland Progress Party Concern­
ing Togoland under French and British Administration? U.N. Doc. T/Pet. 
6/10. T/Pet.?/l2/Add.l (Lake Success: Ï950), p. 7.
"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust
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In northern French Togoland the status quo was supported by the 
Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, which consisted mostly
of the traditional elite and some Western educated persons. This party
43
Upwas established in 1951» mainly in opposition to unification. ^ Its
members were afraid of domination by the Ewes and other southerners.
Ewe unification would sever them from the coast, leaving them dependent 
upon the Ewes for trade, and Togoland unification would bring together 
many of the Ewes and other powerful tribal elements of both Territories.
While arguing that a continued close relationship with France 
would bring added benefits for French Togoland in terms of economic and 
social development, the status quo groups also argued that Ewe unifica­
tion might lead to the "disintegration" of Togoland. The only legiti­
mate unification, said the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, would be that of 
the two Togolands; but it would not be practical for French Togoland to 
unite with the economically deficient British Togoland.^ This was also 
the argument of the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo.^^
The proposals of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, echoed by the 
Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, were that France should
Territories in West Africa," op. cit.. p. ?8.
^^Coleman, op. cit., p. 38.
43lbid.. p. 29.
^ Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under 
French Administration: Petition from the Togoland Progress Party Dated
19 November 1947. U.N.' Doc. T/Pet,6/10, T/Pet.7/Ï2 (Lake Success :
1947), p. 4. (R.M.)
^•^"Examination of Petitions," Trusteeship Council, Official Re­
cords. Seventh Session. 21st Meeting, 6 July 1950, p. I6 7.
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continue to rule French Togoland. However, it should guarantee the na­
tives a large part in the effective management of all aspects of their 
country's affairs and should recognize that its purpose was to promote 
French Togoland's progress and not confine the people within the narrow 
limits of servitude.Further, the status quo groups not only favored 
eventual self-government, but also a continued association with the 
French U n i o n , which has led to their further title of "unionists.”
There were merits to the status quo as defined by its adherents, 
such as continued economic aid and eventual self-government; but the 
arguments against Togoland unification especially were questionable.
There were factors against Ewe unification, it is true. Ewe unification 
would have brought together the richest and most advanced areas of the 
Togolands, leaving the rest of the Territories economically barren.
This would certainly have been detrimental, though it is unlikely it 
would have led to the destruction or "disintegration" of the Togolands, 
as implied by the Parti Togolaise du Progrès. Contrary to the party's 
further arguments that Togoland unification would be detrimental to 
French Togoland, it would seem that Togoland unification might have been 
beneficial to both areas. Territorial unification would have given Brit­
ish Togoland transportation routes and an outlet to the sea. Though it 
was true that British Togoland lagged behind French Togoland in develop­
ment, French Togoland would have benefited from the rich cocoa areas in 
the British Territory. Together the two might eventually have become
^U.N. Doc. T/Pet.6/10, T/Pet.7/12/Add.l, op. cit.. p. 4. 
47coleman, op. cit.. pp. 37-38»
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self-sustaining, as they had been during the last few years under German 
rule,^ particularly with economic assistance from the Administering 
Authority. The Togoland unificationists, after all, did not ask for in­
dependence, but one administration.
The third and last of the major native groups was the integra­
tion movement. Integration was a proposal whereby British Togoland 
would be dissolved into the Gold Coast. Prompted by political forces 
in the Gold Coast, it gained support in all parts of British Togoland, 
particularly in the North where many of the people were tribally related 
to natives in the northern Gold Coast. No real move for integration be­
gan until it became apparent that the Gold Coast would soon be an inde­
pendent country. The Gold Coast and British Togoland lie side by side 
and the British administered the small Territory as part of the Gold 
Coast, Politicians in the colony, once they had realized their objec­
tive of eventual independence, became concerned over the possibility 
that British Togoland would be separated from the Gold Coast when the 
colony emerged from its colonial status. With assistance from Britain, 
which felt it was impractical to rule British Togoland independently 
from the Gold Coast, they worked hard to impress upon the Territory's 
people the desirability of merging with the colony when it became inde­
pendent ,
The major party behind the movement for integration of British 
Togoland into the Gold Coast was the Convention People's Party. It was 
the majority party in the Gold Coast and largely responsible for the
48Beer, loc. cit.
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Gold Coast's advancement toward independence. After it was relatively 
sure of this goal, the party turned its attention to British Togoland, 
with the hope of integrating it into the Gold C o a s t , Branches were 
established in the southern areas of British Togoland to spread the doc­
trine of integration, urging the people to support union with the Gold 
Coast at the moment the colony became independent.
The Convention People's Party argued that the integration of 
British Togoland into the Gold Coast was the logical result of the geo­
graphic, ethnic and economic circumstances of the Trust Territory.^®
This was only partly true. Ethnically, British Togoland and the Gold 
Coast were tied by the occurrence of two large tribal groups in both 
countries, the Dagombas of the North and the Ewes of the S o u t h , F u r ­
ther, they had had a common administration since 1914, which had result­
ed in the development of similar though not equal institutions of educa­
tion, health and government. These were not equal in that British 
Togoland was generally neglected in favor of development for the Gold 
C o a s t , T h e  joint administration tended to strengthen what common eth­
nic ties of language and history existed, whereas the separate institu­
tions which had evolved in the two Togolands since their division
^^Coleman, op, cit., p. 39-
"General Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII): The Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem,” Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Thirteenth Ses­
sion, 50th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no, 11, p. 186,
^^See Ethnic Map, p, 6 ,
M. Bourett, The Gold Coast: A Survey of the Gold Coast and
British Togoland, 1919-1951-(Stanford : Stanford University Press, 1952),
p. 114.
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resulted in the weakening of their ethnic ties. Basically, though, eth­
nic factors gave little justification for either Togoland unification or 
integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast.
The Convention People's Party had even less support for integra­
tion as a logical result of geographic and economic circumstances. In 
the South the two regions were separated by the Volta River, which was 
unbridged, and north of the Volta there were no particular geographic 
factors to unite the areas. Until the Volta could be bridged, geography 
was against integration. It was more feasible for British Togoland to 
use the transportation system of French Togoland, which gave the rich 
cocoa areas of both Territories an outlet to the sea. Even if the Volta 
were bridged, good transportation routes between the Gold Coast and 
British Togoland were lacking,53
Another party which supported integration was the Northern 
People's Party of the northern Gold Coast, While in opposition to the 
Convention People's Party on most matters, it gave vigorous approval to 
integration, 54 The Party argued that the northern peoples of both Brit­
ish Togoland and the Gold Coast had common tribal ties which would be 
severed if the Territory did not become a part of the Gold Coast when 
the British colony received its independence.55 This was a valid
53see Political Map, p. 9»
5^Coleman, op. cit.. p. 38.
55"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus-
teeship Council (A/3046, T/1206 and Add.l, T/1214, T/I215),*’ General 
Assembly (10th sess.), 4th Committee, Official Records. 529th Meeting,
1 December 1955» no. 35, p. 345,
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assertion, for many of the northern tribes of British Togoland had coun­
terparts in the Gold Coast, though the British-French Togoland border 
also divided some groups.
Later the Northern People's Party grew hesitant about integra­
tion, fearing that the northern peoples would be subject to domination 
by the heavily populated areas of the South, unless some autonomy was 
maintained. They demanded a federal relationship with the southern Gold 
Coast for the northern areas of British Togoland and the Gold Coast.
Of the parties and organizations which interacted with each 
other and with the Administering Authorities to influence the United Na­
tions' decision on the future of the Togoland Trust Territories, the 
All-Ewe Conference was the most important during the preliminary devel­
opments after World War II. The pan-Ewe organization's petitions to the 
United Nations in 194? resulted in the first consideration of Togoland's 
problems by the United Nations and began the evolutionary process which 
thus far has resulted in the release of British Togoland from trust 
status and its inclusion in the independent state of Ghana, formerly the 
Gold Coast, and in the French promise of independence for French Togo­
land in 1960.58
In one of its petitions to the United Nations the All-Ewe
5 6"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration, " 
op. cit.. p. 8.
57The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration. U.N. Doc. A/3173 
(New York: 195o). pp. 468-69.
58New York Times. October 3. 1958, p. 5*
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Conference asked permission to support its written petitions by an oral 
presentation before the United Nations,Permission was granted and at 
the second session of the Trusteeship Council in 1947 an All-Ewe Confer­
ence representative, Sylvanus Olympic, appeared to demand the unifica­
tion of the Ewe tribes into an Eweland under one administration. Unhin­
dered by strong opposing native forces, which were only beginning to 
evolve, the All-Ewe Conference representative made a strong case for Ewe 
unification that the British and French could counter only in part.
Most important, he unwittingly set in motion events which, while they 
did not bring Ewe unification, brought vast economic, social and politi­
cal changes to the lives of the people of both British and French Togo­
land,
^^U.N, Doc, T/Pet.6/5, T/Pet.7/6, op. cit.. p. 6.
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CHAPTER II
THE ALL-EWE CONFERENCE PRESENTS ITS CASE
The division of Togoland during World War I and the administra­
tive separation of the eastern and western parts was abhorrent to many 
of the natives of Togoland. It resulted in discontent and some agita­
tion, which was heightened when the boundary was closed for a time dur­
ing World War II, This discontent and agitation continued unabated with 
the application after the boundary was reopened of severe restrictions 
dictated by protectionist policies.^
Militant groups developed asking for some type of reunification. 
Their demands were countered by the formation of native groups in French 
Togoland which supported continued French rule and of native groups in 
British Togoland urging the integration of British Togoland into the 
Gold Coast, Britain and France lent strong support to the latter organi­
zations.
Much of the political conflict resulting from the divergence of 
demands was fought out in the halls of the United Nations. The fact 
that the future of the trust territories depended upon the United Na­
tions' decisions was not lost to the various groups, who realized the
^Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, French West Africa (Stan­
ford: Stanford University Press, 1957)» pp. 440-41,
24
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importance of impressing their views upon the organs of the United Na­
tions concerned with trusteeship matters.
The variety of groups lobbying in the United Nations and their 
highly diversified demands created a major problem for the world organi­
zation, It was difficult for its organs to determine correct courses of 
action, or to determine if in some instances any action should be taken.
The first native group to take advantage of the United Nations' 
position of ultimate responsibility for trusteeship matters was the All- 
Ewe Conference, which wanted the unification of the geographically con­
tiguous Ewe subtribes into an Ewe nation. The All-Ewe Conference was 
able to present its case directly to the Trusteeship Council and make a 
strong impression upon that body. Although the native organization was 
not successful in obtaining Ewe unification, it set the stage for con­
centrated efforts by various Togoland groups and the British and French 
to force certain decisions from the United Nations and to influence 
other decisions.
Prior to appearing before the second session of the Trusteeship 
Council, the All-Ewe Conference sent petitions to the United Nations 
which were impassioned pleas for unification of the Ewe people under a 
single administration. The Conference argued that the partition of 
Togoland and the consequent division of the Ewes had been accomplished 
without determining the wishes of the Ewe people and that the division 
was a serious blow to their existence. The All-Ewe Conference said that 
unification was necessary for economic, social, political and educational
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p r o g r e s s . 2 it stated that the Ewes were a people of the same origin, 
who spoke the same language. Ewe, and who were socially united by the 
closest ties of kinship, language and culture.^
The All-Ewe Conference then turned its attention to administra­
tion, It attacked the differences between British and French adminis­
tration, saying that they severely hindered Ewe unity. The British pre­
pared people for self-government and took account of the indigenous 
culture, making provisions for its development. On the other hand, the 
French colonial policy led in an entirely different direction. It 
called for the conversion of colonial peoples to full French citizenship, 
and therefore aimed at giving the people French culture rather than de­
veloping the indigenous culture. The differences between British and 
French colonial policies was resulting in a division of Ewe culture 
which the Ewes felt was unjust. This, the All-Ewe Conference said, had 
in turn led to a widespread dissatisfaction among both the literate and 
illiterate.^
The native organization further argued that geographically and 
economically the Ewes were injured by the boundary divisions, British 
Togoland had no seacoast and had to depend upon sending its goods to 
Accra in the Gold Coast. The All-Ewe Conference said that while Accra
^Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French 
Administration: Petition from the All-Ewe Conference Dated 26 July 194?.
U.N, Doc, T/Pet.6/3f T/Pet.7/4 (Lake Success: 194?), pp. '3-4. (R.M.;
^Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under French 
Administration: Petition from the All-Ewe Conference Dated 9 August
1947. U.N. Doc. T/Pet.6/5. T/Pet.7/6 (Lake Success: 1947), p. 1. TR.M.)
^Ibid.. pp. 1-2.
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was on the sea it had no port facilities. Furthermore, all traffic over 
the two main roads from Eweland to Accra had to cross the river Volta, 
which had not been bridged. If Eweland existed as a unit, all the Ewes 
would be able to ship their goods to the French Togoland port of Lomé, 
which had port facilities and was closer for the larger portion of Ewes 
than Accra, At the present time they could not do this because the 
French Territory was separated from British Togoland and the Ewes of the 
Gold Coast by strict frontier regulations which made trade practically 
impossible.5
In attempting to make its arguments as strong as possible, the 
All-Ewe Conference asserted that its group was composed of the head 
chiefs, who were the traditional rulers of all the local states of 
French Togoland, British Togoland and of the Gold Coast Ewes, It as­
serted, too, that the representatives of the various Ewe unions in all 
three areas were a part of the organization's membership.̂
The Trusteeship Council also received a petition from the Bel­
gian Congo branch of the All-Ewe Conference. This group's arguments 
were quite similar to those presented by the parent organization, but 
went further, saying that the frontier between British and French Togo­
land cut indiscriminately through local states, villages and farms, thus 
separating sections of people from their chiefs, relatives and farms.
It would be impossible for the Ewes to learn to exercise self-government 
when divided by borders and under different administrations. The branch
5lbid.. p, 20, 
^Ibid.. p. 1 5.
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organization suggested unification under the British system.?
Before its second session the Council received one petition fa­
voring unification besides those from the All-Ewe Conference and its 
branch. This was from Augustino de Souza of the Comité de l'Unité Togo­
laise, who was an important native figure in the Lome area of French 
Togoland. Signed also by traditional chiefs and notables, the petition 
asked for essentially the same thing as the All-Ewe Conference peti­
tions.®
Scmie of the Trusteeship Council members were impressed by the 
petitions, particularly the Iraqi representative.^ Most agreed that the 
seriousness of the assertions indicated that they should give the All- 
Ewe Conference the oral hearing it d e m a n d e d .
In answer to the written petitions and in preparation for the 
oral presentation by an All-Ewe Conference representative, the British 
and French drew up a joint memorandum. A very long, very impressive, 
and very logical document, it attempted to dispel some of the impres­
sions conveyed by the petitions and to supply solutions for those
?Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under 
French Administration; Petition from the All-^e Conference (Congo 
Branch) Dated 5 August 1947. U.N. Doc. T/Pet.6/4. T/Pet.7/5 (Lake Suc­
cess: 1947), pp. 2-4. (R.M.)
®Togoland under French Administration and Togoland under Brit­
ish Administration : Petition from Augustino de Souza Dated 30 June
lÿ»7. U.N. Doc. i p y J g y 2 T/Pet.7/3 (Lake Success: 1947), pp. 3-4.
TO.)
9"Procedural Questions in Connexion with the Consideration of 
Petitions," ITusteeship Council, Official Records. Second Session: 
First Part. 2nd Meeting, 20 November 1947, no. 7, p. 33.
J-Olbid.. p. 37.
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conceded to be true.
In this document, the British and French noted first that the 
Ewes were a minority of 800,000 centered in the southern areas of the 
Gold Coast, British Togoland and French Togoland. They explained that 
the Ewes had nothing in common with the natives of the North or of the 
greater part of Togoland for that matter. There were, however, certain 
tribes of Middle Togoland, such as the Agotime and Adangbe, which had 
adopted the Ewes' language to a large extent and identified themselves 
with that tribe.H
The Administering Authorities agreed that the Ewes did have 
bonds of common origin, language and customs in spite of what they 
termed the "extreme independence" of Ewe sub-tribes. They said these 
bonds had been rapidly growing in strength. Within the last fifteen 
years most of the Ewe divisions of British Togoland and the Gold Coast 
had formed themselves into confederacies for the purposes of local gov­
ernment, and spontaneous pan-Ewe movements had occurred among the edu-
1 pcated Ewe communities in the large towns.
The British and French also said in their joint memorandum that 
there was reason to believe the All-Ewe Conference expressed the objects 
and views of the mass of the Ewe people, both educated and uneducated. 
But they wondered if the Ewes' request for unification was actually 
based on the characteristics that distinguished the Ewes from the
"Ewe Petitions; Observations Submitted by the Governments of 
France and the United Kingdom," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. 
Second Session: First Part. Supplement (194?), p. 25.
IZibid.. p. 26.
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neighboring peoples and on their increased awareness of their common 
identity. The Authorities wondered if the request for unification were 
not based instead on the substantial grievances, produced by the parti­
tion of Eweland, which had stimulated unification demands since 1940. 
They admitted that there were significant differences in the colonial 
policies of the two countries and many of the complaints concerning the 
boundary divisions were legitimate, though not long-standing. These 
difficulties stemmed from troubles that arose during World War 11.^3
In the view of the British and French, not only was it true that 
the demands for Ewe unification lacked longevity, but Ewe unification 
itself was undesirable, A unified Eweland would be impractical. Under 
the most favorable circumstances it would be likely to remain an enclave 
of West Africa, limited in human and material resources. Besides, some 
of the Ewes lived in the Gold Coast, which was a colony of Britain and 
outside the jurisdiction of the trusteeship system. And even if Ewe 
unification were practical, it would be a mistake to unify the Ewes, for 
this could stimulate other demands for tribal unity and result in a 
movement to divide the continent into a "mosaic" of rival countries,
The Administering Authorities believed it would be more practi­
cal to remove as many of the obstacles as possible which hindered the 
movement of individuals and goods across the border and to introduce 
measures which would assure cultural and social unity. The removal of 
border obstacles would require the abolition of permits and other
l^Ibid.. pp. 26-27 and 31. 
l^Ibid,. pp. 33-34.
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formalities and the establishment of a zone where all disabilities re­
sulting from the customs frontier would be removed. Also, the Authori­
ties recognized that steps should be taken to insure that the same indi­
viduals were not taxed in both Territories for the same reasons. To 
assist cultural unity they would introduce English into the primary and 
secondary schools of French Togoland and French into the primary schools 
of British Togoland, A university fund would be established to give 
especially qualified students an opportunity to study in the institu­
tions of higher learning in either of the Territories, Such steps would 
help relieve difficulties created by the border and by dual administra­
tion.^^
The British and French program, presented in their joint docu­
ment, culminated with the statement that they would establish a standing 
consultative commission to handle Ewe affairs. The commission, under 
the joint chairmanship of the Gold Coast Governor and the Commissaire de 
la République of French Togoland, would consist of two representatives 
from each Territory, The commission's task would be to secure the coor­
dination and the necessary impetus needed to carry out programs suggested 
by the British and French, To insure that adopted programs covered all 
spheres affecting the well-being and progress of the Territories' 
peoples, the British and French would see that periodic discussions were 
held between technical officers of the two Territories and between local 
administering officers from each side of the frontier. Whenever appro­
priate, African representatives would be invited to participate in these
l^ibid,, pp. 3^-35.
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discussions. Effective action by the standing consultative commission, 
Britain and France believed, would remove the difficulties created by 
the frontier and guarantee the Togoland people all the advantages which 
in the past had been significant in their advancement.^^
A little over a week before a representative from the All-Ewe 
Conference was designated to speak before the Council, another native 
group entered the picture with the purpose of disavowing the petitions 
sent by the All-Ewe Conference and its forthcoming oral petition. The 
pro-French, status quo Parti Togolaise du Progrès informed the Trustee­
ship Council that the All-Ewe Conference delegate enroute to the United 
Nations represented only a single party and had no mandate from the 
population. The delegate, Sylvanus Olympio, was solely a representative 
of the Ewe petitioners and was not qualified to speak on behalf of the 
majority of French Togolanders,
The Parti Togolaise du Progrès further said that the Ewes were 
only a small minority among all the tribes forming the population of 
Togoland; actually it was the Parti Togolaise du Progrès which repre­
sented the majority of the people. As a representative of the majority 
it approved of the Franco-British memorandum with its plan for a joint 
commission rather than any type of unification. The establishment of an 
Ewe state, the party stated, would lead to the disintegration of Togo­
land, The only legitimate unification was of the two Togolands.
l^ibid.. pp. 35-36.
British and French Togoland i Petitions from the Togoland 
Progress Party Dated 29 November 19^7 and 6 December 19^7. U.N. Doc. T/ 
Pet76/8, T/Pet,7/lO (Lake Success: 194?), p. 2. (R.M.)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
33
However, this was not practical, French Togoland would suffer from uni­
fication with the underdeveloped British Togoland. The only time Togo­
land unification would be desirable was when the two Territories had 
achieved a high enough degree of economic, political and social maturity 
to enable them to manage their own affairs.
On the eighth of December 19^7, Sylvanus Olympio spoke before 
the Trusteeship Council as the oral petitioner for the All-Ewe Confer­
ence. He told the Council that the Ewes were a very sizable population 
in Togoland and the Gold Coast, numbering about one million (the British 
and French estimate was 800,000— see page twenty-nine), and their impor­
tance should not be disregarded, Olympio said the Ewes' difficulties 
began with the first division of their area between the Gold Coast and 
German Togoland. Although the Volta River formed a natural boundary be­
tween the Gold Coast tribes and the Ewes, the boundary had not followed 
the Volta River all the way to the coast, but had jagged across the 
river to include in the Gold Coast Ewe peoples on the eastern side. The 
British and French had done nothing to right this when they acquired 
Togoland, but had further divided the Ewes by a British-French Togoland 
boundary. Even though protests were made when the Ewes learned about 
the intended division, the two powers went right ahead with the plan, 
Olympio noted that in the years afterwards the Permanent Mandates Com­
mission had had to deal with many problems created by the frontier.
Togoland under British Administration and Togoland under 
French Administration: Petition from the Togoland Progress Party Dated
29 November 1947. U.N, Doc, T/Pet,6/10. T/Pet.?/12 (Lake Success: 194?),
pp. 3-5. (R.M.)
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Moreover, the press and the public had often criticized the boundary 
line on the grounds that it was not based on natural considerations such 
as language, race, and local customs.
At the present time agitation for unification of Eweland was be­
coming more and more intense, he said. During World War II difficulties 
had arisen between the French and British governments, and contact be­
tween Ewes living in the British and French zones had become very diffi­
cult and sometimes impossible— especially from 1940 to 1942. This state 
of affairs had finally culminated in the creation of the All-Ewe Confer-
Of)ence, backed by Ewe peoples in all territories.
Turning his attention to the joint memorandum submitted by the 
French and British, Olympio challenged many of the comments made by the 
Administering Authorities. They had said that a separate Ewe state 
would mean "Balkanization" of Togoland. He said he agreed to the need 
for larger groupings and this made it essential that the Ewe country 
should not remain split into three parts.
On the subject of the adverse effect of unification on other 
tribes he said that it was true there were important tribes in northern 
Togoland which were ethnologically different from the Ewes. However, 
their population was only 600,000 (the British and French estimated
^^"Consideration of Petitions Presented," Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records. Second Session: First Part. 11th Meeting, 8 December
1947, no. 3 3, pp. 320-22.
^Qlbid.. p. 324.
Zllbid.. pp. 323-26.
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about 73 0,000)22 ^nd they would undoubtedly enjoy living together under 
one administration. However, this was a hypothetical consideration any­
way, for all the Ewes wanted was the unification of Eweland, not Togo­
land, ̂3
Referring to the recommendations of the Administering Authori­
ties in their joint memorandum, Olympio said his people found them hope­
lessly inadequate, though it did appear that the Administering Authori­
ties sincerely wanted to help them. He noted that the customs barrier 
between French and British Togolands was one of the greatest stumbling 
blocks in international trade and commerce, so important in the develop­
ment of a country. The customs barrier also affected social, cultural 
and religious contacts. While the joint memorandum mentioned removal of 
the customs barrier, no date had been proposed for such an action,
Olympio also was critical of the memorandum for its failure to 
make any specific mention of the necessity for harmonizing the adminis­
trative machinery and the differing methods of administration which he 
believed "in all cases should recognize native institutions,"25
Lastly, he found the proposal in the joint memorandum for a 
standing consultative commission inadequate. The commission was given 
no power to consider the integration of affairs outside the economic and 
cultural sphere. Further, the manner in which the two representatives
22ibid.. 13th Meeting, 10 December 1947, no, 35, pp. 397-98. 
25lbid.. 11th Meeting, 8 December 1947, no. 33, p. 324. 
24ibid,. pp. 326-2 7.
25ibid.. p. 327,
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of the inhabitants were to be chosen for the commission was not defined* 
Moreover, the permanent secretariat of the commission, whose job would 
be to coordinate the efforts of the two Administrations, was to be ap­
pointed by the two governments without deference to the wishes of the 
Ewe people. The whole idea of a standing consultative commission,
Olympio felt, was a makeshift solution that did not meet the basic prob­
lems, For the Ewe people to have true and orderly progress they must 
have a common educational system, the same political organization 
throughout the land, and economic unity. These could only be brought 
about through the complete unification of Eweland under one administra­
tion,^^
The Trusteeship Council gave serious consideration to Olympio's 
speech and questioned him in detail on such subjects as the All-Ewe Con­
ference's views on government, health, education, economics, unification, 
population, tribal groups and so on. Olympio conceded that health 
facilities were not at a disadvantage due to being under two systems, 
but conversely he felt that the diametrically opposed educational sys­
tems tended to divide the country further and were not desirable. He 
restressed the economic handicap imposed by the French-British Togoland 
boundary. Boundary regulations prevented movement from one area to the 
other without a passport, and currency and exchange controls prevented 
a man from working in one Territory and supporting his family residing 
in the other. There were also restrictions on the shipment of some
26lbid.. pp. 327-28,
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goods across the border and the prohibition of others.^7
In view of his earlier demand for a unified Eweland, Olympio 
made a surprising comment on unification. He said the All-Ewe Confer­
ence accepted the suggestion by the Administering Powers that there 
would be no great advantage in cutting Eweland from the rest of Togoland. 
It would rather have a united Togoland under one administration, includ­
ing that part of the Gold Coast occupied by the Ewes.^® This was an 
evident political maneuver on the part of Olympio to gain support from 
Trusteeship Council members who might fear the detrimental effect of Ewe 
unification upon the remaining area of the Togoland Territories, for the 
All-Ewe Conference continued to favor Ewe unification as opposed to Togo­
land unification until 1952.^^
Olympio was not questioned about his change in policy on Ewe 
unification, but was asked instead why he thought Britain would allow 
part of the Gold Coast colony to be included in a united Togoland. He 
said that his people had such a good relationship with the United King­
dom Government that they thought the British might be persuaded to give 
up that part of the Gold Coast occupied by the Ewes as a means of bring­
ing all Ewes under one administration.^^
The Trusteeship Council was not fully convinced of the necessity
27lbid.. pp. 331-33.
28lbid.. pp. 337-38.
Togoland," James S. Coleman, International Conciliation. Sep­
tember 1956, p. 3 3.
"Consideration of Petitions Presented," op. cit.. 12th Meeting, 
9 December 1947, no. 34, p. 348.
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for any type of unification. For example, the United States representa­
tive asked Olympio if the removal of present economic barriers by a cus­
toms union would not overcome economic difficulties ; and the New Zealand 
delegate did not feel that the Council could form any opinion until they 
had heard more from the Administering Powers and from peoples which the 
All-Ewe Conference did not represent.
After the questioning of Olympio was concluded, members of the 
Council questioned the Administering Authorities in great detail. Much 
of the discussion centered upon the division of the two Togolands. In 
answer to queries, the Administering Authorities explained that it was 
necessary that exchange controls be maintained at the present time be­
cause of differences in the economies, but hoped the necessity for re­
strictions would soon d i s a p p e a r , 32
Concerning tribal unity, they felt it was regrettable that it 
had not been preserved, but no serious crisis had been caused by the 
frontier in the past because it had not constituted a barrier. It was 
the control of French Togoland by the Vichy Government which had created 
difficulties, this and the natural hardships brought on by World War II. 
The nature and origin of these hardships were economic and social and 
not at all political.33
Questioned on Ewe nationalism, the British and French said it 
was an elite-originated movement that had secured support from the
3^Ibid.. 11th Meeting, 8 December 19^7, no. 33, pp. 338-39. 
3^Ibid.. 12th Meeting, 9 December 19^7, no. 3̂ , p. 351. 
33ibid., pp. 353-54.
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masses because of economic and social dissatisfaction. Surprisingly, 
they felt that it was more than a local nationalist movement and was 
part of a great spirit of political exultation which had taken place 
throughout Africa since the war. But their opinion, particularly that 
of the French, was that feelings were mixed in Togoland at the present 
time and it would be dangerous to choose any particular current as the 
main stream and pursue a policy favorable only to this current.
The British and French thought the suggestions in their joint 
memorandum would dispel the strong nationalist movement by doing away 
with many of the conditions resulting from the frontier and by bringing 
the Ewe people in closer contact with each other. They argued that the 
standing consultative commission, suggested in the memorandum, would not 
be just an economic, social and cultural commission as Olympio foresaw 
it, but would also be political. After all, it would have the power to 
implement the program and exert influence on the two Administrations in 
order to insure adherence to the program. Pressing the point further, 
the Administering Authorities emphasized that the commission would be 
representative. They assured the Trusteeship Council and the All-Ewe 
Conference that the Ewe population would be fully represented on the 
commission by their own people. For example, the French Togoland repre­
sentatives would be chosen from the natives who were officers of the 
Representative Assembly of French T o g o l a n d . O f  course this raised the 
question of what would happen if the Ewes lost their majority in the
3^Ibid.. pp. 354-5 6. 
35ibid.. p. 358.
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Representative Assembly, a point not considered by the Trusteeship Coun­
cil. Would non-Ewes sit on the consultative commission then?
The Administering Authorities' conclusion was that it would be 
foolish to change administrations for one of the Territories, the neces­
sary result of unifying the Territories under British or French adminis­
tration, They were referring to Olympio's statement in which he out­
wardly abandoned the Eweland concept and said the All-Ewe Conference 
would rather have a united Togoland under one administration than cut 
Eweland away from the rest of Togoland. Changing administrations, said 
France and Britain, would mean a change for one Territory in the offi­
cial language and in administrative techniques. Besides, the French 
representative added, the questions of frontiers and unification lay 
outside the competence of the Trusteeship Council,
France was quite concerned about unification, for it stood to 
lose a larger and better developed area than Britain, particularly under 
the concept of Togoland unification. And while the All-Ewe Conference 
had not stated which Administering Authority it would prefer, the major­
ity of Ewes probably favored British administration. Under British ad­
ministration, even if Britain refused to relinquish the Ewe areas of the 
Gold Coast, which was likely, all Ewes would still be under one control.
The feelings of the Trusteeship Council members on the various 
arguments and proposals differed considerably. The reaction of the anti- 
colonialistic American representative, Gerig, was predictable. He felt 
that the frontier was not very defensible and disagreed strongly with
36ibid.. pp. 370-71.
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the French contention that the questions of frontiers and unification 
were outside the consideration of the Trusteeship Council. He noted 
that on two occasions the Mandates Commission had made recommendations 
in reference to the frontiers and the mandatory powers had followed 
them. He could not see that the Trusteeship Council had any less author­
ity than the Permanent Mandates Commission had had.^? He accepted the 
proposals of the British and French, but as steps toward ultimate unifi­
cation.^
The Chinese representative said his records showed that the 
frontier between the two Togolands had been drawn arbitrarily and he 
wondered why nothing had been done to correct this. He said that the 
longer separate administrations were maintained, the more difficult it 
would be for the people to advance toward unification. He thought a 
possible solution might be the joint administration of T o g o l a n d .
The Iraqi delegate was quite irritated about the whole division 
problem. He wanted to know why it was that the Togolese at large had 
not been consulted on the division of Togoland, particularly as protests 
and objections had been going on since 1884. He wondered if military 
strength gave the right to a power to impose partition on a country and 
disregard the wishes and aspirations of the population. Did this con­
stitute a right in international law? He doubted that the Administering
^^Ibid.. 13th Meeting, 10 December 1947, no. 35, P* 389. 
^®Ibid., 12th Meeting, 9 December 194?, no. 3̂ , p. 379. 
39lbid.. pp. 368-7 3.
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Authorities' plan would satisfy the aspirations of the p o p u l a t i o n .
The Belgian representative took a much more moderate position.
He did not think that a frontier necessarily meant a barrier. Secondly, 
he thought that consideration had to be given to the non-Ewe peoples of 
Togoland. He believed that the Trusteeship Council should support the 
Administering Powers in their intention to put an end to the genuine 
frontier difficulties.^^
The delegate from the Philippines was concerned about the two 
distinct educational systems and felt a single educational system would 
go far in bringing about unity,
The New Zealand representative took a position much the same as 
that of the United States, but slightly more radical. He was grateful 
for the proposals put forth by the British and French, but did not think 
they could be regarded as a final step. In his view they were merely a 
"palliative,
Forsyth of Australia frankly favored the Administering Authori­
ties' proposals. He believed that great weight should be given to the 
advice of Britain and France who would naturally have a long-standing 
knowledge of the people, their problems and their capacities. He 
thought they had presented a practical attack to the problem, but wished
^^Ibid.. 13th Meeting, 10 December 194?, no, 35. pp. 400-02. 
^^Ibid.. pp. 408-10.
42lbid.. p. 394.
43lbid.. pp. 412-14.
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that they had expressed a more positive tone.^
The Mexican delegate felt the matter could not be decided until 
the first Visiting Mission had had a chance to travel through Togoland 
and to present its findings.One of the designated powers of the 
Trusteeship Council is to provide for "periodic visits /by United Na­
tions' missions^ to the respective trust territories at times agree upon 
with the administering authority.
In view of the conflicting opinions among the Council members, 
it was obvious that there would probably be difficulty in arriving at a 
solution that would be satisfactory to most of the members. As was nor­
mal procedure, once discussion was completed the matter was referred to 
a drafting committee on resolutions. At this time the committee was com­
posed of the Trust Powers of Australia and the United States and two 
non-Trust Powers, Iraq and China.
When the draft resolution was presented to the main body of the 
Trusteeship Council, disagreement broke out over two major points. The 
first of these concerned the frontier: had it been a hardship to the
Ewes since the beginning of World War II, or for a more enduring period 
of time? The French and British argued that the hardships had existed 
only a short time, but the majority disagreed and overruled the
^ Ibid.. p. 418.
45lbid.. p. 390.
^ Yearbook of the United Nations. 1946-47. Dept, of Public In­
formation, U.N, Doc. 1947.1 .1 8 (Lake Success: 1947), pp. 840-41.
"Consideration of Petitions Presented," op. cit.. 13th Meet­
ing, 10 December 1947, no. 35, P» 423.
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Administering Authorities on this i s s u e , I t  was important to Ol̂ nmpio 
that they did. Part of his appeal for unification of some kind was 
based on the contention that the boundary had long been a source of dis­
content.
The second point of discord concerned the formulation of the 
standing consultative commission suggested by the British and French in 
their original joint memorandum. The draft resolution,as it came out 
of committee, followed the outlined proposals for the commission made in 
the memorandum, which left the native representatives to the commission 
without any power. In part the proposals said that to insure that the 
program of cooperation between the two Territories covered all spheres 
affecting the well-being and progress of the peoples it would be neces­
sary to organize periodic discussions between technical officers of the 
two Territories and periodic meetings of the local administrative offi­
cers from each side of the frontier. The two native representatives 
from each side would be invited to participate in these discussions and 
meetings "whenever appropriate,"^^ This meant that the commission's 
power lay in the hands of the British and French who would apparently 
direct matters and call in the native representatives if they should 
feel it necessary.
^®Ibid,, 17th Meeting, 17 December 1947, no. 4 5, pp. 555-60.
^^Proposed Draft Resolution Concerning Togoland under British 
Administration and Togoland under French Administration. U.N. Doc. T/91 
(Lake Success: 1947). (R.M.)
"Ewe Petitions: Observations Submitted by the Governments of
France and the United Kingdom," op. cit.. p. 35.
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When the draft resolution following the Administering Authori­
ties' concepts came out of committee it was challenged by a majority of 
the delegates to the Trusteeship Council. They felt that the native 
representatives should not be mere figureheads, but should "normally" 
take part in discussions between technical officers and in periodic 
meetings between the local administrative officials, rather than to be 
invited when the Administering Authorities felt it was appropriate.^^
The final version of the Trusteeship Council resolution was not 
a real victory for any one group attempting to influence the Council; 
however, if anything, it did give more weight to the suggestions of the 
Administering Authorities than to the demands of the All-Ewe Conference. 
This was logical. Britain and France had shown a willingness to take 
action on the Ewe complaints and had come forth with a fairly comprehen­
sive program. These factors weighed in their favor. However, the All- 
Ewe Conference was successful in creating an awareness of the Ewe prob­
lem and in attaining action on the part of the Trusteeship Council and 
the Administering Authorities that was not a rejection of the unifica­
tion concept.
An examination of the Trusteeship Council resolution reveals 
fairly clearly the relative influences of the All-Ewe Conference and the 
Administering Authorities of Britain and France in their interaction 
upon the Trusteeship Council, though it does not indicate what influence, 
if any, the Parti Togolaise du Progrès had on the Council at this time.
^^"Consideration of Petitions Presented," op. cit.. 17th Meet­
ing, 15 December 1947, no, 45, p. 5&0.
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In essence the resolution said the following: the Trusteeship Council
is aware that the petitions of the All-Ewe Conference represent the 
wishes of the majority of the Ewe population. The Council realizes that 
the existing frontiers dividing the Ewe people have been a cause of real 
difficulty to them and have aroused resentment on their part. The Coun­
cil welcomes the measures proposed by the Administering Authorities and 
considers them as representing an earnest and constructive initial ef­
fort to meet the immediate difficulties described in the Ewe petitions. 
It recommends that the British and French foster the association and co­
operation of the Ewe people. The two should assist the Ewes in develop­
ing their capacity for self-government through free discussion among 
themselves and increased opportunities for education. In the future, 
the Trusteeship Council wants a more precise statement of the proposed 
measures to be undertaken. It asks that the Administering Authorities 
consult with each other and with Ewe representatives with a view toward 
developing further measures for fulfilling the wishes of the Ewe people. 
In conclusion, the first Visiting Mission should devote special atten­
tion to the Ewe problem and toward measures to cope with the problem,
The resolution shows that the Council accepted the proposals of the Ad­
ministering Authorities generally, but with the reservations that they 
must relieve the situation so far as possible and that these were only 
preliminary steps toward a solution of the Ewe problem.
^ "Petitions Concerning the Trust Territories of Togoland under 
British Administration and Togoland under French Administration,” Res, 
14 (II), Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Second Session. Supple­
ment. no, 1 (1947-48), pp. 3-6,
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The All-Ewe Conference had been given an opportunity to plead 
its case, but the Conference had been far from victorious. The majority 
of Trusteeship Council members were impressed by the All-Ewe Confer­
ence's unification plea, which they felt was representative of the dis­
satisfaction among the greater majority of the Ewe people. But there 
was no strong indication that the Trusteeship Council considered either 
Ewe or Togoland unification as necessarily the answer. Conversely, 
there was no indication that it was willing to accept completely the 
proposals put forth by Britain and France; those proposals were regarded 
rather as steps toward an ultimate solution. The predominant feeling 
among Council members was that no final decision could be made on Ewe or 
Togoland unification until more information was secured. The most ef­
fective method for the Council to get information on conditions in the 
Trusteeship Territories was through the use of visiting missions, which 
the Council was empowered to send periodically at times agreed upon with 
the Administering Authorities concerned,
Until such a time that the first Visiting Mission to the Togo­
land Territories had made its visit and presented its findings, the 
Trusteeship Council would not take any further steps. This resulted in 
a considerable delay. It was some time before the Council determined 
what member nations of its body should be represented on the four-man 
mission. It was another year before the Mission which was also sched­
uled to visit the Cameroons was sent, A mission was already slated to
"The Trusteeship Council Including the United Nations Func­
tions under Chapter XI of the Charter," loc. cit.
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visit Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi during 1 9 4 8 , and the weather in 
West Africa was bad for traveling during the early part of 1949. In 
November of that year the Mission finally left for West Africa and vis­
ited the Togoland Trust Territories during D e c e m b e r . 55 it was in July 
of 1950, or more than two and one half years since its considerations in 
December of 194?, that the Council pondered the question of unification 
for a second time,5^
The delay gave opponents of the unification concepts an oppor­
tunity to organize and marshal their forces, which was only short of 
disastrous from the viewpoint of, the All-Ewe Conference. At the same 
time, a strong movement for Togoland unification developed during the 
two and one half years, also weakening the All-Ewe Conference's position 
in favor of Ewe unification. This was a position which it continued to 
maintain until 1952 despite Olympic's speech encompassing the larger 
prospect of Togoland unification including the Ewe areas of the Gold 
Coast,
When the Trusteeship Council did reopen the Togoland unification 
question, the situation was quite altered and much more confused as the 
Council was confronted by an increased number of native parties and
5^"Arrangements for a Periodic Visiting Mission to Trust Terri­
tories in Africa (1948) (T/?2)," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. 
Second Session; First Part. 6th Meeting, 1 December 194?, no. 19,
p. 110.
55«Arrangements for a Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in 
West Africa: Item 5 of the Agenda," Trusteeship Council, Official Re­
cords. Fourth Session, 5th Meeting, 28 January 1949, no. 17, pp. 59-60.
5^"Examination of Petitions," Trusteeship Council, Official Re­
cords. Seventh Session. 1950.
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organizations with dissimilar demands. From amongst these demands and 
with apparent dependency upon the Mission's report, the Trusteeship 
Council arrived upon a new decision affecting the evolutionary processes 
in British and French Togolands,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III
THE DECISION FOR AN ENLARGED CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
At the second session of the Trusteeship Council, which was held 
in December of 19^7, the All-Ewe Conference of British and French Togo­
lands and the Gold Coast attempted to convince the Trusteeship Council 
that unification of the Ewe tribal areas was essential. It was unsuc­
cessful, However, the way was held open for some kind of unification in 
the future, dependent partly on the findings of a first Visiting Mission 
to be sent to West Africa.
As a mission was already scheduled to visit East Africa in 1948, 
the West African Mission was delayed until 1949. During 1949 it was 
again delayed, this time by weather conditions, and it was not until 
November of that year that the Mission departed. It toured the Togoland 
Territories during December and thereafter submitted its report, which 
was considered during the Trusteeship Council's summer session of 1950. 
At this time the whole unification question was reopened.
The Council was confronted by a multiplicity of native forces, 
each hoping to influence the United Nations. The All-Ewe Conference's 
use of the Trusteeship Council in 194? in an effort to secure Ewe unifi­
cation had made Togoland unificationists and anti-unificationists aware 
of the United Nations' position as a powerful force in the future of the
50
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two Trust Territories, The two and one-half years between the Council's 
unification considerations of 19^7 and 1950 gave them ample time to de­
velop cohesive programs for promoting their concepts.
With the Administering Authorities of Britain and France, the 
native groups formed a strong interacting element affecting the United 
Nations, It was very evident by 1950 that the increased role which the 
United Nations played in the future of the world's trust territories, as 
compared to the role which the League of Nations had played in the fu­
ture of the mandates, was having its effect upon the political activity 
of the natives in the Togoland Trust Territories, They saw in the 
United Nations an opportunity to promote their own concepts for the fu­
ture of the two territories and worked actively toward this end.
The pressure applied by the tribal groups and the Administering 
Authorities upon the Trusteeship Council as the major body concerned 
with trusteeship affairs in 1950, along with the findings of the United 
Nations Mission to West Africa, resulted in a new decision for Togo­
land' s unification problem. It was decided that the Standing Consulta­
tive Commission established to solve boundary problems in the Ewe areas 
should become a Togoland commission with enlarged powers and membership,^ 
The first Visiting Mission to West Africa, upon whose findings 
the Council was dependent, was chosen by the Council and consisted of 
representatives of the United States, Iraq, Mexico and Belgium,^
^"Examination of Petitions," Trusteeship Council, Official Re­
cords. Seventh Session. 2?th Meeting, 14 July 1950, p. 238,
^"Continuation of the Discussion of Arrangements for a Visiting 
Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa: Item 5 on the Agenda,"
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Belgium and the United States represented those countries which adminis­
tered trust territories and Iraq and Mexico those that did not. This 
composition was significant, for with the exception of Belgium, each 
country participating in the Mission had shown itself to be sympathetic 
to the Ewe cause. Khalidy of Iraq, who was the Mission chairman,^ had 
been particularly active in his support of Ewe unification.
It was unfortunate that the Mission was scheduled to leave in 
November. Besides visiting British and French Togolands, the Mission 
also had to visit the Cameroons. Thus it was given only twenty days 
to travel through both Togoland Territories in order to finish before 
Christmas,^ Normally, visits to a trust territory have averaged about 
three weeks. Within the twenty days the first Visiting Mission was 
supposed to make a thorough study of the "political, economic, social 
and educational conditions," to pay particular attention to the "peti­
tions relating to the Ewe problem, " and to "investigate on the spot 
. . . petitions dealing with the conditions of the indigenous inhabit­
ants. While Togoland is not large, 33,700 square miles,^ it was
Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Fifth Session. 42nd Meeting, 21 
March 1949, no. 88, p. 545.
^Ibid., p. 549.
^"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Terri­
tories in West Africa," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Seventh 
Session. Supplement, no, 2 (1951), P. I.
^"Terms of Reference for the United Nations Visiting Mission to 
Trust Territories in West Africa," Res. 108 (V), Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records. Fifth Session. Supplement, no. 1 (1949), pp. 14-15.
^L, Dudley Stamp, Africa: A Study in Tropical Development (New
York: John l&ley and Sons, Inc., 1953), p. 333.
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impossible for the Visiting Mission to make a thorough study of all 
these problems in the short time allotted.
Considering the volume of work assigned, the Mission's "Special 
Report on the Ewe problem"? was surprisingly complete. It had two weak­
nesses, however, both indicative of the Mission's need for more time to 
conduct the survey. The report necessarily depended largely on French 
and British materials, which may or may not have been accurate, and on 
the petitions received, which may or may not have been representative of 
the attitudes of the population.
One of the first concerns of the Visiting Mission in its report 
on the Togoland Trust Territories was the work of the Standing Consulta­
tive Commission, This Commission had been established in 1948 to secure 
the necessary cooperation and impetus needed to carry out programs sug­
gested by the British and French to relieve conditions created by the 
British-French Togoland border, which was reputed to have injured the 
economy, cultural unity and political structure of the Ewe tribal na­
tion.® Though the Ewes sent two representatives from each of the Terri­
tories, the Commission was mainly a meeting place where technical offi­
cers consulted each other and local administrative officers met to con­
sider plans of action. While the Ewe representatives to the Commission 
took part in these meetings and consultations, they had no power to see
?"Reports on the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Terri­
tories in West Africa," op. cit.. pp. 72-85.
®"Ewe Petitions: Observations Submitted by the Governments of
France and the United Kingdom," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. 
Second Session; First Part. Supplement (194?), p. 25.
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that the Administering Authorities implemented the very programs they 
had promised. The Mission's report indicated that while the Commission 
was operating well as a coordinating body, the British and French had 
not initiated all the programs which the two powers had originally 
spoken of and others were only partially carried out, thereby limiting 
the areas in which the Commission could work.
The British and French had spoken of removing as many as possi­
ble of the obstacles which hindered the movement of individuals and 
goods across the border. While they had relaxed restrictions to the 
point where a resident of one Territory farming in the adjoining Terri­
tory was permitted to export foodstuffs produced on his farm without 
payment of duty if he had a certificate of permission, the governments 
maintained the right to restrict or prohibit the export of foodstuffs in 
time of shortage. When the first Visiting Mission made its tour, the 
export of cattle, sheep, goats, pigs and maize was absolutely prohibited. 
Further, persons traveling from one zone to the other were required to 
declare and possibly submit to an examination all produce and other 
articles they were importing or exporting.9 It was obvious that many of 
the hindrances to the movement of individuals and goods across the 
boundary still existed. The Ewe representatives wanted it understood 
that they ultimately sought the complete removal of the customs barri­
er.
^"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Ter­
ritories in West Africa," op. cit.. pp. 73-74.
lOlbid.. p. 74.
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As a second step toward relieving border difficulties, the Brit­
ish and French had suggested that eventually a conventional zone should 
be established along part of the border, designed to remove all disabili­
ties resulting from a customs frontier. The Ewe delegates to the Com­
mission pressed for early implementation of a conventional zone,^^ but 
it seemed that the Administering Authorities were not willing to imple­
ment it in the foreseeable future.
While the British and French had not made promises to ease ex­
change control, the four Ewe native representatives to the Joint Con­
sultative Commission felt some steps should be taken in this direction. 
They believed that the continuation of currency and exchange control had 
caused considerable inconvenience in the transfer of proceeds from the 
sale of crops, and laborers had a difficult time returning across the 
border with money they had earned in the other Territory. The Adminis­
tering Authorities agreed to initiate some changes in the exchange con­
trol system to make the situation more amenable.
The Administering Authorities were true to their promise of 
mitigating the incident of double taxation, though there were still some 
taxation problems. In his 19^7 oral petition to the Trusteeship Coun­
cil, Sylvanus Olympic of the All-Ewe Conference had complained of taxa­
tion by both the British and French of natives who worked in both Terri­
tories. Now the Administering Authorities issued instructions to the 
effect that receipts for personal tax in one Territory provided
lllbld.. p. 75. 
IZlbid.. pp. 74-75.
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exemption from payment of the corresponding tax in the other Territory. 
However, some tax problems still existed such as the difference between 
types of taxation, rates, and methods of collection in the two Territo­
ries.
The British and French completely failed to carry out their pro­
gram of closer educational cooperation between the two Territories, 
which was to center around programs of mass education, scholarships, the 
exchange of pupils and teachers, and the use of the native tongues in 
teaching. No scholarships had been awarded, no exchange of teachers had 
taken place and the French Commissaire practically rejected any teaching 
of the native tongues, saying that experiments in the extended use of 
the vernaculars had yielded disappointing results.There was no men­
tion of teaching French in British Togoland or English in the French 
Territory, another idea originally suggested by the Administering 
Authorities in order to bring the two Territories closer together.
The areas in which the British and French had made the most 
progress were in the equalization of postal, telephone and telegraph 
rates, establishment of agricultural and veterinary cooperation, coor­
dination of traffic regulations and the development of mutual coopera­
tion in medicine and health,These were mainly technical fields and 
specialized areas where the technical and administrative officers who 
met at the Standing Consultative Commission could work together without
^3ibid,. pp. 75-76, 
l^ibid,. p, 76. 
l̂ lbid.
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conflicting with the policies of the British and French governments.
In those fields of most significance for bringing the Territo­
ries closer together, such as the coordination of education systems, 
and the removal of boundary restrictions and exchange control, the Ad­
ministering Authorities showed a reluctance to make major changes, 
though some had been promised. It was evident that the British and
French were not willing to give full-hearted support to those measures
which they had said would remove the difficulties created by the fron­
tier, and were supposed to guarantee the peoples all the advantages of
"greatest importance to their advancement in the social, political, eco­
nomic and educational f i e l d s . S u c h  proposals, if enacted, could be 
construed as preliminary steps toward eventual Togoland unification, 
which both countries felt would be contrary to their own interests. 
Therefore, they had limited the realms in which the Commission could 
implement the programs of cooperation originally suggested by the Admin­
istering Authorities,
The first Visiting Mission made several observations concerning 
the major organizations of the two Territories. It found that there 
were four significant groups on the political scene at that time : the
All-Ewe Conference, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, the Togoland Union
Party and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès. Of these, the All-Ewe Confer­
ence and the closely allied Comité de l'Unité Togolaise held to the con­
cept of Ewe unification under one Administering Authority, which they
"Ewe Petitions: Observations Submitted by the Governments of
France and the United Kingdom," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. 
Second Session: First Part. Supplement (194?), p. 36.
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suggested should be chosen by a vote of the p e o p l e . T h i s  was a strong 
coalition, for the All-Ewe Conference was a cultural organization with a 
large membership among Ewes in the Togoland Trust Territories and the 
Gold Coast, while the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was the major politi­
cal party in French Togoland,
The Togoland Union Party, the major party of British Togoland, 
continued to support Togoland unification as it had since its conception 
in 19^3 . The Mission explained that this party adhered to Togoland uni­
fication rather than Ewe unification because many of its members were 
not Ewes, but belonged to the Buem tribe. These natives, for fear of 
domination by the Ewes, were also against any unification of Togoland 
which might include the Ewes of the Gold Coast.
The last of the major parties which were active in Togoland 
affairs at this time was the Parti Togolaise du Progrès of southern 
French Togoland, This party's views had altered somewhat since 19^7 
when it asked for the continuation of French administration in French 
Togoland and had rejected any form of unification until the Territories 
had developed considerably more economic, political and social maturity. 
Some of its members now said they were not against immediate unification 
under French administration,^^
In its report the first Visiting Mission also discussed the
"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Ter­
ritories in West Africa," op. cit.. p. 77.
^Qlbid.. pp. 77-78.
l^Ibid.. p. 7 8.
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petitions it had received. It said that the large majority of those on 
the subject of unification favored either a unified Eweland or a unified 
Togoland under one administration. However, there were a few requests 
for other forms ; the unification of the Tchokossi, Bassari and Konkomba 
tribes respectively, all in the North; the separate unifications of 
northern and southern Togolands; and the unification of the two Togo­
lands under the administration of the Trusteeship Council. In all, 
about seventy-five pro-unification petitions were received, almost all 
from the southern parts of the two Territories. 0̂
The Mission received only eight petitions which were specifical- 
ly opposed to unification. These were all from French Togoland where 
the Parti Togolaise du Progrès exercised some influence.
The great predominance of unification petitions was important in 
the Mission's conclusions. It seems unlikely that the Visiting Mission 
was able to get a clear picture of the population's attitude toward uni­
fication in the twenty days it traveled through both Togolands. It had 
to depend mainly upon the attitude of crowds which greeted it, quite 
possibly stimulated by agitators, and upon the petitions it received.
The large number of Ewe and Togoland unification petitions evidently im­
pressed the Mission, for its conclusions mirror closely the tone of 
these petitions. Further, the Mission devoted special attention to two 
All-Ewe Conference petitions, one on education and the other on the 
Joint Consultative Commission.
ZOlbid.. pp, 78-79. 
21lbid.. p, 84,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
The more important of these two petitions concerned the Standing 
Consultative Commission, and the Visiting Mission commented that it 
raised certain questions regarding the scope of the Commission. The 
All-Ewe Conference complained that the Administering Authorities were no 
longer using the Consultative Commission for its original purpose of 
dealing with the Ewe problem and satisfying the "legitimate claims and 
aspirations of the Ewe people." Instead, they had decided to call the 
Commission the "Consultative Commission for Togoland Affairs" and had 
declared at the third session of the Commission that the Commission's 
frame of reference was the Trust Territories and not the Ewe area.
While the Mission did not draw any conclusion as to the questions this 
petition raised concerning the scope of the Commission, the petition 
indicates an attempt by the Administering Authorities to widen the con­
siderations of the body and perhaps its membership, thereby dissipating 
the strength of the Ewes and frustrating demands for both Ewe unifica­
tion and Togoland unification.
The conclusions which the first Visiting Mission reached from 
its investigation of the Togoland Territories were that almost impassi­
ble frontiers separated neighbors and related peoples in the Territo­
ries. The people suffered "materially and morally," and privations were 
imposed. In spite of some improvements, the different economic systems, 
exchange control, customs difficulties and other factors had caused hard­
ships for the frontier population which were not easy to bear. While 
the measures taken by the Administering Authorities were "an appreciable
ZZlbid.. p. 81.
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step forward," they were insufficient to solve the whole problem.
The Mission found that Togoland unification now had support 
among large segments of the population, though the majority of the Ewe 
people seemed to favor the formation of an Eweland comprising the south­
ern areas of the two Territories plus the Ewe districts of the Gold 
Coast. Further, the Mission found that the unification movement as a 
whole had become so strong in the South that the Mission felt it had 
gained the intensity and dimensions of a nationalistic movement, making 
it necessary that a solution be sought with urgency "in the interest of 
peace and stability in that part of the world.
These conclusions of the Visiting Mission demonstrate the belief 
it had in the popularity of the Ewe and Togoland unification concepts. 
But its judgements that the desire for unification was widespread in the 
South and must be regarded as a deeply rooted political force were 
necessarily of a subjective nature. There were certain factors to sup­
port these contentions, it is true. The Togoland Union Party of British 
Togoland, which favored Togoland unification, was the only political 
party of any significance in that Territory, and no opposition to its 
views had developed in the southern area. In French Togoland, the Ewe 
unificationist Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was the strongest party at 
the moment, though it faced strong opposition in the form of the Parti 
Togolaise du Progrès. IVhile the strength of these parties gave some 
indication that unification was popular, the final decision on its
23lbid.. p. 82.
Z^Tbid.. pp. 82-83.
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popularity had to be established by determining the people's attitudes 
through a more direct means. In the short time available to it, the 
only more direct means which the Mission had was personal contact with 
the people and petitions from them. This left the Visiting Mission open 
to influence by the politically active and vocal unificationists, which 
could easily result in a distortion of the over-all popularity of the 
unification forces.
Though the Mission believed that there was a strong desire for 
unification, it was troubled by the diverse forms of unification which 
were d e m a n d e d . ^ 5  This points out the basic problem of unification 
groups at this time. While they were well-organized and had a strong 
influence upon the United Nations, they could not agree on any one type 
of unification and dissipated their strength on conflicting requests.
The result of this lack of unity is obvious in the further con­
clusions of the first Visiting Mission. It felt that the various re­
quests for unification somehow had to be satisfied to an appreciable 
degree. If they were not, the Visiting Mission felt there was danger of 
intensified agitation, perhaps stimulated by nationalistic forces in 
neighboring territories or even outside forces of a different nature, 
which it did not define. But it appreciated the difficulty of arriving 
upon a solution for Togoland in view of demands for varying types of 
unification and the lack of interest in unification in the North, where 
in the British sector some hostility toward unification existed.
^^Ibid., p. 81. 
2 6 l b i d . . p ,  82.
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Therefore, the Mission said, it would not suggest any kind of immediate 
unification, but instead such steps which would relieve tension and at 
the same time allow for possible reconstruction of a unified Togoland at 
some future date.^7 Apparently the Mission favored Togoland unifica­
tion, though it did not say why, but its failure to promote any type of 
immediate unification can in large part be blamed directly upon the in­
ability of unificationists to unite toward one goal of unification.
The Visiting Mission suggested instead of unification, increased 
efforts to reduce or even abolish the customs barrier. Further, it 
thought the British and French should intensify their collaboration with 
a view to coordinating fiscal, economic, cultural, educational, health, 
transportation and public service policies in order to eliminate non­
political grievances of the native populations. Most important, Britain 
and France should guide the political development of their respective 
territories toward the reconstruction of a single Togoland, either as an 
independent state or as part of a larger confederation. In this process,
the Mission considered the Standing Consultative Commission a valuable
PRinstitution that should be developed further.°
Strangely enough, the Mission seemed to reject the concept of 
Ewe unification, though there was strong support for it, in favor of 
Togoland unification. There is no positive explanation for this, but 
there were objections to Ewe unification which probably affected the 
Mission's thinking. The formation of an Eweland would block the
27%bid.
28lbid.. pp. 82-83.
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hinterland of Togoland from the coast. Also, Britain showed no willing­
ness to relinquish any part of the Gold Coast to assist in the creation 
of an Eweland, Furthermore, unification was being requested by other 
tribes besides the Ewes, making it more than an Ewe movement.
As members of the Trusteeship Council, the British and French 
had an excellent opportunity to study the Mission's findings before the 
Council reopened the question of unification in July of 1950. As a re­
sult of this the Administering Authorities were able to prepare a docu­
ment based partly on the findings of the Mission and devised to fulfill 
the suggestions made by the Mission.
The British and French argued that no fundamental political 
changes could be made in the Togoland Territories at the present time. 
The Ewes and other inhabitants were far from agreeing on a political and 
administrative plan and there was divergence in the ranks of the Ewes 
themselves. Furthermore, since the publication of the Mission's report, 
representatives of the northern sections of both Togolands had expressed 
strong views against unification proposals. More important, the Visit­
ing Mission had not been able to propose any concrete answer in its re­
port. The Administering Authorities felt that these factors meant no 
further progress could be made toward a solution of Togoland's problems 
until it could be established what the native population really wanted. 
The best way of determining their wishes, Britain and France said, was 
through enlargement of the Standing Consultative Commission,which the
29Joint Observations of the Government of France and the Govern­
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the 
Special Report of the Visiting Mission Concerning the Ewe Problem, U.N.
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Mission had considered a valuable institution that needed further devel­
opment ,
The Administering Authorities proposed that an enlarged Consulta­
tive Commission would have the following responsibilities ; It would be 
charged with the task of submitting to the governments all practical 
means of satisfying the inhabitants of the two Trust Territories "within 
the framework of the British and French administrations." It would have 
the duty to advise the British and French of additional measures which 
might be taken in the fiscal, economic and cultural spheres, and in mat­
ters of education, public health, transportation and technical coopera­
tion, This would be done with a view to minimizing the inconveniences 
caused by the existence of the frontier.^0
The Administering Authorities made the further proposal in their 
joint document that an enlarged Consultative Commission should be fully 
representative of all the peoples of both Territories, so it could truly 
ascertain their wishes. Before it had merely been a commission to bring 
the Ewes of British and French Togolands closer together. The British 
and French suggested that an enlarged Consultative Commission should be 
headed by co-chairmen, the Governor of the Gold Coast and the Commis­
sioner of the Togo Republic (French Togoland). Each chairman would be 
assisted by an official vice-chairman. The Administering Authorities 
conceived of a commission body with seventeen representatives from Brit­
ish Togoland and twenty-eight representatives from French Togoland.
Doc, T/702 (Lake Success; 1950), pp. 2-3. (R.M.)
30Ibid.. p. 4.
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Fifteen of the seventeen British Togoland representatives would be 
elected by the people and the other two would be chosen by the Togoland 
Union Party and All-Ewe Conference. Twenty-six of the twenty-eight rep­
resentatives from French Togoland would be popularly elected, the other 
two chosen by the Parti Togolaise du Progrès and the Comité de l'Unité 
Togolaise.
The proposai by the British and French would completely alter 
the purpose of the Standing Consultative Commission, changing it from an 
Ewe commission to a Togoland commission. This appeared to be in line 
with the Mission's suggestions that the Administering Powers should 
guide the political development of their Territories toward the recon­
struction of Togoland and that the Standing Consultative Commission 
should be developed f u r t h e r . T h e  only fundamental difference was that 
the Administering Authorities added a restrictive clause, which provided 
that the enlarged Commission proposals designed to satisfy the aspira­
tions of the inhabitants of the two Trust Territories should be "within 
the framework of the British and French Administrations."^^ This clause 
would prevent the unification of Togoland under one administration.
Because the proposal by the British and French fulfilled most of 
the suggestions of the Visiting Mission, the two countries hoped it 
would be accepted by the Trusteeship Council without alteration. And if
31Ibid.
3^"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Ter­
ritories in West Africa," op. cit.. pp. 82-83.
^3u.N. Doc. T/70 2, op. cit.. p. 4.
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the restrictive clause were approved, they would have thwarted native 
efforts to unify the Ewe area or the two Togoland Trusteeships,
Following the publication of the Mission's reports, four politi­
cal parties and groups asked for and received the opportunity to speak 
before the Trusteeship Council when it reopened the unification question. 
Of these, the All-Ewe Conference was the first to present its arguments 
to the Council. Its representative, Sylvanus Olympic, spoke first on 
the position of the northern natives. He disagreed with the Visiting 
Mission's claim that some northerners opposed any sort of unification.
He pictured their attitude more as apathy and indifference. But whether 
this was true or not, he said, the majority of the Ewes wanted unifica­
tion and nobody could dispute this.^^
Olympic tried to smooth over the differences between his group 
which favored Ewe unification, and the Togoland Union Party which wanted 
Togoland unification. He admitted that the Togoland Union Party was 
opposed to inclusion of the Ewe people of the Gold Coast with those of 
the Togoland Territories; but he felt there was no serious divergence of 
views in that both were convinced that the Ewe people of Togoland must 
cease to be artificially divided.This was a weak argument, for while 
it now appeared that the All-Ewe Conference and the Comité de l'Unité 
Togolaise were not against Togoland unification, if it included the Ewe 
areas of the Gold Coast, they were very much opposed to Togoland
^^"Examination of Petitions," Trusteeship Council, Official Re­
cords. Seventh Session. 20th Meeting, 5 July 1950, pp. 147-48.
35lbid.. p. 148.
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unification excluding the Ewes of the Gold Coast, The Togoland Union 
Party, on the other hand, was not willing to include the Gold Coast Ewes 
in a unified Togoland, as many of its members were Buems, who feared 
domination by the Ewes, should all of them be u n i t e d . ^6
The All-Ewe Conference was vehement in its opposition to the 
Anglo-French suggestion of enlarging the Consultative Commission. It 
realized that an all-Togoland commission would probably mean the end of 
hopes for Ewe unification. Their representative, Olympic, asserted that 
the proposed enlarged Commission would have limited powers. The British 
and French said the body should have the power to determine solutions 
only within the framework of British and French administration. Thus it 
did not have the right to consider unification. Moreover, the Commis­
sion lacked political power. Lastly, the Ewe people could not agree to 
being represented as a minority on a commission which would determine 
their future. Therefore, there should be no enlarged Consultative Com­
mission. Instead, the Ewe people ought to be united under one adminis­
tration, and the northern tribes could devise their future through some 
type of standing consultative commission.^7
In his above protest against an enlarged Consultative Commis­
sion, Olympic apparently rejects Togoland unification; but it must be 
remembered that as the representative of the All-Ewe Conference, his 
first objective was Ewe unification, which the proponents of Togoland
"Reports of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Ter­
ritories in West Africa," op. cit., pp. 77-78.
^7«Examination of Petitions," op. cit.. pp. 148-49.
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unification rejected. Until Togoland unificationists showed a willing­
ness to include the Gold Coast Ewes in their unification concept, he had 
to continue to adhere exclusively to Ewe unification.
Olympio's speech became the focal point of heated debate in 
which the French delegate became angered by the opinions expressed by 
certain other delegates and even went so far as to attack verbally the 
United Nations Secretariat. He asserted that Olympio had been in direct 
contact with certain officials in the Secretariat of the United Nations 
and wanted to know who they were. Dr. Ralph Bunche, as the Acting 
Assistant Secretary General in charge of the Department of Trusteeship, 
asked if this question implied any reflection on the Secretariat of the 
United Nations. The French representative replied that it did not, but 
his assurance lacked conviction. It was obvious that the French were 
very sensitive about the unification question. 8̂
The next petitioner who spoke before the Council was Asare, 
representing the Togoland Union, British Togoland's major party. He 
confined most of his statements to the Anglo-French frontier. While the 
majority of his arguments were not new, he did place a new stress on the 
political aspects of the Togoland partition. He said that the two dif­
ferent colonial systems were defeating the legitimate political aspira­
tions of the population, who would not and could not be either British 
or French.39
Like Olympio, Asare spoke out against the concept of an enlarged
3Qlbid.. pp. 149-50. 
39jbid.. p. 150.
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Consultative Commission, He told the Council that the Commission would 
not unite Togoland. Instead of being enlarged, the present Commission 
should be dissolved, the frontier removed and a Togoland Assembly set 
up, having legislative and executive power. This would be the nucleus 
of Togoland's central government.^®
Antor, who also spoke for the Togoland Union Party, went beyond 
the demands of Asare and asked for Togoland unification under one admin­
istration, to be decided by a plebiscite. Prior to the establishment of 
such administration, he believed a constitution for a united Togoland 
should be drawn up by the Togoland people. The goal would be self- 
government in five years.
The pro-French Parti Togolaise du Progrès completely ignored the 
question of an enlarged Consultative Commission. Instead it turned to 
unification, which was denounced by its representative. He claimed that 
most of the Ewes in British Togoland were against a change in adminis­
tration as were many of the French Ewes. He said that neither Ewe nor 
Togoland unification was desirable. Ewe unification would separate the 
Ewes from the northern tribes with which the Ewes had formed a single 
administrative, cultural, social and territorial unit for two genera­
tions. Togoland unification would force another change of administra­
tion on people who had already suffered one change of administration as 
a result of World War I.^^
40ibid.. p. 151. 
4llbid.. p. 152. 
42lbid.. pp. 152-53.
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The representative of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès was sub­
jected to severe questioning after he finished his speech. The Iraqi 
delegate, who had been the chairman of the first Visiting Mission, was 
particularly sharp in his questioning. He insinuated that the Parti 
Togolaise du Progrès had gotten its funds from the French, that it had 
lied about the size of its membership, and that its members were re­
cruited principally from among the minor officials of the French admin­
istration who opposed unification because they were afraid of losing 
their posts,
The representative for the Parti Togolaise du Progrès admitted 
that a large number of his party's members were government officials, 
but he said this was also true of the other French Togoland party, the 
Comité de l'Unité T o g o l a i s e . However, his statement was inaccurate, 
for his party had a singular reputation for being composed of natives 
who held positions in the French government service or otherwise bene­
fited from the presence française.
Both Belgium and France protested the Iraqi delegate's line of 
questioning. The French delegate felt it was highly p e r s o n a l . A t  
this stage a definite division in the Council appeared between France 
and Iraq, which became more pronounced at the following meeting when the
43lbid.. p. 153.
^ Ibid.. p. 154.
•̂5"Togoland, " James S. Coleman, International Conciliation. Sep­
tember 1956, p. 5* 
46 "Examination of Petitions," op. cit.. p. 154.
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Iraqi delegate asked Garreau of France if the French government intended 
to grant self-government to the French Trust Territory. Garreau refused 
to answer this question, saying that he did not intend to be subjected 
to such questioning.The tranquility and compromising spirit which 
had characterized the Council's consideration of the unification ques­
tion in 19^7 had obviously vanished.
The last oral petitioner was Ayeva, who alleged to represent the
2i Ûchiefs and population of northern French Togoland.His group, so new 
that it still lacked an official title, was making its debut in the po­
litical arena. Later it became known as the Union des Chefs et des 
Populations du Nord Togo, which wielded almost absolute power in north­
ern French Togoland. Ayeva spoke against any form of unification. He 
said that unification necessitated two things, a single Administering 
Authority and the subjugation of the other tribes to a unified Ewe 
people. He stated that in the opinion of the northern peoples the Ewe 
movement was subversive and entailed a change in the status of the 
people of northern French Togoland which they did not want. They de­
sired to pursue their normal development under French trusteeship,
Following the oral petitions was a "question and answer" period 
during which the French representative tried his best to discredit the 
All-Ewe Conference. He told Olympic that leaders should not run the 
risk of unleashing disaster and chaos upon the country they wished to
^^Ibid.. 21st Meeting, 6 July 1950, p. I67. 
48lbid,
^^Ibid,, p. 168,
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govern. He wondered what part was being played by the Communists in the 
All-Ewe Conference movement and what connection there was between it and 
the Gold Coast Convention Movement. (He was speaking of the Convention 
People’s Party which was working for Gold Coast independence.) The 
French representative claimed that many of the leaders of that movement 
were avowed Communists.^®
Following the "question and answer" period was a period of gen­
eral discussion. Some of the Trusteeship Council members expressed 
severe criticism of the Administering Authorities' plan for an enlarged 
Consultative Commission. They were particularly critical of the clause 
that would limit the power of the enlarged body to a determination of 
the people's desires "within the framework of British and French admin­
istration." This would seem to exclude Ewe or Togoland unification.
The British representative made a direct effort to save the Ad­
ministering Authorities' plan from possible rejection. He stated that 
it had been put forth in good faith and to demonstrate this good faith 
the British and French were willing to compromise. He noted that there 
had been some concern about the limited powers of the enlarged body, 
that it could only determine the people's wishes within the framework of 
the British and French administrations. To allay such concern, the 
British and French were willing to add the words, "not precluding the 
unification of any parts of the two Trust Territories,in effect giv­
ing the enlarged Commission the power to consider unification if it
5®Ibid.. 22nd Meeting, ? July 1950, pp. 173-75. 
^Ifbid.. 24th Meeting. 11 July 1950, pp. 203-04.
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found that this was what the people wanted. This was an important com­
promise on the part of the Administering Authorities and gave their plan 
for an enlarged Consultative Commission a good chance for acceptance.
It cleared the way for unification in the future, which the majority of 
the Council was not willing to exclude as a possibility. Furthermore, 
the proposals of the British and French now seemed in line with the sug­
gestions of the Visiting Mission, a Mission with a liberal majority.
All of the native groups present before the Council agreed to 
accept the amended plan except the All-Ewe Conference. Olympic noted 
that the willingness to allow possible unification excluded any form of 
unification which would include the Ewes of the Gold Coast. As such the 
amended plan rejected his organization's hope for a unified Ewe tribe,
With only the All-Ewe Conference opposing the Franco-British
amended plan it was quickly supported by the majority of Trusteeship 
Council members. While most of them sympathized with the various unifi­
cation demands they felt that the confusion in Togoland demanded thor­
ough study, and the proposals of the Administering Authorities might 
form the basis for a just solution of the Togoland problems.
Iraq, China and the Philippines formed the opposing Council 
minority. They were against the Administering Authorities' proposals 
and believed that the Ewe people should be united under one administra­
tion as they felt this was the desire of the vast majority of Ewes.^^
52%bid.. 25th Meeting, 12 July 1950, p. 218.
^^Ibid.. 26th and 2?th Meetings, 13th and 14th of July, discus­
sion by China, Iraq and the Philippines; also see: China. Iraq and
Philippines: Amendments to the Draft Resolution Submitted by Argentina
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The final vote on the United States-Argentina resolution incor­
porating the Administering Authorities' plan for an enlarged Consulta­
tive Commission was eight to two in favor of it. Iraq and the Philip­
pines voted against the resolution, China abstained and the U.S.S.R., 
boycotting the United Nations at this time, was absent,
The resolution was a clear victory for Britain and France. It 
stated that the Trusteeship Council, after considering the report of the 
Visiting Mission, hearing the oral statements by the petitioners and 
taking note of the plan put forth by the Administering Authorities, ac­
cepted the British and French plan. The Council felt that an enlarged 
Consultative Commission, as described by the Authorities, had as its 
purpose the "real wishes and interests of the inhabitants of all parts 
of the two Trust Territories."^^ In effect, outside of Britain's and 
France's attempt in their original proposals to prevent an enlarged Con­
sultative Commission from being able to consider unification, the two 
countries had their entire program accepted by the Council.
Of course the Council was not entirely without the suspicion 
that the British and French might try to renege on some parts of the 
program. The Council said it hoped that the Administering Authorities 
would proceed along the lines they had proposed and would take the 
appropriate steps to carry forth the plan. In view of this the Council
and United States. U.N. Doc. T/L.102 (Lake Success: 1950). (R.M.)
^^Ibid.. 2?th Meeting, 14 July 1950, p. 238.
^^Argentina and United States of America: Draft Resolution.
U.N. Doc. T/L.100 (Lake Success: 1950), p. 1. (R.M.)
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wanted the British and French to inform it at the next session on the 
steps which had been taken.-56
The resolution shows what effect the interaction of the various 
forces had had upon the Trusteeship Council, so far, in determining its 
action. The activities of the unification and anti-unification forces 
had caused the first Visiting Mission to draw certain conclusions which 
affected the thinking of Trusteeship Council members. At the same time 
the Mission's conclusions had a strong influence on the Administering 
Authorities. They felt compelled to devise a plan which closely fol­
lowed the Mission's suggestions, but which excluded the possibility of
future unification. Unificationists were not satisfied with either the
Mission's report or the proposals of the British and French. Their rep­
resentatives' protests before the Council, supported by sympathetic mem­
bers of the Council, resulted in a compromise proposal by the Adminis­
tering Authorities which said that different forms of unification could 
be considered by an expanded Consultative Commission. The compromise 
made the entire Franco-British plan acceptable to the Council and all 
native representatives present, except for Olympic of the All-Ewe Con­
ference, Thus, through the interaction of political groups upon one of 
the organs of the United Nations, a new plan for the future of Togoland 
was devised and accepted, known officially as the Enlarged Standing Con­
sultative Commission.
^"Petitions Concerning the Ewe Question, Frontier Difficulties 
and the Unification of the Trust Territories of Togoland under British 
Administration and Togoland under French Administration," Res. 250 
(VII), Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Seventh Session. Supple­
ment. no. 1 (1950), p. 10.
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Of the forces involved in the Council's Togoland considerations, 
the Ewe unificationists had fared the worst as a result of the Trustee­
ship Council's resolution. The enlargement and alteration of the Con­
sultative Commission meant that it would be a Togoland commission rather 
than an Ewe commission, which almost certainly spelled defeat for the 
creation of an Ewe state. It was unlikely that non-Ewe representatives 
in the Enlarged Consultative Commission would accept the formation of a 
nation which would block the rest of Togoland from the coast.
Of course the Ewe unificationists could not place much blame for 
the Council's acceptance of the British and French plan on anyone but 
themselves and Togoland unificationists. If all the unificationists had 
been able to settle upon one type of unification demand, particularly 
Togoland unification, the outcome might have been altogether different, 
for the majority of the Council members had shown themselves to be sym­
pathetic to the unification cause and honestly concerned with finding a 
solution. As it was, the multiplicity of demands, unification demands 
particularly, left the Council confused and unwilling to make any dras­
tic alterations in the Togolands' existing situation. Under the circum­
stances the only answer seemed to be the enlargement and alteration of 
the Standing Consultative Commission.
Even though the Trusteeship Council gave its sanction to the 
creation of an expanded Consultative Commission, the future of the Com­
mission was doubtful. Its success was dependent upon three uncertain 
factors : the honesty and fairness with which the Administering Authori­
ties would conduct the election of representatives, the willingness with
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which they would implement the Commission's suggestions and the partici­
pation of the unificationists in the elections and the meetings there­
after, A failure by the Administering Authorities to do their part, or 
of the pro-unification forces to participate, would most assuredly mean 
the failure of the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IV
THE ENLARGED STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION
The Enlarged Consultative Commission was accepted by the Trus­
teeship Council in 1950 as a way of meeting the widening scope of the 
Togoland problem without rejecting the possibility of Ewe or Togoland 
unification in the future. After the All-Ewe Conference had presented 
its arguments for Ewe unification in 19^7» resulting in the establish­
ment of the Standing Consultative Commission, demands developed both for 
Togoland unification and for maintenance of the status quo. It was 
hoped that the Enlarged Consultative Commission, proposed by the French 
and British as an answer to recommendations by the first Visiting Mis­
sion, would determine what the majority of people wanted and at the same 
time suggest measures which might be taken to mitigate inconveniences 
created by Togoland's division.
The Commission was a compromise and the logical result of the 
efforts by conflicting native groups to take advantage of the important 
position which the United Nations held in trusteeship affairs, and of 
efforts by the Administering Authorities to protect their interests. 
Nevertheless, it was doomed to failure almost from the moment of its ac­
ceptance by the Council.
Its success was dependent upon the honesty and fairness with
79
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which the Administering Authorities conducted the election of repre­
sentatives to the body, their willingness to implement the Commission's 
suggestions and the participation of unificationists in the elections 
and the meetings thereafter. The methods of election became a point of 
dispute almost immediately. Numerous petitions were sent to the Trus­
teeship Council complaining about the electoral system devised by the 
French for choosing representatives and also about discrimination by 
them. The most significant of these petitions was from the Comité de 
l'Unité Togolaise of French Togoland which favored Ewe unification.^
Normally this petition would have been considered by the Trus­
teeship Council. However, the matters discussed in it were of an imme­
diate nature and the Council was not in session; therefore, the petition 
was forwarded to the General Assembly's committee on trusteeship mat­
ters, which was in session. The Fourth Committee's consideration of the 
communication began that body's gradual encroachment on the jurisdiction 
of the Trusteeship Council.
The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's petition asserted that the 
French had devised a two-stage method of choosing members for the En­
larged Consultative Commission which did not give the Comité de l'Unité
pTogolaise fair representation. For this reason the party would not 
participate in the second stage of the election. The Communication said 
that under the French system the representatives were chosen by electors.
1Petition from Mr. Augustino de Souza Concerning Togoland under 
French Administration and Togoland under British Administration. U.N. 
Doc, T/Pet,7/160, T/Pet.6 /1 9 4 (Lake Success: 1950). (R.M.)
2Ibid,. p. 2,
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who in the rural areas were selected by village chiefs. This was un­
fair, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise believed, because the chiefs had 
been selected originally by the Administration and were officials of the 
Administration, Therefore, they owed their allegiance to the French 
Government and would naturally select electors who were friendly to the 
French, The friendly electors would then choose representatives who 
were pro-French and favored the continuation of French administration. 
The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise stated that composed of such representa­
tives, the Enlarged Consultative Commission would be an organ of the Ad­
ministering Authorities.3
The party also complained about the election methods at Lome, an 
Ewe stronghold. In that city the elections were to be held in one 
stage, with a single representative chosen by popular ballot.^ The pro- 
Bwe unification party asserted that the French were trying to limit the 
voters who would choose this representative by allowing only those 
people to vote who had been able to pay their taxes in 1949 and 1950,^ 
The Comité de l’Unité Togolaise gave the election system as the 
main reason why it would not take part in the second stage of the elec­
tion in which the electors chose representatives to the Commission. 
However, the party was concerned about discrimination, too. It claimed 
that French officials were openly intervening in the electoral campaign
3lbid.
^Adden____________________________________________________
Togoland under French and under British Administration. U,N, Doc. T/Petl
dum to the Petition from Mr, Augustino de Souza Concerning
l i j b n ration. . c 
7/160, T/Pet.7/194/Add,3 (Lake Success: 1950), p, 15. (R.M.)
5lbid.. p. 5.
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and were prohibiting meetings of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, Mem­
bers had been arrested and the population was being intimidated.^
The Fourth Committee was very concerned. The charges made in 
the petition were extremely serious. Moreover, the failure of the 
Comité de l'Unité Togolaise to submit candidates for the Enlarged Con­
sultative Commission would destroy the Commission's representative na­
ture, Further the petition was discussing a problem which had already 
had an effect upon conditions in British Togoland, The unificationists 
of British Togoland, where elections had been completed, also had de­
cided not to participate,7 apparently out of sympathy for the Comité de 
l'Unité Togolaise,
Most of the members of the Fourth Committee thought the matter 
should be investigated immediately. Iraqi, Filipino, Indonesian and 
Yugoslav delegates expressed concern. The Filipino delegate, for exam­
ple, felt the matter should be immediately investigated, owing to the 
repercussions already evident. Not only was the Comité de l'Unité Togo­
laise not participating in the elections, but unificationists in British 
Togoland had decided to boycott the Commission. He believed they were 
only doing this in protest of French discrimination against the Comité 
de l'Unité Togolaise, since there were no complications in British Togo­
land, However, the situation in French Togoland and the repercussions
Addendum to the Petition from Mr, Augustino de Souza Concerning 
Togoland under French and under British Administration. U.N. Doc. T/PetT 
7/160, T/Pet,6/194/Add,2 (Lake Success; 1950), p. 2. (R.M.)
^Petition from the Togoland Union Concerning Togoland under 
French and British Administration. U.N. Doc, T/pet,o/l98, T/Pet,?/l64/ 
Add.l (Lake Success: 1951). p. 5. (R.M.)
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it was causing were serious enough to warrant a thorough investigation 
of election conditions in French Togoland.®
A draft resolution was drawn up to the effect that such an in­
vestigation should be carried out.? This was accepted by all but Bel­
gium, France and Great Britain, which abstained.The three consti­
tuted only a very small minority of the Fourth Committee which consists 
of all members of the General Assembly.The French representative 
stated that his country could not accept a resolution that was discrim­
inatory since it failed to take into consideration petitions sent by the 
anti-unification Parti Togolaise du Progrès.
The resolution was forwarded to the General Assembly and passed 
there,^3 Briefly, it said that the General Assembly wanted to impress 
upon the Administering Authorities the necessity of conducting the elec­
tion in a democratic manner in order to insure a true representation of 
the people. The resolution recommended that the French promptly
®"Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1306)," General Assembly 
(5th sess,), 4th Committee, Official Records. l6lst Meeting, 31 October
1950, pp. 115-1 7.
?India. Indonesia. Iraq. Philippines. Yugoslavia: Draft Reso­
lution. U.nT Doc. À/C.4/L.82/Rev.1 (Lake Success : 1950), (R.M.)
"Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1306)," op. cit.. l62nd 
Meeting, 31 October 1950, p. 126.
^^Yearbook of the United Nations. 1947-48. Dept, of Public In­
formation, ”lJ7Nr"Doc7T^948Tl7ÎT"nj3ikê~SÜccë^T 1948), p. 23.
^^"Report of the Trusteeship Council (A/1306)," op. cit.. l62nd 
Meeting, 31 October 1950, p. 126.
"Report of the Trusteeship Council : Report of the Fourth Com­
mittee (A/1546)," General Assembly, Official Records. Plenary Meetings. 
Fifth Session. Vol.I, 316th Meeting, 2 December 1950, p. 549.
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investigate the complaints made by the president of the Comité de 
l'Unité Togolaise and by other petitioners.^^
The French appointed a Procureur Général to conduct an investi­
gation. After he had completed his survey, he appeared before the Trus­
teeship Council to review the contents of a report he had prepared^^ and 
to give further information.
The Procureur Général, Paulin Baptiste, thought that the asser­
tions made by the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise were largely invalid.
First he considered the complaints made against the two-stage election 
system for representatives to the Enlarged Consultative Commission. He 
said that generally the complaints about the election system were not 
justified. In Togoland, where the people were backward, the two-stage 
election was more practical than election by universal suffrage. Fur­
thermore, it was not undemocratic, as had been asserted. The chiefs who 
selected the electors were not virtually civil servants, loyal to and 
dependent upon the Administration. I’Jhile there had been isolated in­
stances of misinterpretation of instructions by the local chiefs, that 
did not mean they had deliberately discriminated against the unifica­
tionists. Besides, these instances had not been serious enough to have 
an effect upon the selection of e l e c t o r s . I n  the opinion of Baptiste
l̂ iiThe Ewe Problem," Res, 441 (V), General Assembly, Official 
Records. Fifth Session. Supplement, no. 20 (1950), p. 53.
^^Report by Mr. Baptiste. Procurator General. U.N. Doc. T/846 
(Lake Success: 1951). (R.M.)
^^Ibid.. p. 6; and "The Ewe Question," Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records. Eighth Session. 330th and 331st Meetings, 26 and 2? 
February 1951, PP. 120-25.
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there were no serious faults in the two-stage election system,
Baptiste also discussed the tax receipt problem in the Lomé 
area. The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had said that tax receipts for 
two years had been required before one could vote and that this had the 
effect of limiting the voting franchise.Baptiste thought it was re­
grettable that tax matters should be brought up in connection with elec­
tions. All people should have the right to express their views. But he 
discounted the possibility that this limitation on voting had been seri­
ous enough to affect the outcome of the election.^®
The Procureur Général brushed aside the complaints of disturb­
ances, arrests and illegal prosecutions in the French Territory. He 
agreed that some disturbances had occurred which were infringements on 
the freedom of assembly, but not to a degree which would distort the ex­
pression of the will of the people. From the documents he had studied, 
Baptiste concluded that most arrests were made only when public order 
had been threatened or disturbed. He doubted that there had been any 
illegal prosecution. The Procureur Général believed it was unlikely 
that the judges could be coerced into such action. Under the French 
Constitution the judiciary was absolutely independent of the executive 
and the legislative, and the judges were very jealous of their power,^9 
It was Baptiste's belief that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's
l^See page 81,
^®U,N, Doc, T/846, o p . cit.. p, 11.
^9"The Ewe Question," op. cit.. 331st Meeting, 2? February 1951,
pp, 123-25,
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poor showing in the first stage of the election had been its own fault
and was not due to discrimination or other such factors. As he viewed
it, the election campaign had hinged on the issue of unification versus
the status quo. The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo and
the Parti Togolaise du Progrès of southern French Togoland frankly
favored the status quo, while the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise of the
southern area favored unification of the Ewe peoples. The Ewe people
strongly supported Ewe unification, but moving northward from the Ewe
area there was increasing opposition to the concept. Tribal groups did
not wish to be deprived of an outlet to the sea, as might occur if an
Ewe state were created. Under the circumstances, stated Baptiste, they
pnhad voted for the status quo parties.
The Procureur Général thought that the nonparticipation of the 
Comité de l'Unité Togolaise in the second stage of the election was not 
really due to discrimination by the authorities, but was caused by fear 
of defeat. He said that the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord 
Togo, founded in the North, exploited the local aspirations of the nor­
therners and had their complete support. Therefore, neither the Comité 
de l'Unité Togolaise nor the Parti Togolaise du Progrès entered into 
competition with it in that area. Unable to make headway in the North, 
the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise could not capture more than a strong 
minority of the French Togoland seats in the Enlarged Standing Consulta­
tive Commission even if it swept the South. When the party received
20Ibid.. p, 12 6; and U.N. Doc. T/846, op. cit.. p. 25.
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setbacks at Atakpame and Anecho in the S o u t h , i t  quit the fight rather 
than lose face.^Z
This was a reasonable explanation of what had occurred, except 
for one possible weakness. Even though the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise 
refused to participate in the second stage of the election, the stage in 
which the electors selected representatives to the Enlarged Consultative 
Commission, it still won six out of the nine seats allotted to the South. 
This would indicate that Baptiste overemphasized the setbacks to the 
Comité de l'Unité Togolaise in the South during the first stage when 
electors were chosen, and if the party had participated in the second 
stage of the elections it might have taken all the seats there. But 
Baptiste felt this would not have happened. He believed that the six 
seats won by the party without any campaigning during the second stage 
were roughly representative of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's 
strength. Active campaigning would not have altered the voting of the 
electors.
The Procureur Général concluded by saying it was regrettable 
that the party had not accepted the six seats it won. This left the 
French with no choice but to assign them to the Parti Togolaise du
pi*Progrès, the only other party on the ticket in the South.
^^See Political Map, p. 9.
p. 125.
^%.N. Doc. T/846, op. cit.. pp. 25-26.
23lbid.. p. 2 6.
Z4"The Ewe Question," op. cit.. 331st Meeting, 2? February 1951,
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The core of Baptiste's report and of his speech before the Trus­
teeship Council was that most of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise's com­
plaints and similar expressions by other French Togoland unificationists 
were without foundation. The Ccanite de l'Unité Togolaise used such com­
plaints as an excuse for quitting the election when the party found it 
was unable to win more than a small minority of French Togoland's seats 
to the Enlarged Consultative Commission.
The Administering Authorities forwarded a proposal based on the 
findings of the Procureur Général. He had discounted most of the asser­
tions made by the Comité de l’Unité Togolaise. Therefore, the British 
and French thought that the party should be forced to take part in the 
Commission. They would widen the membership of the Enlarged Consulta­
tive Commission to make room for the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, whose 
vacant seats had been filled. This would be done in such a way as to 
keep the number in proportion to the original election results. The 
British and French noted that the All-Ewe Conference was also boycotting 
the Commission. As its seats were still open, they thought the Confer­
ence should be urged to take its rightful position after a proportional 
adjustment was made.^^
The Administering Authorities hoped to convene a second session 
of the Enlarged Consultative Commission as soon as possible. The Brit­
ish delegate said they attached great importance to the necessity for 
arriving at a decision regarding the Ewe question. To insure that a 
fair decision was reached they wanted all groups to be fully represented
25%bid.. 338th Meeting, 8 March 1951. PP. 193-94.
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at the Coirmission,^^
The British and French drafted a resolution to put their plan 
into e f f e c t . T h i s  time, however, they were not able to capture the 
favor of the Council, Too many of the members felt that such a plan of 
enlargement would have no success when many of the natives were against 
the Commission's continuation. Instead, the Council accepted a draft
ppresolution initiated by the United States and Iraq,
The disparity between the Franco-British draft resolution and 
the United States-Iraqi draft resolution was not extreme. The signifi­
cant difference was that the latter draft emphasized the urgency of 
finding a solution to the Ewe question. It gave no encouragement to the 
further enlargement of the Consultative Commission, saying that now was 
the time to move toward a substantive solution of the problem, rather 
than to concentrate on completing the membership of the Enlarged Con­
sultative Commission. 29
The United States-Iraqi draft resolution was put to a vote first. 
It was adopted by nine votes to none, with three abstentions— France, 
Britain and Russia. The British and French did not bother to submit 
their draft to a vote, feeling it was useless to do so when the other
^^Ibid.. p. 19 4.
^^France and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire- 
land: Joint Draft Resolution, U.N, Doc. T/L,140 (Lake Success: 1951),
(R.M.)
pQIraq and United States of America: Joint Draft Resolution.
U,N. Doc, T/L.141 (Lake Success: 1951 ). [ 0 7 1
^9"The Ewe Question," op. cit.. 338th Meeting, 8 March 1951, p.194.
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draft resolution had already been adopted.
The Administering Authorities accepted the Trusteeship Council's 
decision with good grace, but were reluctant to see the Enlarged Con­
sultative Commission discarded. The French delegate thought the Admin­
istering Authorities still might be able to use the Commission to carry 
out the task of determining the wishes of the Togoland people. The 
British delegate a g r e e d . T h e  tenacity with which the British and 
French clung to their abortive plan may seem somewhat ridiculous. How­
ever, they had put a good deal of time and effort into the creation of 
the Enlarged Commission; and, in all fairness to them, they had at least 
suggested a possible plan of action. This was more than could be said 
for the Trusteeship Council,
The Council, in accepting the American-Iraqi resolution, failed 
to suggest any method of coping with the Togoland situation. It merely 
recommended that whether or not the composition of the Enlarged Consulta­
tive Commission was completed, "the Administering Authorities should 
formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a practical 
solution to the question . . . . In effect they threw the entire 
burden of responsibility upon the British and French,
This was not an entirely deplorable position for the Administer­
ing Authorities. At the same time that they were given the unenviable
30lbid.. 339th Meeting, 9 March 1951. p. 197.
Ibid.. pp. 197-98.
3^"The Ewe Problem," Res. 306 (VIII), Trusteeship Council, Offi­
cial Records. Eighth Session. Supplement, no. 1 (1951), p. 4.
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task of solving a difficult situation, they were also given the dominant 
policy-making role. The unificationists would have to depend upon them 
for a solution to the Togoland problem. The Enlarged Standing Consulta­
tive Commission was apparently destroyed for all practical purposes, but 
if the Administering Authorities could devise a new plan that was accept­
able to the Council, the most unificationists could do if they were not 
satisfied was take defensive action against it.
The unificationists were truly the losers. Ewe unificationists 
in French Togoland had rejected the Commission, which may or may not 
have been because of dishonesty on the part of Britain and France during 
the elections, only to find themselves dependent upon those two coun­
tries for a plan to replace the Commission, Furthermore, in the past 
year, from the summer of 1950 to the summer of 1951, the unification­
ists' position relative to that of the anti-unificationists had been 
weakened. In French Togoland the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise now faced 
an aroused northern populace, which feared the effects of possible Ewe 
unification. In the form of the Union des Chefs et des Populations du 
Nord Togo, this population had united with the Comité de l'Unité Togo­
laise 's old rival, the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, to work for the de­
feat of Ewe unification. In British Togoland, unificationists were also 
being challenged by the northern peoples, who feared the Togoland 
Union's proposal of Togoland unification which could separate them from 
their fellow tribesmen in the Gold Coast, Unless unificationists quick­
ly settled their differences and worked toward a common goal they were 
likely to lose all possibility of unification in any form.
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It seemed that the most that unification groups could do at the 
moment was to wait anxiously for new proposals by the British and French 
and hope they would be more palatable. If they were not, the unifica­
tionists would again have to bring their cases before the United Nations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER V
THE JOINT COUNCIL: A NEW SOLUTION FOR TOGOLAND
The decision to enlarge the Standing Consultative Commission had 
resulted in failure when the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise of French Togo­
land refused to take part in the second stage of the election of repre­
sentatives to the Commission, Its refusal, on the ground that France 
was discriminating against it, destroyed the representative character of 
the enlarged Commission, Further, the refusal resulted in a boycott by 
unificationists in British Togoland, where elections were completed.
They refused to take part, in sympathy for the Comité de l'Unité Togo­
laise.
When an investigation by a French Procureur Général concluded 
that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had actually refused to take part 
in the second stage of the elections because of its poor showing during 
the first stage, the Administering Authorities had suggested that the 
boycotting groups be forced to participate. The Administering Authori­
ties' proposal was rejected, but no plan was submitted by the Trustee­
ship Council to replace it. Instead, the British and French were di­
rected to "formulate as soon as possible substantive proposals for a 
practical solution to the question" of unification.^
^"The Ewe Problem," Res, 306 (VIII), Trusteeship Council,
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Whatever the reason for its action, the Comité de l'Unité Togo­
laise 's decision to boycott the election indirectly forced the Adminis­
tering Authorities to start anew. They were faced with a difficult 
task, but it was advantageous to be developing a plan, instead of wait­
ing anxiously for the opposition to propose a solution, the position of 
the Ewe and Togoland unificationists.
In July of 1951f the British and French presented their new plan 
to the Trusteeship Council; it was a proposal for a joint council, which 
was a worked-over version of the Enlarged Consultative Commission with 
the added power to suggest projects of common interest on which the Ad­
ministering Authorities should spend money and to decide the priority 
for such projects. In the memorandum which they had prepared, the Ad­
ministering Authorities said that the joint organ would not have any 
executive or legislative power over the two Trust Territories, but would 
provide the representatives of the people with an opportunity to discuss 
and consult with senior administrative and technical officers from each 
side and to advise the British and French on programs of development in 
the economic and social fields. The Administering Authorities argued 
that the joint body would be an effective organization assuring the le­
gitimate aspirations of the people. It would link the people together 
and allow close collaboration between French and British authorities.^
After presenting their proposal, the British and French in the
Official Records. Eighth Session. Supplement, no. 1 (1951), p. 4.
2Joint Anglo-French Memorandum to the Trusteeship Council Re­
garding the Ewe and Allied Petitions. U.N. Doc. T/931 (Lake Success: 
1951). p. 9, (R.M.)
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same memorandum discussed their reasons for dismissing other possible 
solutions: Ewe unification under one administration, joint administra­
tion of an Eweland or of Togoland, Togoland unification under one admin­
istration, and a plebiscite. They felt that Ewe unification was not 
desirable for a number of reasons. Only a minority of the population in 
the Ewe area actually wanted an Eweland, Secondly, a separate Ewe area 
would handicap the northern peoples, barring them from free access to 
the sea and hindering their development. Lastly, there was no indica­
tion that Ewe unification under French trusteeship would be acceptable 
to the inhabitants of the British area or vice versa,3
The Administering Authorities stated that Togoland unification 
was not practical. There was again the problem of deciding who would 
administer the Territories, Natives of French Togoland had expressed 
opposition to unification because it would mean a change in the Adminis­
tering Authority for one of the Territories, retarding the development 
of that Territory, Togoland unification was also impractical because of 
the attitude in British Togoland where some natives wanted integration 
with the Gold Coast, others wanted unification under a single adminis­
tration and still others wanted unification and independence. Further­
more, would those Ewes in both Territories aspiring to Ewe unification 
reconcile themselves to Togoland unification? In the light of such dis­
agreement, the British and French said, Togoland unification was as im­
practical as unification of the Ewe sub-tribes of British and French
3jbid,, pp, 12-13.
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Togolands.^
Britain and France felt that a joint Anglo-French authority over 
an Eweland or a unified Togoland did not reflect the wishes of any im­
portant segment of the population, but they had considered it to insure 
that no possible solution was overlooked. They believed that joint ad­
ministration would result in numerous problems. Not only would there be 
many of the difficulties mentioned above in connection with Togoland or 
Ewe unification under one administration, but there would be the added 
difficulties of adjustments in currency, trade and customs, legal and 
judicial systems, and the staffing and organization of central and local 
governmental systems,^
A plebiscite would not be practical either, the Administering 
Authorities asserted. First it would be necessary to select the alter­
natives that should be offered to the people. Then a decision would 
have to be made on whether the people should vote on Ewe unification or 
Togoland unification. If the plebiscite were only on Ewe unification, 
it would not be possible to justify withholding the vote from non-Ewe 
peoples whose interests would also be affected. If the plebiscite were 
on Togoland unification, there would be difficulty in wording the ques­
tion to be asked. No single proposal could be formed into a question 
which could be answered with a simple yes or no. The issues were many, 
Britain and France stated, and it would be impossible to place the mat­
ter before the voters in a way that would not be misunderstood.
^Ibid.. pp. 14-15. 
5lbid.. p. 16.
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According to the Authorities, an "elucidation" of the people's wishes 
through an assembly of elected representatives would be clearer and more 
satisfactory than a plebiscite,^
The Franco-British memorandum caused a strong reaction among na­
tive groups in the Togoland Territories, Forces representing the unifi­
cation and status quo movements asked for an opportunity to appear be­
fore the Council during the pending consideration of the memorandum. 
Therefore, when the Trusteeship Council reopened discussion of the Togo­
land problem it was again confronted by representatives of the unifica­
tion and the status quo movements and by the British and French, each 
concerned with influencing its decision. The speeches of the Adminis­
tering Authorities were mainly a reiteration of their joint memorandum, 
except for the addition that the joint body would also be able to con­
sider proposals of the Administering Authorities in regard to requests 
for technical assistance from the United Nations, independent special­
ized agencies and other sources,?
The two native organizations present were the Togoland Congress 
Party representing the unificationists and the Parti Togolaise du Progrès 
representing the status quo movement. The Togoland Congress was a very 
significant association of parties and groups formed on the seventh of 
January, 1951* Among its member organizations were the Togoland Union 
and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, which favored Togoland and
Gibid,. p. 16-17.
^"The Ewe Problem," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Ninth 
Session. 379th Meeting, 23 July 1951. no, 12, p. 296.
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Ewe unification respectively. The union of these two parties in an 
association was a major step toward the consolidation of the unification 
forces. While the formation of the Togoland Congress did not solve the 
question of Ewe unification versus Togoland unification, it did bring 
the two movements closer together. Unfortunately, the All-Ewe Confer­
ence did not join the Congress, Among other members were two small 
groups in British Togoland, the Togoland Youth Organization and the 
Togoland National Farmer's Union.® The latter organization was quite 
active in the marketing of cocoa.9
The Togoland Congress was opposed to the Administering Authori­
ties' proposal for a joint council, Antor, speaking for the Togoland 
Congress, said his organization represented the great majority of tradi­
tional rulers and recognized native and political groups. All the Con­
gress members were against the joint body proposed by the Administering 
Authorities and they could not be counted on to support it. The joint 
council was just another of the Administering Authorities' "well-known 
tactics" in their conspiracy to discredit the unification movement, mis­
represent the aspirations of the people and distort the meaning of the 
Charter to their own ends.^^
O"Hearing of the Representative of the Togoland Congress," 
Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Eighth Session. 343rd Meeting,
15 March 1951, pp. 241-42,
^Addendum to Petition from the Conference of Farmers of Togo­
land under United Kingdom Trusteeship Concerning Togoland under British 
Administration. U.N. Doc. T/Pet,6/5/Add.l (Lake Success : 1950), pp, 2-7.
101,The Ewe Problem," op. cit.. 380th Meeting, 24 July 1951, no,
1 2, p, 297.
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The people he represented, Antor stated, would only accept the 
immediate establishment of two district councils for the northern and 
southern sections of British Togoland and the establishment of a sepa­
rate legislature for British Togoland composed of the northern and 
southern councils. Beyond this they proposed a central representative 
assembly, with or without legislative powers, for all of Togoland, This 
central representative assembly would decide upon the administering 
country, which in turn would be advised by the United Nations' commis­
sion residing in Togoland. Antor claimed if administration by this 
country failed, in what respect he did not say, the Togoland Congress 
members wanted self-government for Togoland.
A representative of the Parti Togolaise du Progrès, the status 
quo party of southern French Togoland, also spoke before the Council.
His organization rejected unification, claiming that the majority of 
people in French Togoland would be dissatisfied with any type of unifi­
cation under one administration. It agreed that the program of unifica­
tion for Togoland aroused sympathy, but no one wanted it to be achieved 
at the cost of a change in administration,^^ Many of the party's mem­
bers were officials in the French administration, and it is evident they 
feared that the unificationists' demands, which included administration 
by one country, might result in British administration and thus involve 
the loss of their jobs.
The Parti Togolaise du Progrès was not unequivocally in favor of
lllbid.
IZlbid.. p. 300,
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the Administering Authorities' plan for a joint council. When the 
Comite de l'Unité Togolaise had refused to accept its six seats on the 
Enlarged Consultative Commission, these seats had been given to the 
Parti Togolaise du Progrès. Therefore, this party held a dominant posi­
tion on the Enlarged Consultative Commission. Its representative stated 
that the proposed joint body did not differ substantially from the exist­
ing, although inactive. Enlarged Consultative Commission. Such being 
the case, he thought the Commission should be maintained for two more 
years to avoid the unrest which new elections might entail and to allow 
the other parties time to think over the Togoland problem,
At the conclusion of the speeches, the British representative 
brought to the attention of the Council a draft resolution that his 
country and France had submitted to implement their plan for a joint 
council. He did this with a seeming disregard for the arguments of the 
natives which had just been presented and without allowing time for dis­
cussion of the oral petitions.Immediately thereafter, the United 
States, Thailand and the Dominican Republic submitted a joint draft 
amending the Franco-British d r a f t . I t  was obvious that both drafts 
had been written before the native petitioners had spoken. Apparently 
the petitioners were addressing a Council in which most of the members
13lbid.
l^ibid.. p. 30 1.
^^Dominican Republic. Thailand, and the United States; Amend­
ment to the Draft Resolution on the Ewe Question Submitted by the Dele­
gations of France and the United Kingdom (t/L.212). U.N. Doc. T/L.213 
(Lake Success : 1951)* P* 2. (R.M.)
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had already decided their positions.
The Franco-British draft resolution stated that the Trusteeship 
Council approved the joint memorandum presented by the delegations of 
France and the United Kingdcxn. It welcomed the establishment of a joint 
council with powers and functions in all matters of common interest 
within the economic, social, educational and cultural fields. The Anglo- 
French draft further said that the Council urged the various elements of 
the population to give their full support to the body.^^
The three-power draft of the United States, Thailand and the 
Dominican Republic was fundamentally the same as the Franco-British 
draft in all but one important aspect. Whereas the Administering Au­
thorities' draft said the joint council should be able to exercise its 
function with respect to "all questions within the economic, social, 
educational and cultural fields . , . , the three-power draft said 
the body should exercise its functions with respect to "all questions of 
common concern to the people of the two Trust Territories, including 
questions of political, economic, social, educational and cultural devel­
opment . . . . The Administering Authorities' draft resolution 
limited the fields in which the joint council would be able to exercise 
its functions, while the United States, Thailand and Dominican Republic 
draft resolution included all questions of common concern and
^^France. United Kingdom: Draft Resolution on the Ewe Problem. 
U.N. Doc. T/L.212 (Lake Successor 1951), P. 2. (R.M.)
1?U.N. Doc. T/L.212, loc. cit.
18u.N. Doc. T/L.213, loc. cit.
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specifically listed political development as one of these.
The authors of the three-power draft resolution supported it on 
at least three bases. They felt the Franco-British draft was too lim­
ited and the joint council needed the power to function in the political 
field, particularly in view of the difficulty in deciding whether a 
question was economic or political. Further, they defended their reso­
lution by saying that the establishment of a joint council with wide 
powers of suggestion would provide a stop-gap measure until such a time 
as the natives could reach agreement on unification,^^
Two countries, Iraq and Russia, were vehemently opposed to the 
Administering Authorities' proposal for a joint council as conceived in 
either of the draft resolutions.
The Iraqi delegate was convinced that the Comité de 1'Unité 
Togolaise's petitions concerning the violations of human rights were 
true and he said that from reading the petitions one could not help won­
dering whether the French Administration was able to carry out its gov­
ernmental responsibilities without resorting to force, subjecting women 
and children to brutal treatment and abolishing the freedom of assembly. 
As far as he was concerned, the joint council was just another means for 
the Administering Authorities to forestall any form of unification. He 
felt the proposed joint council would be no more effective than the En­
larged Consultative Commission had been, because it lacked executive and 
legislative powers. Its recommendations, therefore, would not be bind­
ing on the British and French, Moreover, the election of members to the
^^"The Ewe Problem," loc, cit.
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new joint body would presumably give rise to the same incidents and the 
same circumstances as had accompanied the elections to the Enlarged Con­
sultative Commission. He thought it was odd that two European powers 
with long experience in solving problems arising in colonies should be 
incapable of finding a satisfactory solution to the Togoland problem but 
must suggest such a weak proposal as the joint c o u n c i l .
The Iraqi delegate also bitterly accused the Trusteeship Council 
of giving aid to the Administering Authorities and being partly respon­
sible for the lack of an effective solution to the unification question. 
He asserted that the Council had done nothing but sanction the decisions 
of the Administering Authorities.^^
After the speeches were completed, a roll call vote was taken on 
the three-power draft resolution submitted by Thailand, the Dominican 
Republic and the United States, All Council members voted in favor of 
it except Iraq and Russia, which abstained.^2 Only Russia commented on 
its abstention, but the Iraqi position was evident from its representa­
tive's previous speech. Soldatov of Russia said he had abstained be­
cause the draft resolution disregarded the desire for unification by the 
Ewe tribes and for the establishment of an independent Togoland state.^3 
It appeared that Soldatov regarded these as one and the same, but this 
was only an example of the Russian efforts to appeal to all
ZOlbid.. pp. 302-03. 
Zllbid.. p. 303.
22ibid.. p. 304. 
23lbid.
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unificationists at the same time.
Both Britain and France voted for the resolution which amended 
their own. The British delegate stated he had done so to give evidence 
of his country's desire to work with the Trusteeship Council, to carry 
out its wishes and to do its utmost toward serving the interests of the 
Togoland people. The French representative said he had voted for the 
amendment in the same spirit as had the United Kingdom.Without ques­
tioning the sincerity of the British and French, it suffices to say that 
their statements were good propaganda.
Why did the Trusteeship Council accept the modified version of 
the Franco-British plan? After all, it did not solve the Togoland prob­
lem and the joint council it initiated was not drastically different 
from the preceding committees that had failed. Possibly the answer lies 
in part in the composition of the Council, With six trust-administering 
nations and six non-trust-administering states in the Council, Britain 
and France always had a good chance of securing the backing of at least 
half the Council, Possibly part of the answer might also be found in 
the persuasive arguments presented by the British and French, However, 
the most likely explanation is found in the opinions expressed by Liu 
Shih-shun of China when he explained why his delegation had voted for 
the extensively amended Franco-British draft resolution.
The Chinese representative stated that the Ewe question should 
be settled in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of the two 
Territories, But it had to be admitted that, "as a result of the
Ẑ Tbid.
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conflict of opinion on the subject among the people of Togoland," the 
Council had not been able to devise a satisfactory solution. Therefore, 
his delegation had voted for the draft resolution as amended, "in the 
hope that it would pave the way for a satisfactory solution.
The very inability of the Togoland people, particularly the uni­
ficationists, to agree on one goal for Togoland again led the Trustee­
ship Council to accept the recommendations and plans of the Administer­
ing Authorities. Undeniably, the majority of the Council accepted the 
demand for unification as legitimate, but none besides the Iraqi and 
Russian delegations were willing to make a major decision in favor of 
some type of unification when the Togoland people were so divided on 
what was best for themselves. When the Togoland natives could not agree 
on a single demand, the Council turned to the Administering Authorities, 
pressing them for a solution.
In their efforts to influence the United Nations, it seemed that 
at this moment Britain and France had been very successful. It is true 
that their draft resolution had been considerably altered by amendment, 
but this was because they had tried to restrict the powers which the 
joint council would have, not because their plan for a joint body had 
been rejected. All the native groups were losers : the unificationists
because their demands for unification had been rejected, and the status 
quo groups because they had hoped to see the continuation of the En­
larged Consultative Commission for at least a little longer. Moreover, 
the native groups were the victims of a change in attitude among
25lbid.
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Trusteeship Council members. The immediate submission of two previously 
drawn draft resolutions, as soon as the native groups had presented 
their oral petitions, indicated the lack of consideration presently 
being given to the arguments of the native organizations. The Council 
was becoming unreceptive to their many claims and counterclaims, and its 
attitude of concern was being tempered by feelings of misgiving. The 
Ewe problem had dragged on too long without a solution, with too many 
groups making conflicting assertions and demands.
Once the proposal for a joint council had been accepted by the 
Trusteeship Council, it was the Administering Authorities' task to put 
it into effect. This was a lengthy process, particularly with the need 
for elections, and the Joint Council had not yet been initiated when the 
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly met in the winter of 1951-1952 
to ponder the Trusteeship Council's annual report.
In the course of the Fourth Committee's considerations, the Ewe 
and Togoland unification problem came up for discussion. Though gener­
ally it was the Trusteeship Council's task to consider petitions, the 
Fourth Committee delved into matters discussed in a number of the peti­
tions received from the Togolands since the Council's latest session. 
Thus the Togoland problem was reopened and the joint council concept re­
considered. Furthermore, as part of this consideration, the Fourth Com­
mittee accepted requests by native groups to speak before the Committee,
^^General Assembly (6th sess.), 4th Committee, Official Records 
(1951-52).
"Request for Hearings," ibid,. 202nd Meeting, 15 November 
1951, p. 8,
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From this point forward the Fourth Committee played an increasing role 
in trusteeship matters.
Both unification groups and those favoring the status quo spoke. 
The unificationists' purpose in appearing before the Committee was 
threefold: to forestall the establishment of the Joint Council, to com­
plain about the handling of the Togoland problem by the Administering 
Authorities, and to present arguments for their particular types of uni­
fication.^8
The All-Ewe Conference's speaker, Sylvanus Olympic, centered his 
speech on a condemnation of the French method of handling the Ewe prob­
lem, and the attempts by the Administering Authorities to prove that the 
Ewe unification movement did not exist. He declared that the French had 
used almost every conceivable weapon against the Ewe people, including 
undemocratic elections, arbitrary arrests and the suppression of free 
speech and assembly, to prove that the Ewe problem was a minor one and 
that the Ewe people were a trouble-making minority. An unrelenting cam­
paign had been waged in both Togoland and the United Nations to prove 
that the Ewe unification movement did not exist.^9
The newly organized Togoland Congress, which consisted of unifi­
cation parties and organizations from both Territories, spoke in favor 
of Togoland unification and against the Joint Council, It thought the 
Joint Council would be useless. What could it do to stop the two Trust
See the speeches by the All-Ewe Conference, Joint Togoland Con­
gress and the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, "Report of the Trusteeship 
Council (A/I85 6)," ibid,. 226th Meeting, 13 December 1951, pp. I6I-6 5.
^9ibid., pp. I6I-6 2,
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Territories from being swallowed by the French Union and the Crown 
Colony of the Gold Coast? Togoland should be given unification with a 
view to eventual self-government and independence,^®
The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, which was the Ewe unification- 
ist party of French Togoland, made an effort to present a solution to 
the obvious conflict between Togoland and Ewe unification goals. Its 
representative, Aku, believed that self-government for Togoland would 
bring the two forces together. He thought it was essential for the de­
velopment of Togoland that the two objectives be merged into one common 
aspiration, and he stressed that the desire for self-government was 
gaining strength due to the policy of oppression and injustice practiced 
by Britain and France,
Aku was convinced that self-government for Togoland was more de­
sirable than setting up an elected commission such as the Joint Council, 
The methods used by the Administering Authorities made it impossible to 
have a fairly elected council, for the British and French were using all 
means, fair and foul, to prevent the emancipation of the people,^2 This 
was the first time that self-government was openly suggested by a major 
native party to a United Nations organ and indicated the growing disil­
lusionment among unificationists with the Administering Authorities,
Significantly, all unification groups spoke against initiating 
the Joint Council, If the proposal for its establishment were accepted
30Ibid., pp. 163-64,
31lbid,. p, 165,
32lbid.
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by the Fourth Committee, would they boycott it as they had the Enlarged 
Consultative Commission? The Trusteeship Council had already shown some 
concern about this in its resolution, asking the natives to give full 
cooperation to the establishment and operation of the joint body.
The native groups who favored the status quo spoke a few days 
later. They paid lip service to unification, but rejected it as imprac­
tical. The Parti Togolaise du Progrès of southern French Togoland said 
it favored a close relationship between the two Togolands, but not inde­
pendence. As Togoland's resources were limited, it needed the assist­
ance of the Administering Powers.33
The representative of the Union des Chefs et des Populations du 
Nord Togo, the only political party in northern French Togoland, said 
that the chiefs and people of his area fervently desired unification of 
Togoland, but they could not see how this could be brought about with 
two Administering Authorities. Therefore, his party thought it wisest 
to accelerate the political, economic, social and cultural advancement 
of the Togolanders so that they might quickly reach the stage of self- 
government or even independence. Once self-government had been attained, 
the union of the two Territories might be contemplated.3̂
From the speeches the representatives of both the above parties 
gave, it was apparent that even those in favor of the status quo were 
finding it necessary publicly to favor Togoland unification in order to 
maintain popularity. This suggests that the desire for Togoland
33lbid.. 233rd Meeting, 21 December 1951i no. 12, p. 211.
3̂ Ibid.. pp. 211-12.
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unification had become widespread in French Togoland where these two 
parties drew their support. But the increased approval of Togoland uni­
fication did not help the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise which continued to 
adhere to Ewe unification until the following summer of 1952. If this 
French Togoland party had joined the Togoland unification movement much 
earlier, it is quite possible that the outcome for both French and Brit­
ish Togolands would have been different. As it was, the status quo 
parties of French Togoland, by claiming to favor Togoland unification 
"at some future date," could gain support by masquerading as the cham­
pions of Togoland unification. While the demands for Togoland unifica­
tion were stronger than ever before, the Togoland and Ewe unification 
parties were, as a group, perhaps weaker due to the Comité de l'Unité 
Togolaise's lack of popularity among non-Ewe groups who were set against 
Ewe unification.
The Fourth Committee and ultimately the General Assembly ac­
cepted the joint council concept. As in the Trusteeship Council, the 
main reason was the confusion that reigned in Togoland. Though the uni­
fication groups had made a stronger effort than ever before to present a 
unified front, it was obvious that they were still at odds. Furthermore, 
other groups spoke of unification only in terms of a distant goal. One 
could not make a final decision on unification under such conditions.
The Fourth Committee's resolution was nearly identical to the 
Trusteeship Council's resolution, but emphasized the Administering Au­
thorities' responsibility in the reaching of a solution to the problems 
of the two Territories, The resolution accepted the creation of a joint
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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council and urged the Administering Authorities to exert every effort to 
achieve a prompt, constructive and equitable settlement of the Togoland 
problem. It noted that according to statements made by certain native 
groups there was an atmosphere of tension in the Togolands resulting 
from the delay in arriving at an adequate solution. Lastly, it stressed 
the importance of having all parties and groups consulted in the deter­
mination of a satisfactory procedure for election of representatives to 
the Joint Council.
The success of the proposed Joint Council was very important to 
the United Nations. Two plans, the Standing Consultative Commission and 
the Enlarged Standing Consultative Commission, had already fallen by the 
wayside. The failure of the Joint Council would hardly make it sensible 
to introduce a fourth plan encompassing some type of joint organization, 
and under the confused circumstances existing in the Territories it 
seemed impractical to take such a far-reaching step as Togoland unifica­
tion. But the increasing agitation and political activity emphasized 
the need for some solution. If the Joint Council failed what could re­
place it?
The native groups in the two Togolands were concerned with the 
outcome of elections for representatives to the Joint Council and the 
exact form the body would take, especially the unificationists, for 
their position was particularly critical. Should they fail to win a 
majority of seats in the Joint Council, little would be gained by taking
^^"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem," Res. 555 (VI), 
General Assembly, Official Records, Sixth Session. Supplement, no. 20
(1951-5 2), p. 56.
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part in its meetings. But to boycott the body, even if discrimination 
had occurred during the elections, would be dangerous. Native arguments 
were no longer making as significant an impression, particularly in the 
Trusteeship Council, which had been saturated by arguments and contra­
dictory claims. If the Ewe and Togoland unificationists boycotted the 
Joint Council, would the United Nations give heed to their statements, 
or would the international organization turn its back on unificationists 
in disgust? There was a good chance that the unification groups would 
not capture a majority in the Joint Council. It seemed quite possible 
that the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise would win only a few of the French
seats, for even disregarding the strong possibility of French discrimi­
nation, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise was far weaker than it had been. 
Its insistence on supporting Ewe unification had only served to weaken 
its position, particularly when the northern people of French Togoland 
became more concerned with the effect of such a step on the North,
Though the situation was brighter for the unificationists in British 
Togoland, it was a question of whether a unificationist success in the 
British Territory could counteract the failing popularity of the Comité 
de l'Unité Togolaise.
Even if the Ewe and Togoland unification groups were able to 
capture a majority of seats in the Joint Council, there was still the 
question of the Joint Council's duties. Would it be allowed to use the 
full extent of its outlined powers, or would the body be hamstrung by 
the British and French? With all these considerations in mind, unifica­
tion groups had good reason for extreme anxiety.
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Status quo groups and other anti-unificationists also were vi­
tally interested in the outcome of the Joint Council, If unification 
groups captured most of the seats in the Council, Togoland or Ewe unifi­
cation could soon be a reality. Either might have an adverse effect 
upon natives who worked for the Administering Authorities. Togoland 
unification or Ewe unification would also be injurious to the northern 
peoples. The former would result in domination of the northern tribes 
by the politically agressive southerners. Moreover, it would probably 
sever the northern British Togolanders from their tribal relatives in 
the Gold Coast. Ewe unification, on the other hand, would cut the 
northern peoples from the sea and rob Togoland of much of its richest 
area.
Britain and France also had a large stake in the outcome of the 
Joint Council. Both countries obviously wanted to retain control of 
their respective Territory. The Territories, after all, were rich 
cocoa-producing areas, and French Togoland along with Dahomey gave 
French West Africa a needed outlet to the sea.
To all groups, therefore, the fate of the Joint Council was vi­
tally important. IVhile not one of them was particularly enthusiastic 
about its inception, all were concerned with the part it would play in 
the success or failure of their goals. Yet, though none were enthusias­
tic, the Joint Council was, paradoxically, a result of their own efforts 
to direct the decisions of the United Nations as to the Territories' 
future.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE FAILURE OF THE JOINT COUNCIL
In an effort to take a constructive step toward resolving the 
confused situation in the Togolands, the United Nations had accepted the 
British and French proposals for a joint council in January of 1952,^ 
This council was to replace the unsuccessful Enlarged Standing Consulta­
tive Commission,
The United Nations and the native groups awaited the formation 
of the Joint Council with anxiety. The United Nations was concerned 
that it might fail as had the Enlarged Consultative Commission. This 
would leave the United Nations with the problem of seeking a new propos­
al, which would probably be extremely difficult, or to attempt to patch 
together the Joint Council. The native groups were particularly con­
cerned about the election of representatives to the Council which would 
possibly determine the fate of unification.
There was some hope of success for the Joint Council at the time 
of its acceptance. Unificationists were not in as good a position to 
initiate a boycott as they had been when they boycotted the Enlarged
"Report of the Trusteeship Council: Reports of the Fourth Com­
mittee (A/2061) and the Fifth Committee," General Assembly, Official 
Records. Sixth Session. 361st Plenary Meeting, 18 January 1952, no. 12, 
p. 349. See adoption of draft resolution V.
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Consultative Commission. A second boycott might seriously injure their 
position with the United Nations which very much wanted the Joint Coun­
cil to be a success. Conversely, the bitter accusation of discrimina­
tion during the election of representatives to the Enlarged Consultative 
Commission had directed the attention of the United Nations to that 
problem and thus made it likely that the Administering Authorities would 
take more precautions to insure fair elections. Further, status quo 
groups were unlikely to create difficulties as they were closely allied 
with the French. There was a question, however, whether the northern 
tribes of British Togoland, who felt themselves more closely tied to the 
Gold Coast than to the rest of Togoland, would be willing to take part 
in the Joint Council, Their failure to take part would immediately in­
jure the effectiveness of the Joint Council as an all-Togoland body.
While it seemed that the Joint Council had a fairly good chance 
of fulfilling those functions for which it had been established, which 
were to advise the two Administering Authorities on matters of common 
concern to the people of the two Trust T e r r i t o r i e s , ^ it was for all 
practical purposes as much a failure as the Enlarged Consultative Com­
mission, From the very beginning it would appear that the Administering 
Authorities were not anxious to see its implementation, partly in fear 
that unificationists would win a majority and partly because a Joint 
Council might bring the Territories closer together. While it was not 
apparent at the time, it later became obvious that Britain preferred
^"The Ewe Problem,” Res, 3^5 (IX), Trusteeship Council, Official 
Records. Ninth Session. Supplement, no, 1 (1951)t p. 3.
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that British Togoland be integrated into the Gold Coast, Constitutional 
reforms during 1951 and 1952 in the Gold Coast made future Gold Coast 
independence imminent. This created a dilemma, Britain administered 
British Togoland as an integral part of the Gold Coast. This would be 
impossible once the Gold Coast was independent, yet to administer Brit­
ish Togoland separately would put a strain on British finances, since 
the Territory was economically weak and without a seaport. Britain, 
therefore, wished to see it integrated into the Gold Coast when that 
colony became independent, for British Togoland would then be part of an 
area with a British-imposed heritage and probably within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, France was not anxious to implement the Joint 
Council because it wanted no threat to its continued control over the 
cocoa-rich Territory or to its gradual inclusion in the French Union,
The first delay in establishing the Council came during the 
early part of 1952, While the Trusteeship Council was considering the 
proper time for a second mission to West Africa, it was informed by the 
British representative that Britain would not be able to hold an elec­
tion in its Territory for the Joint Council until June or July of that 
year. The British were in the process of democratizing the central gov­
ernment of the Gold Coast and were ready to embark on a parallel program 
in local government which would include British Togoland, It would be 
about August of 1952, therefore, before the natives would be able to par­
ticipate in the Joint Council,^ This meant it would be seven months
^"Arrangements for a Periodic Visiting Mission to Trust Territo­
ries in West Africa," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Tenth Ses­
sion. 388th Meeting, 29 February 1952, p. 15.
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from the time the General Assembly accepted the proposal for a joint 
body until the Council was put into effect.
While the election of members to the Joint Council was pending, 
petitions were sent from both Territories of Togoland complaining of 
restrictive action by the Administering Authorities and attempts to nul­
lify the unification movement. From the Togoland Congress, an alliance 
of unification groups, came the first strong accusation that the British 
government was attempting to integrate the Territory into the colony of 
the Gold Coast, which was already receiving extended powers of self- 
government, The Congress, fearing that integration was imminent, urged 
the immediate implementation of the Joint Council.^ Only recently its 
representatives had spoken against the joint council proposal, demanding 
instead immediate unification. Now the Congress urged the implementa­
tion of the Joint Council in the same breath that it accused the British 
of trying to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast.^ Evidently 
it reasoned that any step toward unification was better than a vacuum 
which might facilitate integration.
Petitions from French Togoland were mostly from unificationists 
who complained of French actions aimed at destroying the unification 
movement. Their leaders wrote that intolerable restrictions had been 
placed on political democracy since the beginning of 1952. For example, 
the unificationist Comité de l'Unité Togolaise could hold no meetings.
^Petition from the Togoland Congress Concerning Togoland under 
British Administration, U.N, Doc. T/Pet,o/31^ (New York: 1952), p. 2.
(R.M.)
5lbid.
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except in private homes.^
The accusations made in the petitions from French Togoland cul­
minated in a strongly worded petition from the Comité de l'Unité Togo­
laise in which its representative Augustino de Souza stated that since 
France was using undemocratic methods in the selection of representa­
tives to the Joint Council, his party would not participate in the Coun­
cil pending the arrival of the second Visiting Mission. He said that 
the French had made a pretense of consulting the population on the man­
ner in which they wanted members elected to the Council. Afterwards 
France rejected all proposals for considering the views of the politi­
cal parties on this question. Instead, it held to its plan of having 
representatives appointed by members of the Conseils de Circonscrip­
tion,^ advisory bodies at the local administrative level.® According to 
De Souza, the Conseils de Circonscription, ostensibly representative na­
tive organizations, were actually appointed by the French Government. 
Therefore, they would choose only administration-approved members for 
the Joint Council. As France was following the same undemocratic method 
of choosing representatives which it had used for the defunct Enlarged 
Consultative Commission, the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise would not
cPetition from Messrs. Aku. Olympio and Antor Concerning Togo- 
land under French Administration, U.N, Doc. T/Pet.7/294 (New York: 
1952), p. 2. (R.M.)
7Petition from Mr. Augustino de Souza Concerning Togoland under 
French Administration, U.N. Doc. T/Pet.7/303/Add.1 (New York ; 1952),
p. 2. (R.M.)
®"Report of Togoland under French Administration," Trusteeship 
Council, Official Records. Seventeenth Session. Supplement, no. 2
(1956), p. 11.
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participate in the Joint Council until the second Visiting Mission had 
had an opportunity to investigate the s i t u a t i o n . ^
De Souza’s accusation concerning the Conseils de Circonscription 
was not entirely true. Members were not, in any sense, actually ap­
pointed by the French. They were elected by electors who in turn were 
chosen by the villages in accordance with their traditional ways of des­
ignating village chiefs. However, in 1956 the third Visiting Mission 
did find that the selection of electors by the traditional methods used 
to select chiefs resulted in undue influence by the chiefs during the 
choosing of electors. In turn, the electors chose the chiefs as repre­
sentatives to the Conseils de Circonscription,^® As the chiefs depended 
upon some support from the Administering Authority for their position as 
headmen in the villages, it is only natural that they would tend to be 
pro-French in their attitudes as representatives on the Conseils de Cir­
conscription, Therefore, it is possible that the Conseils de Circon­
scription would choose a larger percentage of pro-French natives than 
would be selected under a scheme of general adult suffrage. However 
much De Souza may have overstated his case, there was some justification 
for his concern about the selection of representatives to the Joint 
Council by the Conseils,
The refusal of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise to participate in 
the Joint Council was not the only instance of native boycotting. The 
northern peoples of British Togoland absolutely refused to even elect
9u.N. Doc, T/Pet.7/303/Add.1, loc. cit,
"Report of Togoland under French Administration," loc, cit.
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representatives. They desired integration with the Gold Coast and 
wanted nothing to do with matters concerning the Trust Territories joint­
l y . B y  this action, the northern peoples robbed the Joint Council of 
any chance to be representative and deprived it of any opportunity it 
may have had to solve the Togoland problem through meetings of groups 
with diverse interests and objectives.
Approximately a month after the Joint Council had been finally 
implemented, the second Visiting Mission made its tour of British and 
French Togolands in late August and early September of 1952. This Mis­
sion, chosen without dispute by any members of the Trusteeship Council, 
except Russia, constituted a more conservative group than the first 
Visiting Mission. Two trust-administering countries were selected, Aus­
tralia and Belgium, and two non-trust-administering countries, China and 
El Salvador. While Australia was not particularly conservative in mat­
ters of trusteeship policy, Belgium had a reputation as the one nation 
which could be depended upon to stand firmly behind the British and 
French in favor of the status quo. It was more conservative than any 
nation that had been on the first Mission. Though China and El Salvador 
were fairly sympathetic toward the unification movement, they were not 
nearly as vocal in their sympathy as the Iraqi member of the first Mis­
sion.
llSoecial Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust 
Territories in West Africa. 1952. on the Ewe and Togoland Unification 
Problem. U.N. Doc. T/1034 (New York; 1952), p. 98. (R.M.)
12«Arrangements for a Periodic Visiting Mission to Trust Terri­
tories in West Africa,” op. cit.. 409th Meeting, 2? March 1952, no. 5»
p. 180.
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The findings of the second Visiting Mission were interesting in 
light of its more conservative membership. In its report to the Trus­
teeship Council, the Mission noted that the Joint Council, during the 
four meetings it had held before the arrival of the Visiting Mission, 
had substantially deteriorated. At the first meeting of the Joint Coun­
cil, only four of six members were present from British Togoland and 
fourteen out of fifteen from French Togoland. The Mamprusi and Dagomba- 
Nanumba areas of northern British Togoland had not elected representa­
tives and the Comité de 1'Unité Togolaise of French Togoland refused to 
appoint its representative. (In addition to the elected representatives, 
each major party and organization was allowed to appoint one representa­
tive.) No work of any significance had been accomplished at the opening 
meeting of the Joint Council.
At its second meeting, the Council's deterioration was already 
apparent. The co-chairman from British Togoland asked the Joint Council 
to present the Administering Authorities with a plan for equal represen­
tation in the Council for both Territories. He was supported by two of 
the elected representatives from the French Territory. But the majority 
from the French Territory, representing the Parti Togolaise du Progrès 
and the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, refused to con­
sider such a proposal. This angered the British Togoland representa­
tives who were very serious about wanting equal representation for their 
Territory,
l^U.N. Doc. T/1034, O P .  cit.. p. 99. 
l^ibid.. pp. 100-01.
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The Mission's report revealed that at the third meeting of the 
first session the Joint Council lost any semblance of a representative 
organization. Members from British Togoland again asked for equal rep­
resentation. When refused, they left the Council, followed by the two 
sympathizers from the French Territory.The Council then consisted 
only of the pro-French bloc.
Those representatives remaining continued the meeting. At this 
time and during the fourth meeting they made many recommendations de­
signed to ease border restrictions and tie the two Territories into a 
closer association with each other. They agreed that there should be a 
free movement of food supplies and other goods between the two Territo­
ries and they asked that individuals crossing the border be allowed to 
carry one hundred pounds or fifty thousand francs from one Territory to 
the other. They thought that the time limit for British Togoland vehi­
cles in French Togoland should be raised from twenty-four hours to one 
week. The Joint Council members recommended that persons living in one 
Territory should be allowed to become members of cooperative societies 
in the other Territory and to sell their produce through such societies. 
The members also thought it would be an excellent idea to have the na­
tive languages taught on the primary level in all schools in British 
Togoland and in the schools of southern French Togoland.Evidently 
the Joint Council felt that teaching the natives to read and write the 
vernaculars would bring the two Togolands closer together in that the
^^Ibid,. pp. 103-05.
l^Ibid.. pp. 106-09.
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Ewe language was the main language of the southern Togolands and the 
western interior of British Togoland,These relatively mild sugges­
tions by the joint body would have facilitated closer relationships be­
tween the two Territories.
However, each of the above recommendations was rejected, some 
completely, others to some extent. The French authorities thought that 
restrictions on the free flow of foodstuffs had been relaxed as much as 
possible. The French opposed lengthening the time that British vehicles 
could remain in the French Territory, saying that such a step would 
allow British Togoland transport owners to truck goods all the way to 
Lome and Palime in French Togoland, injuring truckers from French Togo­
land. The French also rejected teaching the native languages, saying 
that there were too many dialects. The British and French thought one 
hundred pounds or its equivalent in francs was too great an amount to be 
carried from one Territory into the other and they would not permit the 
free transfer of more than sixty pounds. The French said the question 
of exchange control was beyond the sphere of Togoland affairs. The only 
recommendation the Administering Authorities accepted was a minor one 
asking for an increase in the number of scholarships available at the 
secondary and higher educational levels.^®
At the fifth meeting of the Joint Council nothing of a
l^joan Coyne MacLean, ed,, Africa : The Racial Issue ("The Ref­
erence Shelf," Vol. XXVI, No, 1; New York: Wilson Co,, 195^), p. 11.
18U.N. Doc. T/1034, op. cit.. pp. IO6-O9 .
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substantive nature was accomplished and the Council ceased to be opera­
tive,^^ Any further action of the Joint Council awaited the findings of 
the Visiting Mission and conclusions by the Trusteeship Council and by 
the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly.
The second Visiting Mission's resume of the Joint Council's 
meetings thus revealed that the Joint Council was not an effective or­
ganization. Boycotts had left it completely unrepresentative and those 
in attendance, having only the power to suggest measures, were unable to 
secure any real concessions from the Administering Authorities, The 
French, particularly, were unbending, even though pro-French natives 
were the only members left on the Joint Council. It was unmistakably 
clear that while the French and British had suggested the organization, 
they were unwilling to give it the support it needed to be successful.
It was also apparent that, for the French at least, the Joint Council 
and the ill-fated bodies that preceded it were no more than politically 
expedient organizations designed to pacify the United Nations.
When the second Visiting Mission made its investigation of the 
Togolands, it questioned the major political parties for their opinions 
concerning the Joint Council now that it was inoperative. The Parti 
Togolaise du Progrès thought the Joint Council was a satisfactory organ 
which might be considered in the future as the nucleus of a parliament 
for a unified T o g o l a n d . ^0 This status quo party was finding it more and 
more expedient to speak in favor of unification as an eventual goal.
19lbid.. pp. 110-11. 
ZOlbid.. p. 112.
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rather than to reject it completely. At the same time, the party held a 
strong position in the Joint Council and therefore supported the Council, 
The Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference, 
which had in the past favored Ewe unification, also spoke in favor of 
the Joint Council, although they had boycotted it. Their representa­
tives informed the Visiting Mission that the Council might be a useful 
body if it had equal representation from British and French Togolands 
and if free democratic elections based on universal suffrage were con­
d u c t e d , ^1 The disproportionate representation and the unfair means of 
selecting representatives constituted the two major reasons they had not 
taken part in the Joint Council,
The very fact that these two groups were willing to see the re­
establishment of the Joint Council indicates a change in their position. 
An all-Togoland organization such as the Joint Council meant almost sure 
death for the Ewe unification program, yet the two organizations were 
willing to accept the Council. Evidently they were concerned about the 
possibility that by having boycotted the Joint Council they would be 
blamed along with other unificationists for its present inoperativeness. 
They needed the continued support of the United Nations. Furthermore, 
it was possible that with the death of the Joint Council no new plan 
would be forwarded, leaving all unification aspirations unanswered. It 
was better to have a revised Council than nothing at all.
At a time when the Togoland unificationists might have made
21lbid.
^^Ibid.. pp. 86-87.
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peace with Ewe unificationists, they chose a separate path. The Ewe 
unificationists were making a very big concession indeed when they de­
cided to work for a revised Joint Council which would be an all-Togoland 
organization. The Togoland unificationists, by demanding a completely 
independent Togoland, made reconciliation impossible. The Togoland 
Union Party and a small group known as the Ewe Youth Action Movement, 
both of British Togoland, said they would accept no more joint commit­
tees, councils, or other compromises which might be proposed. They 
wanted nothing less than independence for a unified Togoland,This 
very distinct disagreement between the demands of the Ewe and Togoland 
unification groups reopened a breech between them which had been partly 
mended when parties of both types had worked together to form the Togo­
land Congress. It was not until the following year, 1953, that the 
breech closed and the Togoland Congress, with the sanction of the Togo­
land Union, was able to give support to the reimplementation of the 
Joint Council.
In view of the second Visiting Mission's rather conservative 
composition, its recommendations regarding the Joint Council were sur­
prisingly liberal. The Mission felt, as a result of its investigation, 
that the Joint Council's powers should be specifically numerated in the 
Council's terms of reference. The Council should have explicit freedom 
to discuss political, as well as economic, social and educational
^3ibid,. p. 112,
2^"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the Trusteeship Council," General Assembly (8th sess,), 4th Committee, 
Official Records. 366th Meeting, 13 November 1953i no, 31, p. 326,
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matters, A body with these powers and provided with sufficient funds 
might form the nucleus of a single legislative body, once the Territo­
ries achieved self-government. With the full cooperation of both Admin­
istering Powers and of the native political groups, the Joint Council 
could become a valuable institution.
Significantly, the Mission was impressed by the complaints of 
the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference about the 
lack of equal representation and by their demands for universal adult 
suffrage. The Mission said that the natives should be fully consulted 
on possible modifications of the Joint Council. These modifications 
should include changes in the function, powers and, most important, the 
composition of the Council. The second Visiting Mission believed the 
membership of the Joint Council could conceivably consist of an equal 
number of representatives from each of the two Territories, On the 
question of universal adult suffrage, the Mission pointed out that uni­
versal adult suffrage was used by the British in electing represents- 
tives to the Council and suggested it might also be used by the French, 
That the Mission, which was a conservative body, should have made these 
suggestions indicated that it was impressed by the validity of the com­
plaints made by the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Confer­
ence.
The Trusteeship Council held a short special session for the 
specific purpose of considering the Mission's report on Togoland
Z^U.N. Doc. T/1034, op. cit.. pp. I3O-3I.
2^Ibid.. p. 131.
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problem. Most of the Trusteeship Council members agreed with the Mis­
sion that the terms of reference for the Joint Council should specifi­
cally provide the body with power to discuss political, economic, social 
and educational matters. Further, they felt that the Administering 
Authorities should consult with each other and with representatives of 
the people to bring about possible modifications in the composition, 
function and powers of the Joint C o u n c i l . 27 The majority of the Trus­
teeship Council naturally relied heavily upon the findings and conclu­
sions of the second Visiting Mission, feeling that that body was in the 
best position to know the situation at the moment. Even Britain and 
France accepted the Mission's report, finding it diplomatically embar­
rassing to oppose the findings of a relatively conservative Mission.
However, a few of the Trusteeship Council members were dis­
satisfied with the Mission's report. Most significant of these was 
China, which had been a Mission member. While China's delegation en­
dorsed the findings of the Mission's majority, it felt that the report 
was incomplete. Because of a lack of time the body had failed to study 
the problem thoroughly and to make specific proposals for a solution.28
After the Trusteeship Council's special session, the Visiting 
Mission's report and the Trusteeship Council's remarks on it were
2?"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem," Res. 643 (XI), 
Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Eleventh Session: Second Part.
Supplement. no. 1 (1952), p. 3.
28«The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa 
(T/1034)," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Eleventh Session: 
Second Part. 457th Meeting, 24 November 1952, no. 2, p. 4.
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considered by the Fourth Committee in a long and heated session during 
December of 1952. The Joint Council was discussed in a calm manner, but 
the Mission's report was attacked with vigor by the more radical elements 
of the Fourth Committee, For example, the Russian delegate accused the 
Visiting Mission of being a "servile instrument" of the colonial pow- 
ers29 and the Iraqi delegate thought the second Visiting Mission was 
open to serious criticism both in regard to its methods and its report.
It had failed to attend a major unification demonstration at Lome in 
fear of disrupting order. More important, the Mission had failed to 
find out what form of unification enjoyed the most favor with the people, 
even though the United Nations had asked it to devote sufficient time 
to study the problem thoroughly. Further, the report itself was contra­
dictory, All documentation showed that the people favored unification, 
yet the Mission's conclusions favored maintenance of the status quo,30 
The Brazilian delegate also believed the report did not provide the 
guidance expected by the Committee.31
Petitioners from the All-Ewe Conference and the Togoland Con­
gress joined in the attack on the Mission. The All-Ewe Conference's 
representative asked what purpose there was in the Visiting Mission's 
leaving New York and going to Togoland when it did not investigate acts 
of violence and the prohibition of popular demonstrations, but merely
^9"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the Trusteeship Council," General Assembly (?th sess.), 4th Committee, 
Official Records. 306th Meeting, 15 December 1952, no, 32, p, 402.
30lbid.. 307th Meeting, 15 December 1952, no. 32, p. 410.
31Ibid.. 308th Meeting, I6 December 1952, no, 32, p. 414.
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collected petitions from the natives and denials on the part of the Ad­
ministering Authorities, 32
Though there was much criticism of the report, the Fourth Com­
mittee eventually accepted most of the Mission's findings and drafted a 
resolution to this effect. The Committee's resolution was quite similar 
to the Trusteeship Council's, but ignored the question of equal repre­
sentation for both Territories, The French representative had objected 
vigorously to that suggestion, saying that it was completely illogical. 
If the two Togolands really constituted one country, it was hard to see 
why they should be represented on the Joint Council like two different 
states in a federal body,33
Why did the Fourth Committee, so critical of the Mission's re­
port, accept most of the conclusions of the second Visiting Mission? 
Apparently the major reason was that it had no alternative. Though the 
United Nations had been seeking a final solution since 19^7. it had not 
been able to devise any solution favorable to a majority of Togolanders, 
Therefore, it had relied on the Mission. The Mission had been no more 
successful in finding a solution and as a result suggested the continua­
tion of the Joint Council in an altered form as the most feasible tem­
porary measure. While the Fourth Committee was not satisfied, it col­
lectively knew less about the situation than the Mission and was in­
capable of presenting any better plan. Under such conditions, it could 
do nothing but accept the second Visiting Mission's conclusions.
3^Ibid., 300th Meeting, 10 December 1952, no, 32, p. 359* 
33ibid,. 303rd Meeting, 12 December 1952, no, 32, p. 385.
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Normally, when draft resolutions have been affirmed by the 
Fourth Committee, they are passed by the General Assembly without much 
question. However, in this instance one important amendment was pro­
posed by Venezuela and Argentina to alter that part of the draft concern­
ing the reestablishment of the Joint Council. The sunendment recommended 
that the Joint Council be reconstituted as soon as possible by means of 
a direct election based on universal adult suffrage exercised through 
secret ballot.
With the support of the United States, the amendment was accept­
ed by a vote of fifty-five to nothing with five abstentions.^^ The Gen­
eral Assembly wanted to assure the native people a fair election and a 
truly representative Joint Council. The unification groups had suc­
ceeded in creating doubts regarding the manner of election of represent­
atives to the Joint Council.
Once the United Nations voted for the reimplementation of the 
Joint Council in a revised form and under altered election conditions, 
the Administering Authorities found all kinds of reasons for not imple­
menting the body immediately. These tactics continued until the idea of 
a revised Joint Council was finally dropped.
Several factors may have affected the Administering Authorities' 
attitude toward the revised Council. The new Joint Council, as
^^Argentina and Venezuela; Amendment to the Draft Resolution 
Submitted by the Fourth Committee. U.N. Doc. A/L.139 (New York; 1953), 
p. 11. (R.M.)
35"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Report of the
Fourth Committee," General Assembly, Official Records. Seventh Session. 
Plenary Meetings. 409th Meeting, 20 December 1952, no. 32, p. 4ëo.
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envisioned by the United Nations, would have more extended powers than 
any of the previous bodies, and would probably have applied heavier 
pressure on the Administering Authorities for alterations in the status 
quo. There was also the new election system to be considered. The 
United Nations asked for universal adult suffrage in the election of 
representatives to the revised Joint Council. This was fine in British 
Togoland, for British elections were already conducted under this sys­
tem; however, it meant a decided change in French Togoland. Unifica­
tionists there had accused the French of using an indirect method of 
election in order to discriminate against the unificationists and elect 
representatives who favored the status quo. If this were true, France 
would naturally have found the request for universal suffrage abhorrent. 
Any alteration in the election results after the initiation of universal 
suffrage could be taken to mean that France had discriminated against 
opposition groups in the earlier elections. Further, if France had done 
this, it would be afraid that new elections might mean the defeat of the 
status quo groups.
In British Togoland, a revised Joint Council would affect the 
movement for integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, which 
was just beginning to gain strength. Britain supported this movement, 
as it felt that once the Gold Coast was independent, the British could 
not profitably continue to rule the small, land-bound Territory, and it 
preferred to see the Territory remain within the British sphere of in­
fluence rather than become part of an ill-defined Eweland or Togoland 
possibly under French domination. Further, Britain had to consider the
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practical need to satisfy the Gold Coast’s desires. It was diplomatical­
ly advantageous to support the large native element in the Gold Coast 
Government wanting to integrate British Togoland into the colony, among 
which were many Gold Coast Ewes whose proposals for separation from the 
Gold Coast and unification with the Togoland Ewes had been flatly re­
jected. In integration they saw an opportunity to be united with at 
least some of the Togoland Ewes. Britain’s support of integration re­
sulted in an evident effort to stall the reestablishment of the Joint 
Council until, through economic aid and various other means, integration 
became so popular among British Togolanders that a joint Togoland con­
gress would be unwarranted.
The first suggestion that the Administering Authorities were not 
eager to reimplement the Joint Council came during the summer of 1953. a 
few months after the General Assembly resolution encouraging renewed ef­
forts to make the Joint Council viable. On the fifteenth of July the 
British representative explained to the twelfth session of the Trustee­
ship Council that his country accepted the General Assembly’s resolution; 
however, it was really rather early to expect the principal bodies and 
political parties in the Trust Territories to have informed the Adminis­
tering Authorities of their views on the constitution and functions of 
an organ to succeed the Joint Co uncil.This was plainly an attempt to 
stall, for the General Assembly had not said that the Administering Au­
thorities should create a new organization.
’General Assembly Res, 652 (VII): The Ewe and Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem,” Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Twelfth Session. 
481st Meeting, I5 July 1953. no* H. PP* 327-29.
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The French representative made little mention of the Joint Coun­
cil in his report given at the same session. He talked mostly of the 
progress which had been made in the French Territory and devoted the 
rest of his time to the proposition that the Visiting Mission was wrong 
in asserting that the frontier problem was not only economic but also 
political. This was a basic argument of the French, stemming back to 
World War II, The French asserted that unification agitation originated 
from economic difficulties created by severe restrictions along the bor­
der, particularly during World War II. If the economic difficulties 
were solved, the people would again be content. There was no reason to 
assume that the agitation was due to deprivation of political rights, 
Indirectly, the French representative's speech implied his government's 
opposition to consideration of political questions by a joint body and 
thus indicated French opposition to the position taken by the majority 
of the members of the United Nations,
The Trusteeship Council accepted the reports by the Administer­
ing Authorities with little comment and proceeded to other subjects.
The records reveal no explanation for the Council's failure to press the 
Administering Authorities for quick action, but perhaps they felt that 
it was not diplomatically wise to do so.
The Joint Council, or a similar organization, was still not op­
erative in December of 1953 when the Ewe and Togoland unification prob­
lem was considered in great detail at the eighth session of the Fourth
^7lbid.. pp. 329-30.
^®Ibid., 483rd Meeting, 21 July 1953» no, 11, p. 344,
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Committee, There was, therefore, extensive discussion regarding the 
Joint Council and related problems.
Various native groups were present to speak to the Committee,
The Committee gave particular attention to accusations made by the All- 
Ewe Conference and the Togoland Congress, The representative of the 
All-Ewe Conference said that France was using increasingly repressive 
measures to prevent his organization from holding meetings or pursuing 
normal political activities,The Togoland Congress' representative 
spoke at length on the need for reestablishment of the Joint Council,
He noted that in the nearly twelve months since the General Assembly had 
decided the Joint Council should be implemented in a revised form, the 
two Administering Authorities actually had done nothing towards its con­
stitution, Instead, the British were doing all they could to integrate 
British Togoland into the Gold Coast,
France and Britain defended their delay in speeches which were 
somewhat contradictory. The French delegate explained that his country 
and Britain had nearly completed a thorough survey of the views of rep­
resentative elements of the population which indicated that the majority 
of the populace opposed reestablishment of the Joint Council,Partial­
ly contradicting this statement, the British speaker said that at least 
a majority of the people in his Territory saw value in the establishment
39«The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the Trusteeship Council," General Assembly (8th sess,), 4th Committee, 
Official Records. 366th Meeting, 13 November 1953• no, 31, p. 326.
^^Ibid,. 365th Meeting, 13 November 1953, no. 31, pp. 320-23,
^^Ibid., p, 317.
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of an institution such as the Joint Council and the remainder might be 
prepared to view it with benevolent indifference. However, it was es­
sential to proceed with care and patience so that the situation which
had arisen in 1952, when the Joint Council had convened with perhaps un-
h 2due haste, would not recur.
The Fourth Committee, not impressed by the Administering Author­
ities' arguments, again urged the reestablishment of the Joint Council,
A draft resolution to this effect was passed by the Fourth Committee and 
accepted with minor changes by the General A s s e m b l y , I n  its final 
form the resolution recommended the establishment of a new Joint Council 
with the power to consider and make recommendations on the question of 
unification, as well as on political, economic, social and educational 
problems affecting the two Territories, It reemphasized the General As­
sembly's recommendation in the resolution a year before, that the Admin­
istering Authorities adopt measures to promote common policies on polit­
ical, economic and social matters of mutual concern to the Trust Terri­
tories,^ The resolution was a direct rejection of the French assertion 
that a majority of Togoland*s people opposed reestablishment of the 
Joint Council,
In spite of the evident wishes of the General Assembly in this
^^Ibid,. p. 320,
«The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Report of the
Fourth Committee," General Assembly, Official Records. Eighth Session. 
Plenary Meetings. 469th Meeting, 8 December 1953. p, 440,
^"The Togoland Unification Problem," Res. 750 (VIII), General 
Assembly, Official Records. Eighth Session. Supplement, no, 1? (1953), 
p, 28,
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matter, the British and French still had not implemented the Joint Coun­
cil in the spring of 195^. when the Trusteeship Council convened. The 
Council could no longer avoid concerning itself, and the problem was 
given lengthy consideration.
The arguments of the Administering Authorities made it obvious 
that they were avoiding the reimplementation of the Joint Council. Sir 
Alan Burn of Britain said his country was ready to help constitute the 
Council, provided sufficient agreement could be found among the people 
of British Togoland on its election, composition, functions and terms of 
reference. But no steps should be taken for the moment. At the present 
time, he stated, the British were negotiating with the government of the 
Gold Coast on a new constitution. After this was completed there would 
be a general election throughout the Gold Coast and British Togoland to 
choose members for a new common legislative body. Burn said indications 
were that the unification groups would run candidates for the seats from 
British Togoland, The strength shown by the unificationists in the 
elections would supply useful supplementary information as to the wishes 
of the p e o p l e , H e  was implying that if the unificationists fared 
poorly, the people did not generally favor unification and there would 
be no need to set up the Joint Council, The British were apparently 
preparing to present the United Nations with a fait accompli.
The French representative objected strongly to establishment of 
the Joint Council again. He said it was not wanted by the people of
^"General Assembly Res. 750 (VIIl): The Togoland Unification
Problem," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Thirteenth Session. 
505th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no, 11, p. 184,
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French Togoland. All the French Togoland representatives to the French 
Parliament, twenty-one of the thirty members of the Territorial Assem­
bly, almost all the local Conseils de Circonscription and thirteen out 
of the fifteen former members of the Joint Council vehemently opposed 
the reconstitution of the Joint Council. The attitude of the pro-unifi- 
cation Comité de l'Unité Togolaise had only provoked resentment and mis­
trust from the majority parties who had steadily and faithfully shoul­
dered the responsibility for the failure of the various bodies set up to 
solve Togoland's problems* Furthermore, the French representative as­
serted, the majority parties were worried about the attitude of the 
various parties in British Togoland and hesitated to take any stand on 
the problem of unification versus integration, as integration was pri­
marily a concern of the other Trust Territory,
It was absolutely clear now that the Administering Authorities 
were against implementation of a revised Joint Council, It was also 
clear that they were intent on destroying any hope of unification. Up 
until 1952 the unification groups had been largely responsible for their 
failure to achieve unification. Their own inability to agree had left 
the United Nations no alternative but to accept the proposals of the Ad­
ministering Authorities. But during 1952 the platforms of the Ewe uni- 
ficationist Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the All-Ewe Conference were 
altered to support Togoland unification, bringing unification groups 
closer toge the r.A nd after the winter of 1952, when the United
46lbid.. p. 185.
"Togoland, " James S. Coleman, International Conciliation.
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Nations had demanded universal adult suffrage to insure a representative 
joint organ and had asked that any joint body be given extremely wide 
powers of recommendation, the weight of blame for the failure of either 
Ewe or Togoland unification shifted to the British and French, From 
this time on, it became more and more apparent that the two countries 
would not allow themselves to be forced into actions which would aid the 
cause of unification and that they were actually giving support to anti­
unification forces.
In addition to the Administering Authorities, native groups also 
spoke, one of which was making its first appearance. This was the Con­
vention People's Party, the major political party in the Gold Coast, 
Since 1931, when it had become evident that the Gold Coast was definite­
ly moving toward independence, this party began to take an active inter­
est in the future of British Togoland. In August of 1952, its southern 
British Togoland branch issued a resolution supporting both the unifica­
tion of the two Togolands and their ultimate integration into a federal 
Gold Coast,^ By 1954, this position had altered to become a strongly 
supported demand for British Togoland's integration into the Gold Coast 
under a unitary form of government.
The southern British Togolese branch of the Convention People's 
Party argued at the 1954 session of the Trusteeship Council that inte­
gration was the natural and logical solution in view of the geographic, 
ethnic and economic circumstances of the Trust Territory, The natives
September I95 6, p. 3 3,
^ Ibid.. pp. 38-39.
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of British Togoland were not prepared to take part in a joint body which 
might jeopardize the Territory's future association with the Gold Coast. 
The people the party represented, however, would not object to the re­
vival of the Joint Council if its powers were limited to frontier prob­
lems, But they could not accept a council with political powers which 
might jeopardize the political future of the Territories.
Other groups favoring integration also spoke before the Council, 
but did not refer to the Joint Council. Pro-unification elements ig­
nored the Trusteeship Council altogether, in favor of the Fourth Commit­
tee.
Though the Trusteeship Council was concerned about the Joint 
Council, it did not again urge acceptance of the body. It no longer 
seemed feasible to insist upon the Joint Council's reimplementation. 
France was in uncompromising opposition and Britain spoke of the need 
for further delay. The Council's attitude also may have been influenced 
by the failure of any native groups present to urge the reactivation of 
the Joint Council. In this respect, the pro-unificationists' unofficial 
boycott of the Trusteeship Council during this session, because they 
felt the Council was controlled by a conservative majority, was not po­
litically sound. While the Trusteeship Council did not reverse its 
earlier position in favor of reestablishment of the Joint Council, it 
did postpone any decision on the matter until the next session.
^^"General Assembly Res. 750 (VIII): The Togoland Unification
Problem," op, cit.. 506th Meeting, 2 March 1954, no. 11, p. 192.
^°Ibid.. p. 199.
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At the following session, the idea of a revised Joint Council 
was finally abandoned. The British did not think the Joint Council 
should be reimplemented because it appeared that the majority of British 
Togolanders were against unification. An election in the Gold Coast and 
British Togoland under a new constitution had just been completed and 
candidates in British Togoland favoring integration had won a majority 
of the Territory's seats. The British believed that a revised Joint 
Council to consider the economic, social and political problems of the 
two Territories would be pointless when the majority of natives in Brit­
ish Togoland did not favor unification,^^
The French representative reiterated what he had said at the 
last session. The great majority of the French Togoland people were 
against the idea of a Joint Council, It would be impractical to recon­
stitute it merely to satisfy two minority groups in the two Trust Terri­
tories,^^
In view of the intransigence of the Administering Authorities 
the Trusteeship Council had no choice but to abandon the Joint Council, 
Moreover, the strength of integration as indicated by British election 
statistics, made it appear possible that unification was no longer fa­
vored by the majority in the British Territory, Even Asha of Syria, the 
most strongly pro-unification of the delegates then on the Trusteeship 
Council, conceded the death of the proposal for a revised Joint Council,
51«General Assembly Resolution 750 (VIII): The Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem," Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Fourteenth Ses­
sion, 558th Meeting, 13 July 195^» no. 10, p, 224,
52lbid.. p, 225.
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though he was bitterly disappointed that a properly representative Joint 
Council had never been established,-53
There were several factors which caused rejection of demands for 
a revised Joint Council, Unificationists failed to vigorously support 
the Council program at every opportunity. Their tacit decision to boy­
cott the Trusteeship Council in favor of the Fourth Committee, because 
of the Council’s relatively conservative composition in recent years, 
had left the Administering Authorities, status quo groups and integra- 
tionists free to present their position to the Trusteeship Council with­
out serious opposition from any native groups. The Trusteeship Council 
itself, by not forcefully insisting on effective revision of the Joint 
Council incurred some of the responsibility for the failure of its own 
program. Apparently it felt that nothing could be gained by insistence, 
except the animosity of the Administering Authorities, Also, there was 
some indication that the Council had begun to lose faith in the Joint 
Council as a solution, as the integration movement in British Togoland 
gained impetus.
The most important factor in the defeat of demands for a revised 
Joint Council, however, was the delaying tactics of the French and Brit­
ish, They were able to stave off reimplementation of the Council until 
1954 when the British could with some justification say that unification 
of the Togolands was no longer as popular in British Togoland as the in­
tegration of the British Territory into the Gold Coast,^ The first
53lbid.. pp, 225-26, 
^ Ibid., p, 224.
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general elections in British Togoland, which were held in 195^» sup­
ported the British contention and almost forced the Trusteeship Council 
to reject a revised Joint Council, What sense was there in creating a 
body to bring the Togolands closer together if British Togoland wanted 
integration with the Gold Coast? Plainly, the role of the integration 
movement was significant.
There is much evidence that the British actively supported the 
integration movement from the time of its conception in 1951» and that 
together with the Gold Coast Government and two major parties in the 
Gold Coast, the Convention People's Party and the Northern People's Par­
ty, they promoted integration so well that in 1954 the pro-integration 
candidates captured a majority of the seats from British Togoland to the 
Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, The factors which led to the growth of 
the integration movement are very important, partly because of the move­
ment's place in supplying the impetus leading to the final rejection of 
the Joint Council, but much more significantly because this movement led 
to the destruction of the hopes for Togoland and Ewe unification.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VII
THE MOVE FOR INTEGRATION OF BRITISH TOGOLAND 
INTO THE GOLD COAST
The move in British Togoland for integration of the Territory 
into the Gold Coast was by 195^ the strongest obstacle to unification. 
From 1947 through 1951 the unification movement in British Togoland had 
not been dangerously challenged; but from 1951 on, during the same years 
that the Joint Council was accepted, became inoperative and its reestab­
lishment was delayed, the demand for integration grew rapidly until it 
threatened the entire unification movement.
Immediately after World War II unification had little opposition 
from native groups, and from 194? to 1952 the major factor holding back 
the movement was the failure of its adherents to agree upon one type of 
unification. During this time, however, revolutionary changes were tak­
ing place in the Gold Coast, Nationalistic forces, working hard for 
Gold Coast freedom, were able to secure dramatic constitutional revi­
sions during 1951 and 1952 at the central, regional and local governmen­
tal levels. Confident that independence was imminent. Gold Coast na­
tionalists turned their attention to British Togoland and the possibili­
ty of permanently attaching it to the Gold Coast,^ They worked
^"Togoland," James S. Coleman, International Conciliation. Sep. 
tember 1956, p. 33.
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diligently to convince the people of British Togoland that the integra­
tion of the Territory into the Gold Coast was desirable.
The major native forces in this mildly imperialistic effort were 
the Convention People's Party, the majority party in the Gold Coast Gov­
ernment, and its opposition, the Northern People's Party, They were as­
sisted by the British, who greatly increased funds available to the Gold 
Coast Government for development of British Togoland. Also, through 
constitutional changes developed by the British in cooperation with the 
Gold Coast, British Togoland was given an increased role in government 
and elected its first representatives to the Gold Coast Assembly, With 
such policies in its favor, the integration movement developed rapidly. 
By 1954 Britain could claim, though not yet without dispute, that inte­
gration was more popular than Togoland unification,
British assistance to the integration movement had begun with 
the constitutional revisions which left Gold Coast nationalists free to 
turn their attention to the future of British Togoland, Since British 
Togoland first became a mandate, it had been ruled as an integral part 
of the Gold Coast, though distinguished by its position as a mandate and 
later as a trusteeship,^ Now constitutional revisions in 1951 and 1952 
advanced the Gold Coast toward independence, giving it a high degree of 
self-government. But at the same time these revisions created a dilem­
ma, Britain could not continue to administer British Togoland as an 
integral part of the Gold Coast once the Gold Coast became independent;
^Duncan Hall Hessel. Mandates. Dependencies and Trusteeships 
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), p, 81,
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to administer it separately would strain British finances, since the 
Territory was economically weak and without a seaport, Britain, there­
fore, preferred integration, which would make the Territory part of an 
area with a British-imposed heritage and within the British Commonwealth 
of Nations, Vûth this in mind, the British began working with Gold 
Coast integrationists,
British Togoland unificationists became concerned about integra­
tion very early. In late 1950t they were disturbed by a British plan to 
create a native legislature for the Gold Coast which for the first time 
would include representatives from British Togoland, The Togoland Union 
Party, one of the participants in the larger Togoland Congress, informed 
the United Nations that Britain was making a determined effort to incor­
porate British Togoland into the Gold Coast, through its plans for a new 
legislature,3
Unificationists* concern deepened when Britain took active steps 
to implement its plan for integration. During the spring of 1951 the 
Togoland Congress sent a petition to the United Nations in which it as­
serted that British district commissioners were trying to persuade the 
people, against the will of the native rulers, to vote for members to 
the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly. The Togoland Congress felt there 
should be a separate legislature and budgetary autonomy for British 
Togoland,^ The unificationists believed, perhaps rightly, that each
^Petition from the Togoland Union Concerning Togoland under 
French Administration, U.N. Doc, T/Pet .ë/205, T/Pet,7/l70 (Lake Success :
1950), p, 2. (R.M.)
^Petition from the Togoland Congress: Third Addendum to the
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step which brought British Togoland into the Gold Coast Government was a 
move toward integration and away from unification. Ultimately the 
United Nations might well be faced with a fait accompli which would pre­
clude any real consideration of unification.
At the 1951 session of the Trusteeship Council, the Togoland 
Congress Party tried to make an issue of integration. Its representa­
tive told the Council that constitutional changes in the Gold Coast and 
the establishment of a cabinet of eight African ministers signified the 
growing independence of the Gold Coast. Such advancement clearly meant 
that British Togoland could not continue to be ruled as an integral part 
of the Gold Coast and still be under British trusteeship. The Congress' 
representative stated that while the British Togoland people bore no ill 
will toward the inhabitants of the Gold Coast and sympathized with their 
struggle for independence, they did not want to become a part of the 
neighboring colony. It was only just that the Gold Coast people should 
recognize British Togoland as a separate entity and respect its status 
as a trust territory,^
The Administering Authorities defended the British move for 
closer association of British Togoland with the Gold Coast, The French 
delegate, whose country favored integration because it would destroy the 
unification movement and leave France a free hand in its Territory,
Petition from Togoland Union Concerning Togoland under British Adminis­
tration. U.N. Doc. T/Pet.ë/2Q6/Add.^ (Lake Success; 1951)* PP* 3-7. 
(R.M.)
5"The Ewe Problem (T/931. T/93l/Add.l and T/L,208)," Trusteeship 
Council, Official Records. Ninth Session. 380th Meeting, 24 July 1951* 
no, 12, pp. 297-98,
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spoke for both of the Administering Authorities, He said that any sepa­
ration of British Togoland from the Gold Coast would undoubtedly prove a 
serious setback to the development of the British Territory and affect a 
large number of the inhabitants. Integration of British Togoland into 
the Gold Coast was more desirable than Togoland unification, which would 
establish new frontiers by separating British Togoland from the Gold 
Coast.^
At the same session in which the Administering Authorities 
talked against unification and defended integration, they presented the 
plan, never effectively implemented, for a joint council to facilitate 
relations between the two Togolands. There was nothing contradictory 
about this, as the Administering Authorities had been asked to present a 
plan which would work toward unification. This did not mean that they 
favored such a plan. What the action did imply was that Britain and 
France would probably do very little to promote the success of a joint 
council,
The Trusteeship Council was not impressed at this time by the 
arguments in favor of integration and concentrated its attention on the 
feasibility of establishing a joint council. There was no proof that 
integration was supported by a substantial portion of the British Togo­
land population and the Council was concerned with finding the solution 
most satisfactory to the natives.
Late the next year, 1952, the second Visiting Mission went to 
British and French Togoland, It found very little agitation for
^Ibid.. 379th Meeting, 23 July 1951. no, 12, p, 296,
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integration in British Togoland, where, as yet, the integration movement 
had made little headway. Instead, the Mission found that unification 
had gained wide recognition in both Territories. Even the anti-unifica­
tion parties found it wise to state that eventual unification was desir­
able. The only strong vocal opposition came from the northern areas of 
British Togoland^ where many native leaders favored closer ties with the 
Gold Coast.
The Trusteeship Council's special session in November of 1952 to 
consider the Mission's report on the Ewe and Togoland unification prob­
lem did not provide time for a thorough consideration of problems since 
the Fourth Committee wanted a report on the subject in time for discus­
sion before Christmas; therefore, the integration question was not 
directly discussed. The most direct reference to it came when the New 
Zealand delegate noted that the northern peoples of British Togoland had 
expressed opposition to unification.®
In contrast to the Trusteeship Council, the Fourth Committee 
discussed integration thoroughly when it considered the Trusteeship 
Council's special report to the General Assembly which included the Mis­
sion's report. The time factor was not as important as it had been dur­
ing the Trusteeship Council session, so the Fourth Committee was able to
7Special Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust 
Territories in West Africa. 1952. on the Ewe and Togoland Unification 
Problem. U.N. Doc. T/1034 (New York: 1952), p. 124% (R.M.)
®"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa, 
1952," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Eleventh Session; Second 
Part. 457th Meeting, 24 November 1952, no. 2, p. 4.
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consider each aspect of the Togoland situation.
The records of this Fourth Committee discussion indicate that 
the integration question was a fairly important issue even at this early 
date. The British representative stated that the northern peoples of 
British Togoland had close affinities with neighboring tribes in the 
Gold Coast and were against unification of the two Togolands. Further­
more, unification was opposed by the majority of non-Ewe tribes in 
southern British Togoland, for they felt a strong attachment to the Gold 
Coast, He said that about half the people in the British Trust Territo­
ry actively desired complete integration into the Gold Coast and even a 
larger percentage rejected Togoland unification, -Establishment of a 
unified Togoland, the British delegate estimated, would be actively op­
posed by three-quarters of the population,^
In contrast to this, the Togoland Congress said the British were 
attempting to build an integration movement artificially. For example, 
they were trying to persuade the population that it would be to their 
advantage to join the pro-integration Convention People's Party of the 
Gold Coast,which had branches in British Togoland. This was the ma­
jority party in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly and was in a posi­
tion to give economic assistance to British Togoland, Beyond this, 
stated the party, the British had created a Trans-Volta/Togoland Region
9"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the Trusteeship Council (A/2289)," General Assembly (7th sess,), 4th 
Committee, Official Records. 302nd Meeting, 11 December 1952, no. 32, 
pp. 378-79.
^^Xbid,. 301st Meeting, 11 December 1952, no, 32, p. 366,
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with the purpose of placing southern British Togoland people in a minor­
ity position which would gradually lead to the loss of their separate 
identity.
There was some truth in what the Togoland Congress asserted.
The Trans-Volta/Togoland Region, established in 1952, consisted of the 
heavily settled area of the Gold Coast lying on the right bank of the 
Volta Riverl^ and the southern area of British Togoland.13 The Trans- 
Volta part of the Region contained fifty-five percent of its total pop­
ulation, thus leaving the British Togoland area in a minority position. 
However, this was not serious, as the southern British Togolanders held 
fifty-seven percent of the seats in the council for the region.1^ It 
is therefore more likely that the Togoland Congress feared the integra­
tive effect of the Region's formation, rather than the minority position 
of the British Togolanders. The majority of the inhabitants in both the 
Trans-Volta area and southern British Togoland were Ewes. The fact that 
they were joined as a region with a regional council which had the pow­
er to advise the Gold Coast Government and the regional administration 
on matters affecting the welfare and interests of the Region's
lllbid.
l^See Political Map, p. 9.
1 3"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Fifth Special Session. Supple­
ment. no. 2 (1955), p. 11.
^^Coleman, op. cit.. p. 19.
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inhabitants^-^ tended to unite the two areas. It could well happen that 
Ewes of British Togoland would find it more advisable to accept combi­
nation with the Gold Coast Ewes rather than to continue to fight for 
unification with French Togoland. This would take most of the power 
from the Togoland Union Party, which drew much of its strength from its 
large Ewe following, and some power away from the more inclusive Togo­
land Congress which was an alliance of parties from both British and 
French Togolands, including the Togoland Union Party.
The Togoland Congress had already been faced with an example of 
the integration movement's drawing power. The All-Ewe Conference, with 
Ewe membership from both Territories and from the Trans-Volta Region of 
the Gold Coast, split over the integration question in 1952. That year 
the All-Ewe Conference dropped its demand for an Ewe state as futile and 
sought other means to bring about Ewe unification. The leadership was 
divided on how such unification could be achieved. The Conference's 
founder, D, A. Chapman, and other leaders espoused the integration of 
British Togoland as the first step in Ewe liberation from colonial rule. 
A much larger faction, represented by Sylvanus Olympio and by Augustino 
de Souza of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, thought it was more prac­
tical to support Togoland unification,^^ Though the All-Ewe Conference 
had never joined the Togoland Congress, its split was a matter for Togo­
land Congress concern. If Ewe unificationists were divided on the
1 3"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration, " 
loc. cit.
^^Coleman, op. cit., p. 33-
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relative desirability of integration and Togoland unification, what 
effect would the integration movement have on those non-Ewe groups in 
British Togoland who were not enthusiastic about either Togoland or Ewe 
unification?
In its presentation to the Fourth Committee, during December of 
1952, the Togoland Congress Party also attacked the Convention People's 
Party. It asserted that the People's Party had extended its organiza­
tion into the Trust Territory in order to promote artificially the move­
ment for a closer relationship with the Gold Coast, The Togoland Con­
gress thought these activities should be condemned by the United Nations 
as unjustified interference.1?
For all practical purposes, the Fourth Committee disregarded the 
arguments for and against integration. Concerned with the apparently 
increasing demand for unification which the second Visiting Mission had 
noted, and absorbed with reestablishment of the Joint Council for Togo­
land Affairs, the Fourth Committee missed the significance of the inte­
gration movement. This was unfortunate for the unification groups. An 
investigation of the integration problem might have caused Britain and 
the Gold Coast to retrench. As it was, their promotion of integration 
went unchecked.
To the dismay of unification groups, the integration movement 
grew unhindered throughout the early part of 1953. Unification peti­
tions concentrated increasingly on integration and on its advocates'
"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
the Trusteeship Council (A/2289)»" op, cit.. 306th Meeting, 15 December 
1952, no, 3 2, p. 404,
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activities against unification. For example, the Togoland Congress in­
sisted in one petition that Nkrumah, leader of the Gold Coast Convention 
People•s Party and head of the Gold Coast Government, was trying to in­
corporate British Togoland into the Gold Coast through the establishment 
of the first local government for the Territory.18 By themselves, these 
petitions were ineffective and the unification groups did not follow 
them up with a request to be allowed to send representatives to appear 
before the Trusteeship Council, Unification groups were conducting an 
unofficial boycott of the Council, which they felt had become reaction­
ary with the change in part of its membership. By doing so, they dam­
aged their own cause.
When the Trusteeship Council met again in June of 1953, the 
British and French, therefore, were faced with no organized native oppo­
sition, Taking advantage of this opportunity, the British representa­
tive praised the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council, presenting it as an ex­
cellent example of the economic and political progress being made in 
southern British Togoland, To make his point, he quoted from the speech 
made by Prime Minister Nkrumah of the Gold Coast to the Gold Coast Leg­
islative Assembly shortly before the opening of the Trans-Volta/Togoland 
Council on the eleventh of July, 1953* The British representative 
thought the speech clearly exemplified the policy of Britain regarding 
the development of the Territory,However, he did not point out that
^8petition from Chairman Togoland Congress Concerning Togoland 
under British Administration, U. N. Doc. T/Pet.6/L.3 (New York; 1952), 
p. 2, (R.M.)
19"General Assembly Resolution 652 (VII): The Ewe and Togoland
Unification Problem (T/l067/Rev,l, T/Pet./L,l to 6, T/Pet.6 and T/L.4
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it also could be taken to represent Britain's best effort to destroy the 
move for Togoland unification through efforts to woo the natives of 
southern British Togoland,
In that speech to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly, the Prime 
Minister praised the Trans-Volta/Togoland Council as a body which for 
the first time gave elected representatives from the Volta Region of the 
Gold Coast and from southern British Togoland the opportunity to meet 
and discuss matters affecting the welfare and interest of their areas 
which had just been combined as the Trans-Volta/Togoland Region. This 
Region was to be the focal point for a vast development program planned 
by the British and designed to improve economic conditions in British 
Togoland, Nkrumah noted that the Gold Coast Government was now prepared 
to build a tarred road from Accra in the Gold Coast across the Volta 
into the cocoa areas of British Togoland, Soon it would build a bridge 
to span the Volta River so that natives no longer need ferry their goods 
across the river to reach Accra, their only port of export, A million 
pounds were being made available by the Gold Coast Government for this 
purpose. Another million pounds would be made available for other de­
velopment projects,
It is significant that the initiation of the Trans-Volta/Togo- 
land Council and programs of economic assistance to southern British 
Togoland based on it coincided with Britain's obvious desire to link the
to 6, T/Pet,7/L,2 and 3)»” Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Twelfth 
Session. 481st Meeting, 15 July 1953, no. 11, p, 328,
ZOibid.
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Territory's future with that of the Gold Coast now that the colony's 
independence was imminent. The Trans-Volta/Togoland Council brought the 
southern part of the Territory into a closer relationship with the Gold 
Coast at the same time that Britain and France were holding back the re­
implementation of the Joint Council which was intended to bring closer 
association between the two Togoland Territories. The development pro­
gram, backed by Britain, accelerated economic progress and by implica­
tion promised that integration with the Gold Coast would be profitable 
for the people of British Togoland and proved that integration was feas­
ible. It was quite clear that the British and Gold Coast governments 
were promoting integration. The very fact that the Gold Coast Govern­
ment, with monetary assistance from Britain, should speak of building a 
tarred road from Accra across the Volta River into British Togoland and 
should also speak of bridging the Volta River suggested that they were 
prepared to fight any unification which would sever the British Terri­
tory from the Gold Coast.
The Trusteeship Council failed to consider the implications of 
the British regional program. Like the Fourth Committee, its members 
were concerned primarily with the reimplementation of the Joint Council. 
Furthermore, they thought it advisable to consider the Togoland situa­
tion in conjunction with the yearly reports of the Administering Author­
ities which had not yet been received,And, perhaps even more serious.
"Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to Trust Terri­
tories in West Africa, 1952 (T/1040, T/l04l, T/1042, T/1043, T/1044 
and Corr.l, T/IO6 8, T/IO6 9, T/IO7O)," ibid.. 480th Meeting, 14 July 
1955, no. 6, pp. 324-25.
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as the unification groups continued to bypass the Trusteeship Council 
in favor of the more liberal Fourth Committee, no one came before the 
Council to make an issue of the integration movement or Britain's and 
the Gold Coast's part in it.
Only a few days after the Trusteeship Council adjourned, the 
All-Ewe Conference spotlighted the integration movement as a "plot" with 
a disclosure designed to embarrass the British and Gold Coast govern­
ments. It revealed a document marked "Most Secret," which it claimed 
had been stolen from the Gold Coast Government.^2 Supposedly inspired 
by the British Colonial Office for the purpose of guiding Gold Coast 
politicians, it was a working plan for the annexation of British Togo­
land.
The document, probably written in 1951» began by explaining that 
British Togoland was being administered in two sections, as part of the 
Gold Coast Colony and as part of the Northern Territories of the Gold 
Coast, the Gold Coast Colony and the Northern Territories being two of 
the three administrative divisions of the Gold C o a s t . ^3 Outwardly, it 
appeared that Britain was the Administering Authority, while in fact 
British Togoland was administered by the self-governing Gold Coast.
The authors of the document urged great care to maintain this outward 
appearance until integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast
^^Larmar Middleton, "Most Secret" Politics in Togoland: The
British Government's Attempt to Annex Togoland to the Gold Coast (New 
York; Contemporary Press, 195^)» p. 8.
23coleman, op. cit.. p. 17.
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was acceptable to the majority of British Togolanders.^^
The blueprint then discussed plans to be implemented immediately 
in order to make integration acceptable. The administration of the 
Trust Territory as part of the Gold Coast, while it was still a trustee­
ship, was proving to be very complicated and an obstacle to constitu­
tional advancement in the Gold Coast. So long as British Togoland re­
mained a trusteeship, the United Kingdom had to continue to demonstrate 
that it was maintaining control of the Territory. ̂-5 This meant that if 
Britain wanted to follow its past policy of administering British Togo­
land as part of the Gold Coast it had to demonstrate that it was the 
ruling force in the colony also, obviously impracticable as the time for 
Gold Coast independence grew nearer. As Britain wanted British Togoland 
to remain within the British sphere of influence, it felt that the only 
desirable solutions were the dissolution of British Togoland's trustee­
ship status and the Territory's integration into the Gold Coast or the 
designation of the independent Gold Coast as the Administering Authority, 
both alternatives requiring the affirmative action of the United Nations, 
Separate administration of British Togoland by Britain was considered 
economically impractical. Of the alternatives remaining, the British 
believed it was more practical to work for independence of British Togo­
land as part of the Gold Coast than for a change in administering
authority.26
2^^ddleton, op. cit.. p. 9.
23lbid.
26ibid,
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If integration were to be successful, the document continued, 
the Territory would have to emerge from its trust status no later than 
the Gold Coast attained complete self-government. The necessary consent 
of the General Assembly, the document asserted, would require conclusive 
proof that such a step would be in accordance with the "freely expressed 
wishes of the people concerned." Neutralization of both the Ewe unifi­
cationists under Sylvanus Olympio, who had made the first plea before 
the Trusteeship Council for Ewe unification, and of Togoland unifica­
tionists belonging to the Togoland Congress would be e s s e n t i a l . ^7
The "Most Secret" document stated that this neutralization should 
be accomplished by two means. Ewe unification leaders would have to be 
persuaded that the only way to achieve Ewe unification would be through 
integration with the Gold Coast. In other words, the sooner self-govern­
ment was achieved, the sooner Britain's restraining hand would be re­
moved and the Gold Coast would be able to prevail upon the French to 
support unification. Togoland unificationists, on the other hand, would 
have to be neutralized by securing the support of the Togoland Congress' 
leader, who should be promised a position in the legislative a s s e m b l y . 28 
The document added that these tactics would not be sufficient 
in themselves but should be augmented by economic assistance. The larg­
est expenditure should be in the southern section of British Togoland 
and the Trans-Volta area of the Gold Coast in order to weld those areas 
solidly together. For this purpose, at least one million pounds would
27ibid.. pp. 9-10. 
^^Ibid.. pp. 10 and 12.
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be necessary. The expenditure of these funds would be associated with 
the establishment of a Trans-Volta/Togoland C o u n c i l . ^9
It was believed that the northern area of British Togoland 
should also receive some benefits to keep them content, but it would not 
be necessary to expend large sums as most of the people in this region 
had close tribal ties with the Gold Coast and were already largely in 
favor of integration. Further, it was necessary to keep expenditures 
there at a minimum so that people across the border in the Northern Ter­
ritories of the Gold Coast did not become jealous.
The document concluded that a total of 1,500,000 pounds was 
needed for the development program. It said that this was not a large 
sum in light of the benefits to be received. Unless British Togoland 
were integrated into the Gold Coast, the Volta River Project might be 
impossible to achieve,T his  project to harness the Volta River for 
hydro-electric development was extremely important since the Volta River 
is one of the primary rivers of Africa, A gorge course in the lower 
Volta offers possibilities for major development. A 1950 scheme had 
even envisaged a dam larger than Boulder in the United States.32
There was no proof that the "Most Secret" document was genuine, 
but plans discussed in it were similar to certain actions the British
29lbid.. p .  12. 
30lbid.
^̂ Ibid.
3^L, Dudley Stamp, Africa; A Study in Tropical Development 
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953)» P- 302.
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had just taken, such as the establishment of the Trans-Volta/Togoland 
Council and the sudden expenditure of funds in that region. Also, the 
document in many ways paralleled the speech by the Gold Coast Prime 
Minister to the Gold Coast Assembly in 1952. Most significant, the 
British failed to deny the genuineness of the document.
The All-Ewe Conference’s disclosure was followed by a voluminous 
increase in petitions stressing activities which might be regarded as 
steps toward integration. By late fall, 1953» when the Fourth Committee 
again convened, unification groups had succeeded in making the United 
Nations more conscious of the policies of the British and the Gold Coast 
governments than it had ever been heretofore.
Unificationists attended the fall and winter session of 1953- 
1954 in full force, speaking at length on the unification and integra­
tion problems and on the "Most Secret” document. A representative from 
the All-Ewe Conference stated that publication of the document had led 
to angry demonstrations in both British Togoland and the Gold Coast, es­
pecially among the Ewes. According to him, the natives realized that 
the execution of the plan would mean the end of the unification movement 
and the permanency of the international boundary between the two Trust 
Territories. Rejecting integration and hoping for unification, the 
people were willing to accept the Joint Council as a step toward the 
latter, if the Council were truly representative and democratic. They 
realized the need for an organ such as the Joint Council, through which 
they could speak with authority and be heard with respect.
33"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of
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A representative from the Togoland Congress was present also.
He too discussed the "Most Secret" document, labeling it proof that 
Britain was attempting to integrate British Togoland into the Gold Coast. 
He said that further evidence of this was the actions of regional offi­
cers and government agents who toured their various districts in the 
Trust Territory urging people to abandon demands for establishment of a 
revised Joint Council, In light of these activities, the Togoland Con­
gress' speaker demanded a review of the trusteeship agreement which per­
mitted the Territory's administration as an integral part of the Gold 
C o a s t . H i s  demand for a review was significant in that it touched on 
a problem which bothered the British and Gold Coast governments and 
caused them to work diligently for integration. They realized that with 
independence pending for the Gold Coast it was only a matter of time be­
fore the United Nations would feel it necessary to revise the trustee­
ship agreement and administratively separate the Togoland Trust from the 
Gold Coast, As the two governments desired integration, they wanted no 
discussion of revision until they could prove that the British Togoland 
people wanted to be part of the Gold Coast. Fortunately for them, the 
Fourth Committee did not agree with the Togoland Congress that there was 
need for review of the trusteeship agreement at that time.
The British representative made a short speech defending the 
British administration and the government of the Gold Coast, but he did
the Trusteeship Council (A/2424)," General Assembly (8th sess.), 4th Com- 
mittee, Official Records. 366th Meeting, 13 November 1953, no. 31, PP.
326-27.
3^Ibid.. 365th Meeting, 13 November 1953, no. 31, PP. 323-24.
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not deny the authenticity of the "Most Secret" document and similar 
other secret papers that the unificationists claimed to have "found,"
He stated that the petitioners were trying to give the feeling that these 
secret plans and documents embodied the policy of the Administering Au­
thority and the Gold Coast Government, This, he claimed, was not so.
The policy set forth in the "Most Secret" document, for instance, did 
not represent an established general policy of the British, Neither 
the Gold Coast Government nor the Administering Authority had sought or 
would seek to hamper the free expression of the people's w i s h e s , 35 But 
the British representative did not say whose policy these documents were 
supposed to express nor did he deny that Britain had prepared the papers. 
Thus it was that the integration question was finally given full 
consideration by a United Nation's organization, much too late to halt a 
program which was rapidly bringing about a fait accompli. Moreover, 
even though a majority of the Fourth Committee members were impressed by 
unification arguments concerning the integration issue, no action was 
taken. Without actually condemning British and Gold Coast activities, 
which on the surface were humane efforts to assist British Togoland, 
there was nothing the Committee could do, A condemnation of the British, 
who had cooperated more closely with the United Nations on trusteeship 
affairs than the French, would only create resentment. Little could be 
gained by alienating Britain or indirectly the Gold Coast Government. 
Under the circumstances the only possible policy for the Fourth Commit­
tee was to continue working for unification, which it did by asking the
33lbid,. 366th Meeting, 13 November 1953» no, 31, p. 325.
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Trusteeship Council to urge adoption by the Administering Authorities of 
measures for promoting common policies on political, economic and social 
matters through the medium of the Joint Council.36
The Fourth Committee also drafted other directives for the Trus­
teeship Council. It requested that the Council reexamine all aspects of 
the Togoland problem concerned with the progressive development of the 
inhabitants toward self-government or independence, particularly those 
having to do with the special circumstances created by the constitution­
al and political situation faced by the Gold Coast and British Togoland.37 
The Committee drafts were passed by the General Assembly without alter­
ation, 3®
During its first session in 1954, which began in March, the Trus­
teeship Council discussed the particular phases of the Togoland problem 
referred to it by the Fourth Committee directives, including integration, 
but came to no decisions. The Council instead accepted a suggestion by 
the British that consideration of the whole problem of unification, in­
tegration and reestablishment of the Joint Council should be postponed 
until after the general elections in the Gold Coast and British Togoland 
during May, The British thought the Trusteeship Council would be able 
to judge the Togoland situation better after they saw how unification
3^"The Togoland Unification Problem," Res, 750 (VIII), General 
Assembly, Official Records. Eighth Session. Supplement, no, 17 (1953)i 
p. 28,
37ibid,, p, 29.
3®"The Ewe and Togoland Unification Problem: Report of the
Fourth Committee," General Assembly, Official Records. Eighth Session. 
Plenary Meetings. 469th Meeting, 8 December 1953» 1̂0 • 31. P* 440.
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candidates fared in the election to select members to the Gold Coast 
Legislative Assembly.^9
However, although no decisions were made by the Trusteeship 
Council in the spring of 195^. it definitely considered integration as 
one of the possible solutions to the British Togoland problem. Unifica­
tion was no longer the sole, or even necessarily the most attractive 
solution in the minds of those United Nations• members who were convinced 
that the status quo must be altered. One reason for the lessening in­
terest in unification was undoubtedly the fact that once again in the 
thirteenth session of the Trusteeship Council the unification parties 
failed to make an appearance, while several pro-integration groups were 
present to impress upon the Council both the practicality of and the 
widespread demand for integration of British Togoland into the Gold 
Coast.
The Convention People's Party, referring to southern British 
Togoland, claimed that integration would unify 300,000 Ewes in the Gold 
Coast with 137,000 in British Togoland, that is, about three-fourths of 
the total Ewe population,^® If the French figure of 17^^400 natives for 
French Togoland were accurate, the claim that integration would unify 
three-fourths of the Ewes would be true. However, since 1947 when they 
had estimated that there were 290,000 Ewes in French Togoland, the French 
had gradually been reducing the estimated size of the French Ewe
39”General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII): The Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem," Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Thirteenth Ses­
sion. 507th Meeting, 3 March 1954, no. 11, p. 199.
^Olbid.. 506th Meeting, 2 March 1954, no. 11, p. 192.
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population, claiming 1?4,400 in 1951*^^ As the French, unlike the 
British, had taken no census during these years, the decrease in popu­
lation seems to have been a result of France's desire to reduce the ap­
parent importance of the Ewe population in the French Territory, In 
contrast to the French figures the All-Ewe Conference claimed there were 
500,000 Ewes in French Togoland, It based its estimation on old German 
figures, which included the related Mina and Fon tribes.^2 This would 
mean that integration would unite less than half of the Ewes, whereas 
Togoland or Ewe unification would unite a little over two-thirds of the 
Ewes, Without a census, population figures could be juggled to support 
either integration or unification and the United Nations had no way of 
knowing which statistics were more valid.
A representative of the Dagomba District Council, claiming to 
speak for the chiefs and peoples of the Dagomba, Nanumba, Mamprusi and 
Gonja tribes of the North, said the name "Togoland" no longer had any 
meaning for the people he represented. They wished to become a part of 
the Northern Territories of the Gold Coast and were determined not to 
be separated from their kinsmen in that country in order that the Ewes 
might be u n i f i e d , H i s  assertion had a foundation since it was true 
that a majority of the northern people belonged to tribes divided by
^^Coleman, op. cit.. p. 13.
^^"Consideration of Petitions Presented," Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records, Second Session: First Part. 10th and 11th Meetings,
8 and 9 December 1947, nos. 33 and 34, pp. 333 and 342.
^3"General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII): The Togoland Uni­
fication Problem," op. cit.. 505th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no. 11, pp. 
187-88.
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the British Togoland-Gold Coast border,
A representative of the Buem-Krachi District of upper southern 
British Togoland also spoke.^ He claimed that the Buem and Krachi 
tribes favored integration with the Gold Coast and that supporters of 
the Togoland Congress Party were few, -̂5 His statement was not entirely 
true, for while it appears that a majority of people in the area were 
against the Togoland unification platform of the Congress, the third 
Visiting Mission in 1955 found the region almost evenly divided on the 
question of integration versus unification,^^
Though the integration groups did not convince the Trusteeship 
Council that their movement was supported by a majority of British Togo­
landers, they did persuade the Council that a strong movement for inte­
gration was in existence. Even the Syrian delegate, who was strongly in 
favor of unification, admitted that the Togoland problem was no longer 
just a question of unification versus the status quo, but that integra­
tion had to be considered as an additional alternative.^^
More uncertain of its course now that integration also seemed a 
possible solution, the Trusteeship Council passed no resolution on the 
Togoland question in its first session of 1954, but decided to postpone
^See Political Map, p. 9.
^5"General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII): The Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem," op. cit.. 505th Meeting, 1 March 1954, no. 11, p. 188,
46«Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
op, cit.. p. 32,
"General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII): The Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem," op. cit.. 50?th Meeting, 3 March 1954, no. 11, p. 195*
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any action until after the May general elections in the Gold Coast and 
British Togoland in the hopes that voting results would clarify the 
views of the native population. Therefore, when the Trusteeship Council 
reopened in June, the Togoland problem was the major item on its agenda. 
Discussion centered on the results of the general election held 
in the Gold Coast and British Togoland. The election rendered the most 
destructive blow yet suffered by unificationists. At the same time it 
elevated the doctrine of integration to a position within the United Na­
tions equal to that of unification.
The British delegate to the Trusteeship Council noted that the 
integrationists had won a majority of the seats for British Togoland in 
the elections just completed, and said this indicated that unification 
was not warranted. He proposed that the Trust Territory should instead 
become a part of the Gold Coast when that colony became independent, 
since the election results amounted to a rejection of unification by the 
majority of British Togoland people. As a result, Britain was now pre­
pared to negotiate the termination of British Togoland as a trusteeship 
after it had assisted the General Assembly in ascertaining the views of 
the inhabitants to be absolutely certain they wanted integration.^®
Britain had a good reason for suggesting that there should be a 
further determination of the people's wishes. Although Britain was 
fairly sure that integration now had more popular appeal than unifica­
tion, it realized that the United Nations could not be convinced of this
^"General Assembly Resolution 550 (VIII); The Togoland Unifi­
cation Problem,” Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Fourteenth Ses­
sion. 558th Meeting, 13 July 1954, no. 10, pp. 224-25.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
169
fact easily, in view of the Fourth Committee's’ sympathy for the unifica­
tion movement. Further, any step by the United Nations which determined 
the fate of a trusteeship was likely to be taken only after the member 
nations of the United Nations were sure that such a step was in accord­
ance with the will of the majority of people within the trust territory 
involved. Therefore, Britain suggested that some way should be worked 
out to determine absolfttely the wishes of the people. This implied a 
plebiscite, or vote by the people.
Britain's suggestion was ironical. In 1951t when the movement 
for unification was very popular, both Britain and France had rejected a 
plebiscite, asserting that no single solution could be presented to the 
people as a question answerable by a simple yes or no, and that further­
more it would be impossible to place the unification matter before the 
voters in a way which would not be misunderstood by them.^^ Now that it 
appeared integration was more popular, Britain reversed its stand. Hav­
ing prevented the implementation of a revised Joint Council and having 
successfully assisted the integration movement, Britain was willing to 
let the people express their opinion on a solution to the British Togo<- 
land situation. Its earlier objections to a plebiscite were no longei^ 
voiced.
The Trusteeship Council found the British proposal very tempting. 
Some arrangement such as a plebiscite would give the Council definite 
information as to the relative popularity of integration and unification.
Joint Anglo-French Memorandum to the Trusteeship Council Re­
garding the Ewe and Allied Petitions. U.N, Doc. T/931 (Lake Success;
1951), pp. 16-17. (R.M.)
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and might lead at last to a solution of the British Togoland situation. 
If a majority of the people opposed integration then it would be possi­
ble to continue efforts for unification. If they voted for Integration, 
the way would be open for the United Nations to dissolve the trusteeship 
and make British Togoland a part of the Gold Coast when the latter be­
came independent. Indirectly, therefore, they would have freed one of 
their trust territories from foreign rule.
Not all factors, however, favored a plebiscite or some similar 
plan. While a plebiscite would-give the people in the British Territory 
a chance to express themselves, it would leave French Togoland’s future 
dependent upon what happened in British Togoland, If that Territory’s 
people voted in favor of integration, French Togolanders would be left 
with no choice other than to accept their separate status or agitate 
also for integration with the Gold Coast,
The Trusteeship Council evaded the issues prompted by the Brit­
ish representative's speech, possibly because of the problem outlined in 
the previous paragraph. They threw the whole question into the Fourth 
Committee, with the recommendation that the Committee should place the 
United Kingdom proposal on its agenda along with the Togoland unifica­
tion problem,
Though the Trusteeship Council evaded the plebiscite issue, it 
is significant that the Council referred both the British request for a 
plan to determine the British Togolanders' wishes concerning integration
50nThe Togoland Unification Problem," Res, 1002 (XIV), Trustee­
ship Council, Official Records. Fourteenth Session, Supplement, no, 1 
(1954), p. 5.
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and its request for dissolution of the Territory's trusteeship status to 
the Fourth Committee, This action meant that three short years of activ­
ity by the pro-integration forces had increased the popularity of inte­
gration so much that Britain could suggest a consultation of the British 
Togoland people with the assurance that a majority would favor integra­
tion. A consultation would be the most important step thus far consid­
ered by the United Nations in seeking a solution to the Togoland problem. 
Should the General Assembly find a plebiscite acceptable, the resultant 
vote could well mean the first relinquishment of a trusteeship territory 
and the first fulfillment of the trusteeship system's goals of self- 
government or independence for trusteeship territories.
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CHAPTER VIII 
PLEBISCITE CONSIDERATION
After three years of vigorous activity by the United Kingdom and 
native groups from the Gold Coast, the movement for integration of Brit­
ish Togoland into the Gold Coast had gained by 195^ such popularity in 
British Togoland that it had become the primary deterrent to the unifi­
cation of British and French Togolands.
Once the British felt that a majority of the Territory's people 
favored integration, they offered to relinquish control over the area 
after assisting the United Nations in determining the wishes of the 
people as to their future. With the coming independence of the Gold
Coast, Britain could no longer rule British Togoland as part of that
colony and British leaders felt that it was not economically feasible to
rule the Territory as an independent unit.
This being the case, Britain favored integration rather than a 
unified Togoland for several reasons. It preferred to see British Togo­
land as part of an area which would probably remain within the British 
sphere of influence, rather than united with French Togoland whose fu­
ture status was impossible to predict. Integration would also guarantee 
the Gold Coast the use of the Volta River should it decide to construct 
the high dam visualized by the British, Further, the British thought it
172
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was more feasible to maintain the economic, social and cultural ties, 
which had developed between the Gold Coast and British Togoland during 
the thirty years they had been administered as joint possessions, than 
to sever these ties and reestablish the old bonds between French and 
British Togolands.
Britain's offer to relinquish the Territory after determining 
the people's wishes markedly altered the Togoland problem. Unification 
steps had thus far failed and although it left the situation in the 
French Territory unsettled, Britain's proposal gave the United Nations 
an opportunity to solve the problem of British Togoland,
Those groups interested in the future of Togoland realized the 
significance of the British offer. They flocked to the Fourth Committee 
to express their views on the proposed consultation of the people and 
particularly on integration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast, for 
undoubtedly any consultation would include a query on the popularity of 
integration.
Discussion of the British proposal in the Fourth Committee de­
veloped into four areas of consideration: should there be a plebiscite;
if so, what areas should it include and in what manner should it be car­
ried out; and what question or questions should be submitted to the 
people for their decision? Consideration of whether or not there should 
be a plebiscite began in earnest at the 449th meeting of the ninth ses­
sion of the Fourth Committee held during the fall and winter of 195^ and 
continued through the 468th meeting when a plebiscite for British
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Togoland was accepted.^
Eleven separate native organizations, some relatively obscure, 
were present to represent the three major views on the Togoland problem: 
unification, integration and the status quo. The pro-unification groups 
were the Togoland Congress of the British Territory, the Mouvement de la 
Jeunesse Togolaise and the Mouvement Populaire Togolaise of the French 
Territory, and the All-Ewe Conference with membership in both Territo­
ries and the Gold Coast. The two parties from French Togoland were rela­
tively new organizations. The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise was a 
radical offshoot of the Comité de l’Unité T o g o l a i s e , ^ the major party 
opposed to the French in French Togoland. The Mouvement Populaire Togo­
laise was a new organization consisting of former members of the Parti 
Togolaise du Progrès who had switched from a status quo to a unification- 
ist position.3
The pro-unification groups differed in their opinions on a pleb­
iscite, The Togoland Congress was willing to accept the proposal, but 
thought both Togoland Territories should be consulted. Its representa­
tive visualized an all-Togoland plebiscite under the supervision of the
^"The Togoland Unification Problem: Special Report of the Trus­
teeship Council (A/2669)," and "The Future of the Trust Territory of 
Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship (A/2660)," General Assembly 
(9th sess.), 4th Committee, Official Records. 468th Meeting, 11 December 
195 ,̂ nos. 35 and 5 2, pp. 465-66,
^James S. Coleman, "Togoland," International Conciliation. Sep­
tember 1956, p. 3 1.
3jbid.
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United Nations and free from any direction by the British and French,^
He argued that the problems of unification and integration affected both 
Territories, therefore, both should vote on thera.-̂  The All-Ewe Confer­
ence agreed with the Togoland Congress.^ The Mouvement de la Jeunesse 
Togolaise (the Juvento) disagreed with the Togoland Congress and the All- 
Ewe Conference. It believed that all of Togoland should be united as an 
independent state before a plebiscite was held, when it would be deter­
mined by a vote whether or not Togoland wished to be part of the French 
Union, remain completely free, or be federated with the Gold Coast.^ In 
the view of the Juvento, unification should not be an issue in the pleb­
iscite, only the future of a unified Togoland. The Mouvement Populaire 
Togolaise expressed no opinion on the plebiscite. As in the past, the 
unification groups worked at cross currents, continuing to weaken their 
common objective.
Representatives from five organizations which favored the inte­
gration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast were present at the 
Fourth Committee to submit their views. Four of these, the Dagomba Dis­
trict Council, the Mamprusi District Council, the Buem-Krachi District 
Council and the Natural Rulers of the Buem-Krachi District represented
^"The Togoland Unification Problem , . , ," and "The Future of 
. , . Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship , . . ," op. cit,, 453rd 
Meeting, 2 December 195^t nos. 35 and 52, p. 358.
^Ibid., 547th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos, 35 and 52, p. 391.
^Ibid,. p. 394.
7%bid.
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natives in the middle and northern sections of British Togoland,^ The 
fifth was the Convention People's Party which had its major headquarters 
in the Gold Coast,^
Unlike the unification groups, the integrationists were able to 
present a united front on the subject of a plebiscite. They favored a 
consultation of the people in British Togoland only, not of all Togoland. 
For example, the Convention People's Party noted that certain factions 
in French Togoland were against unification with British Togoland. Peo­
ple in British Togoland were not prepared to allow such feelings to hold 
them back from the integration they sought with the people in the Gold 
Coast, Any form of plebiscite should therefore be confined to British 
T o g o l a n d . This was a vague argument, but it was clear that the Con­
vention People's Party would support a plebiscite, but only if it were 
held in the British Territory alone.
Two organizations, the Parti Togolaise du Progrès and the Union 
des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo, continued to favor the status 
quo for French Togoland.Neither of them had any influence upon the 
Fourth Committee's decision on a plebiscite. The Parti Togolaise du 
Progrès expressed no opinion on the subject; and the Union des Chefs et
®See Political Map, p, 9*
9"The Togoland Unification Problem , . . ," and "The Future of 
. . .  Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship . . . ," op, cit., 453rd 
Meeting, 2 December 195^» nos, 35 and 52, p. 361.
^®Ibid., 457th Meeting, 6 December 195^» nos, 35 and 52, p. 390.
^^Ibid.. 453rd Meeting, 2 December 1954, nos, 35 and 52, pp.
364-66,
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des Populations du Nord Togo spoke neither for nor against a plebiscite, 
saying only that if there were to be one, French Togoland should also be
consulted.
Certain similarities emerged from the speeches of the various 
native groups. None of them found serious fault with the plebiscite 
proposal. Their major disagreements centered on the area to be included 
in the polling, its timing and administration,
France supported the integrationists of British Togoland, It 
was determined that a plebiscite should be held only in the British Ter­
ritory, The French delegate stated that one plebiscite for both Terri­
tories would tend to tie the future of French Togoland to British Togo­
land, Moreover, a plebiscite in the French Territory would disturb the 
Territory's peace and equilibrium and would delay its political progress 
at a time when reforms had been adopted to speed its advancement toward 
self-government, A premature plebiscite would sabotage the reforms, 
which, according to the French delegate, allowed the four largest towns 
in the Territory to elect their own mayors and which established a 
French Togoland Government Council.^3
The most enthusiastic supporter of a plebiscite for British 
Togoland was Britain, Yet the British spoke mostly about their own role 
in the integration movement, Britain was concerned lest the Fourth Com­
mittee feel it had ulterior reasons for supporting integration. The
408-09.
^^ibid., 457th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p, 391. 
l^Ibid,, 459th Meeting, 7 December 1954, nos, 35 and 52, pp.
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British representative assured the Committee that Britain’s offer of a 
plebiscite was an honest effort to discern what the people wanted.
While his country honestly believed that integration was the best solu­
tion for British Togoland, the fact that it forwarded a proposal for a 
consultation of the people proved that Britain was willing to let the 
natives make their own decision. There was no truth to the accusation 
that Britain had inspired the integration movement as a "Machiavellian 
design" to keep British Togoland within the British Commonwealth. The 
Gold Coast, of which British Togoland would be a part, would have the 
freedom to remain within the Commonwealth or to leave the association at 
the time it became independent. Besides, the representative continued, 
the British Commonwealth was not a closed trade system that operated for 
the narrow benefit of the United Kingdom.
A majority of the Committee accepted the proposal for a plebi­
scite in British Togoland, British assurances played a part in this de­
cision, but other factors were equally important. No major native or­
ganizations spoke against a plebiscite for the British Territory, though 
some thought the entire Togoland population should be consulted. More­
over, a plebiscite appealed to the United Nations because it offered the 
British Togoland people a voice in their own future. Lastly, a consul­
tation of the people would assist the international body in determining 
the exact strengths of unification and integration, knowledge which was 
essential for future planning.
An all-Togoland plebiscite was rejected because it was felt that
^^Ibid.. 458th Meeting, 6 December 1954, nos. 35 and 52, p. 401.
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the two Territories faced different problems. People in British Togo­
land were concerned with a choice between integration and unification. 
People in French Togoland were involved in a decision between a contin­
ued close relationship with France or unification. Therefore, a single 
plebiscite would not apply to all of Togoland. However, this did not 
preclude the possibility of a separate vote for French Togoland in the 
future.
Various speeches point out the distinction made by Fourth Com­
mittee members between the British and French Togoland situations. For 
instance, the New Zealand delegate believed it was necessary to have a 
vote in British Togoland because the impending independence of the Gold 
Coast necessitated a decision in British Togoland on integration. As no 
integration issue confronted the French Togoland population, there was 
no need to have them participate in the plebiscite.
While the majority of the Fourth Committee felt the problems of 
the two Territories were too different to be encompassed in one plebi­
scite, a strong minority disagreed, feeling that no steps should be 
taken in either Territory which might lead to a separate future. When 
India drafted a resolution which restricted the present consultation of 
the people to the British Territory there was a widely supported move to 
amend this draft. Paragraph four of the preamble to the Indian draft 
resolution stated:
The future status of the Territory /British Togolan^ should be de­
termined in the light of its particular circumstances and of the
^^Ibid.. 46lst Meeting, 8 December 195^. nos. 35 and 52, p. 423,
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freely expressed wishes of its peoples,
Poland submitted an amendment which would have altered the paragraph to 
read:
The future status of the Territories of Togoland under British ad­
ministration as well as Togoland under French administration should 
be determined in light of their particular circumstances and of the 
freely expressed wishes of the people.1?
This amendment was rejected by the narrow margin of twenty-three to 
twenty-one with nine abstentions, A roll call vote was taken on this 
important issue. Those in favor of the proposal that there should be a 
single plebiscite for both Territories were Afghanistan, Argentina, 
Bolivia, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, Czecho­
slovakia, Ecuador, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Philippines, Poland, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet So­
cialist Republics, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen and Yugoslavia, Those op­
posed were Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Columbia, Cuba, Denmark, 
France, Iraq, Israel, Liberia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zea­
land, Norway, Panama, Sweden, Thailand, Union of South Africa, United 
Kingdom and the United States. China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Lebanon, Pakistan and Peru abstained,^® So evenly was 
the Fourth Committee divided that had the unificationists been able to 
present a stronger case, or had other variables changed slightly, the 
separate plebiscite for British Togoland would probably never have taken
"Report of the Fourth Committee," General Assembly, Official 
Records, Ninth Session. Annexes, nos, 35 and 52 (1954), P* 15.
l?Ibid,
^^Ibid.. p, 16,
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place.
The Polish amendment was the most serious challenge to the Indi­
an draft resolution. Shortly after its defeat, the Indian draft was 
passed by the Fourth Committee and adopted without change by the General 
Assembl y,T he resolution said that in view of the eventual revision 
or termination of the trusteeship agreement, steps should be taken to 
ascertain the wishes of the inhabitants of British Togoland as to their 
future. The Trusteeship Council was requested to consider what arrange­
ments should be made in pursuance of the above decision and was further 
requested to dispatch a special mission to the British and French Togo­
lands to make a study of their p r o b l e m s , ^0
During its fifteenth session in the early part of 1955 the Trus­
teeship Council discussed methods of carrying out the instructions of 
the General Assembly, France, charging that such a move would cause 
local repercussions, frustrated the efforts of the Council by bluntly 
rejecting the appointment of a special mission as requested by the 
Fourth Committee to visit French Togoland. Not only would such a mis­
sion agitate the local situation, the French representative said, but 
its very appointment would run counter to the provisions of the Charter,
"The Togoland Unification Problem," and "The Future of the 
Trust Territory of Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship," General 
Assembly, Official Records. Ninth Session. Plenary Meetings. 512th Meet­
ing, 14 December 1954, nos, 35 and 52, p. 499.
^®"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration," Res, 860 (IX), 
General Assembly, Official Records. Ninth Session. Supplement, no, 21 
(1954), p. 32,
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the trusteeship agreement and the Council’s rules of procedure,21 
France's refusal forced the Trusteeship Council to revert to the use of 
a regular mission. Actually a regular mission could do the same work 
as the special mission, but it would be more limited in time, as the 
regular missions to Togoland also visited the other trusteeships in West 
Africa.
Without dissent on the part of any member nation, except Russia, 
the Council decided that Australia, the United States, India and Syria 
would constitute the membership of the third Visiting M i s s i o n . ^2 it was 
a heterogeneous group. Both Australia and the United States were trust- 
administering countries which more often than not had favored British 
and French proposals concerning Togoland, Yet they were not as inher­
ently conservative on colonial matters as France and Belgium. India was 
quite liberal, but sided with Britain on the question of integrating 
British Togoland into the Gold Coast. Perhaps its representatives 
thought of its own case, in which Pakistan had split off from the Indian 
state when independence from the Qnpire had been accomplished. In con­
trast to Australia, the United States and India, the radical anti-colo­
nialist Syria was a very strong supporter of u n i f i c a t i o n . 23 The
"General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX); The Togoland Unifica­
tion Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under 
British Administration (T/L.551» T/L,553)»" Trusteeship Council, Offi­
cial Records. Fifteenth Session. 59?th Meeting, 11 March 1955» no. 14, 
p. 258.
22%bid.. 598th Meeting, 14 March 1955* no. 14, p. 264.
2 3"The Togoland Unification Problem , . . and "The Future of
. . . Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship . . . ," op. cit., 46?th 
Meeting, 11 December 1954, nos, 35 and 52, p. 467.
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Mission's composition inevitably brought conflict within the body and 
resulted in a split between Syria and the others on some issues.
The Mission was instructed by the Trusteeship Council to deter­
mine what arrangements should be made to ascertain the freely expressed 
wishes of the people of British Togoland and to study problems in French 
Togoland,The importance of the Mission's conclusions cannot be over­
stressed, particularly those concerning British Togoland, They formed 
the basis for the discussion of the manner in which a plebiscite should 
be instituted and during December of 1955 provoked extended debates in 
the Fourth Committee.
There were five main areas around which these debates centered. 
The first of these concerned the question of whether or not British To­
goland should be politically separated from the Gold Coast before a 
plebiscite was held. The Syrian member of the Mission supported a de­
mand by the Togoland Congress that British Togoland should be formally 
separated from the Gold Coast and a separate legislature established 
before a plebiscite was held. He felt that a political separation of 
British Togoland from the Gold Coast was necessary to insure the Terri­
tory's status as a trusteeship during the period of the plebiscite and 
to avoid any interference by political organizations from the Gold 
Coast, The three more conservative members considered the creation of 
a temporary legislature prior to a plebiscite as unnecessary, serving
"Terms of Reference of the United Nations Visiting Mission to 
the Trust Territories of Togoland under British Administration and Togo­
land under French Administration," Res, 1252 (XVI), Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records. Sixteenth Session. Supplement, no, 1 (1955), pp. 1-2,
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only to delay the consultation.^5
This disagreement was considered by the Fourth Committee and re­
solved in favor of the more conservative mission members. A large ma­
jority of Fourth Committee members agreed that the establishment of a 
separate legislature for the British Territory was not necessary and 
would only delay the plebiscite. Saudi Arabia's representative, for 
example, favored separate political institutions, but felt their crea­
tion was impractical because independence of the area would be d e l a y e d .  
Even the anti-colonial Iraqi delegate was against separating British To­
goland from the Gold Coast before the plebiscite. He thought it was 
useless because the northern people had said they would not participate 
in a separate legislative b o d y . ^ ?  The rejection of the Syrian recommen­
dation was a direct defeat for the unificationists of British Togoland, 
who had suggested the idea originally.
Another part of the Fourth Committee's discussion concerned the 
administration of the plebiscite. The third Visiting Mission had sug­
gested that a United Nations plebiscite commissioner should be appointed 
to coordinate the work of observers who would be stationed at various
25”Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Fifth Special Session. Supple­
ment. no. 2 (1955)» p. 15.
^^"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus­
teeship Council (A/3046, A/C.4/L,428/Rev.1 and 2, A/C.4/L.429/Rev,1 and 
2, A/C.4/L.431, A/C.4/L.432, T/1206 and Add.l, t/1214, T/1215)," Gen­
eral Assembly (10th sess,), 4th Committee, Official Records. 539th Meeting. 
8 December 1955. no. 35, p. 411,
^7Ibid.. 539th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35, p. 405.
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points throughout the Territory. The main task of implementing the 
plebiscite, however, would be left to Britain.28 The Togoland Congress, 
representing the Togoland unificationists, could not agree to this.
The Congress thought the plebiscite should be administered by 
the United Nations. Its representative told the Fourth Committee that 
the United Kingdom had gone to considerable lengths to destroy the move­
ment for unification and to replace it with an artificially created de­
mand for integration. The British had worked with the Gold Coast Gov­
ernment to conduct an unprecedented propaganda campaign in British Togo­
land to convince the people of the desirability of integration. Under 
the circumstances, the Togoland Congress representative stated, it would 
be absurd to give Britain the responsibility for administering the pleb­
iscite. Could the British be expected to conduct it with any degree of 
impartiality? 29
For two reasons the Fourth Committee did not respond to the de­
mand that the plebiscite be administered by the United Nations, First, 
United Nations administration would require a huge staff and would put 
a heavy strain on the organization's budget. Secondly, it would be a 
direct insult to the British, who had initiated the proposal for a pleb­
iscite.
28"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration,” 
op. cit.. pp. 18-19.
29"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration; Report of the Trus­
teeship Council op. cit., 528th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no.
35, p. 334.
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However, several Committee members were clearly conscious that 
Britain might show partiality. The Mexican delegate wanted assurances 
that the plebiscite would be conducted fairly so that the results would 
be valid.30 The Philippine representative felt the same w a y . 31 it was 
generally agreed that the best way to insure impartiality was through 
effective observation during the stages leading to the plebiscite and 
throughout the plebiscite itself.
This decision was the second rebuff for the unificationists.
While it was gratifying for them to know that the Fourth Committee was 
concerned about insuring an impartially conducted plebiscite, observation 
was quite different from actual administration. The Togoland Congress 
was not pleased, but accepted the decision,
A third area of discussion evolving from the report of the Mis­
sion concerned the manner in which the United Nations observation team 
should be directed. The third Visiting Mission suggested that it should 
be headed by a single c o m m i s s i o n e r , 32 feeling that a commissioner would 
be more efficient than a commission. Members of the Committee were in­
clined to agree. The New Zealand representative thought disputes could 
be settled by a single commissioner more efficiently than by representa­
tives selected by the Fourth Committee from among the nations belonging
30lbid.. 538th Meeting, 8 December 1955» no. 35» P. 404.
31lbid.. p. 407.
32«Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
op. cit., p. 19.
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to the Committee.33 The Australian delegate, who had been a member of 
the third Visiting Mission, felt that a commission would have limited 
efficiency since authority would be divided. Furthermore, the direct 
personal relationship that should exist between the leadership of the 
United Nations observers and the British Plebiscite Administrator would 
be affected in that the British administrator would have to cooperate 
with a group rather than an individual. Moreover, a commission was not 
justified either by the size of the population or the area of the Terri­
tory. It was possible, too, that the use of a commission might lead to 
a dissenting opinion within the commission which could cause the General 
Assembly to question the validity of the plebiscite. This would place 
the Administering Authority in an intolerable position.3^
Those members who favored a commission did so in deference to 
public opinion. The Guatemalan delegate, for one, asserted that a com­
mission would create an atmosphere of calm and confidence among the en­
tire population,35 Apparently he believed that the people would feel 
that a commission had less chance of being influenced by the British 
than a single commissioner.
The Fourth Committee rejected the commission proposal in favor 
of the proposal for a single commissioner by the very narrow margin of
33"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus­
teeship Council op. cit., $40th Meeting, 8 December 1955. no.
35, p. 416.
3^Ibid.. 544th Meeting, 10 December 1955. no. 35. p. 447. 
35%bid.. p. 442.
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twenty-six to twenty-two with five abstentions.^^ The commission plan 
was defeated by the weight given to the Mission's recommendations for a 
commissioner and by the arguments that such an arrangement would bring 
greater efficiency.
This decision contrasted with the position taken by the Togoland 
Congress, which rejected either a commission or a commissioner in favor 
of direct control of the plebiscite by a United Nations' force. It 
thought that neither Britain nor France should be responsible for a 
plebiscite since they both had a vital interest in the plebiscite's
outcome.
In the Mission’s report, there was a suggestion that British 
Togoland should be divided into four major areas for voting purposes. 
Each area would vote upon and decide its future separately. This sug­
gestion was the fourth important topic of discussion within the Fourth 
Committee.
The Mission had found British Togoland severely divided on the 
issue of integration. The northern section of British Togoland over­
whelmingly favored it. The Buem-Krachi District of upper southern To­
goland was split on the issue, the northern half favored integration and 
the southern half opposed it. In the South, the districts of Ho and
3^"Report of the Fourth Committee," General Assembly, Official 
Records. Tenth Session, Annexes, no, 35 (1955), p. H .  See rejection 
of amendments to operative paragraph three of section A,
37"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus­
teeship Council . , , , " O P .  cit,. 528th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no, 
35. p. 338,
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Kpandu were strongly against integration. As it seemed apparent that 
integration would be one of the alternatives submitted to the people, 
the Mission felt that to be fair each of these four areas should decide 
its own future. No one area should be forced to accept a solution to 
which it was violently opposed, just because a majority in the Terri­
tory favored it. Further, the Mission suggested that if any of the four 
areas preferred separation from the Gold Coast, there should be a con­
tinuation of the trusteeship over that area, pending the ultimate de­
termination of its future,38
The third Visiting Mission's suggestion immediately became a 
point of controversy. Late in November of 1955 the Trusteeship Council 
had held a special session to give some consideration to the Mission's 
findings before they were discussed by the Fourth Committee. At the 
session the British representative stated that his country was loath to 
accept the Mission's suggestion that British Togoland should be divided 
for plebiscite purposes. He said that the will of the majority should 
rule over all the Territory. Furthermore, voting by sectors would pos­
sibly result in fragmentation of British Togoland, a dangerous prece­
dent . 39
Later, in the Fourth Committee, the Togoland Congress
38«Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
op. cit.. p. 16,
39«General Assembly Resolution 860 (IX): The Togoland Unifica­
tion Problem and the Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under 
British Administration (T/1206 and Add.l, T/1215)," Trusteeship Council, 
Official Records. Fifth Special Session, 648th Meeting, 21 November 1955» 
no. 1, pp. 3-4.
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representative opposed the British position. He told the Committee he 
was surprised that Britain should make such a protest about the division 
of British Togoland for purposes of consulting the people. They had re­
peatedly justified the cleavage between northern and southern British 
Togoland for administrative p u r p o s e s , administering the two areas sep­
arately. The northern area was ruled as part of the Northern Territories 
of the Gold Coast, while the southern sector was ruled as part of the 
southern Gold Coast.
Branches of the Convention People’s Party were split on the is­
sue of electoral division. The parent body, which was the major party 
in the Gold Coast, had gradually formed affiliates in British Togoland. 
Two of these branches were present at the Fourth Committee debates where 
they expressed differing views on the proposal to divide the Territory 
into four parts for plebiscite purposes. The leader of the Akan-Krachi 
branch said his group was willing to accept the Visiting Mission's rec­
ommendation that their district be divided. They thought it unwarranted, 
but would not protest, as they had no doubts about the results of the 
plebiscite.However, the Convention People's Party in the Kpandu 
District opposed the idea of division. Like the British, it asserted 
that a plebiscite should adhere to the principle of majority vote.
Apart from the question of principle, its representative said, serious
^"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration; Report of the Trus­
teeship Council . . . ," op. cit.. 528th Meeting, 1 December 1955f no. 
35. p. 336.
4^Ibid.. 529th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 35, p. 345,
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difficulties might result from the adoption of area voting. For example, 
if the Akan-Krachi and Buem districts voted for integration and the 
southern districts of Ho and Kpandu against it, many people in the lat­
ter districts would find themselves separated from their farms,
The conflict between the two branches of the Convention People's 
Party nullified the party's effectiveness on this issue. It also re­
vealed a difference in attitude between the two branches based on their 
relative strengths, Integrationists in the Akan-Krachi area, feeling 
they were in the majority, were willing to have British Togoland's fu­
ture determined by separate decisions for each of four areas by the peo­
ple within these areas ; but the integrationists in the Kpandu District 
were quite sure they were in the minority and therefore wanted a pleb­
iscite deciding the future of British Togoland as a unit.
The Fourth Committee had considerable difficulty resolving the 
question of how the plebiscite should be implemented. Britain, assisted 
by the Gold Coast Government, which was represented on the British dele­
gation, led the opposition to the third Visiting Mission's proposal. 
British representatives' argued as they had in the Trusteeship Council, 
that dividing the Territory might lead to the fragmentation of the small 
area. This in turn could impede the attainment of independence.^^
Among those who supported Britain were India, New Zealand, the 
Netherlands and Pakistan, While India, which had been a member of the 
third Visiting Mission, had not dissented from the majority in the
^^Ibid.. p. 348.
^^Ibid,. 536th Meeting, 6 December 1955* no, 35* P* 392,
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Mission's report on this issue, it stated in the Fourth Committee that 
division of the Territory was not desirable. Its representative as­
serted that the trusteeship agreement had established British Togoland 
as one unit and the plebiscite should be conducted accordingly.^ The 
delegate from New Zealand agreed that the fate of the Territory should 
be determined as a whole. The Administering Authority favored this and 
he placed great importance on its v i e w s , T h e  Netherlands felt that 
dividing the Trusteeship into four areas prejudged the results of the 
voting and this was not proper.Pakistan thought the division into 
four parts might bring subsequent difficulties. If one area took a dif­
ferent view from the others, it might be forced to accept the majority 
opinion of the other three. This would create more dissension than if 
the people had voted as a group with the knowledge that they would be 
expected to abide by the opinion of the majority in the Territory,^?
The arguments of those against division were valid enough, but 
there were valid arguments for division too, and a large number of dele­
gates supported it, Venezuela did not think the majority should enforce 
its will upon a minority. It had in mind, particularly, the effect of a 
large northern vote upon the fate of the southern section,^® The dele­
gate from Yemen believed that there should, at least, be a division
^ Ibid.. 538th Meeting, 8 December 1953, no, 35, p. 402.
^^Ibid.. 540th Meeting, 8 December 1955, no. 35» P» 4l6,
^ Ibid,, p, 418,
^^Ibid,. 541st Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 422,
^ Ibid,, 537th Meeting, 6 December 1955, no, 35, p. 397.
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between North and South. The holding of separate plebiscites for the 
two sections was the best way to insure satisfaction of the true desires 
of the people in each area.^9 Saudi Arabia argued that dividing the 
Territory was the only practical way to administer the plebiscite in 
view of the differences between the northern and southern a r e a s . The 
validity of these arguments as well as those against division made it 
very difficult for the Committee to decide between the two positions.
The conflict among members of the Fourth Committee was finally 
resolved when Liberia submitted a provision to divide the British Terri­
tory into four parts for purposes of the plebiscite. The proposal was 
rejected by the slim margin of fifteen votes to thirteen with twenty- 
four abstentions.^^ This left the British free to administer the plebi­
scite for the Territory as a single unit.
The Committee’s decision rendered a further defeat to the unifi­
cationists. Indications were that the solidly pro-integration North 
would muster enough votes to defeat the less entrenched unification ele­
ments of the South,
It cannot be said with certainty why a majority of the Fourth 
Committee rejected the recommendation of the Visiting Mission and the 
position of the Togoland Congress in deference to the viewpoint of the 
United Kingdom and the Gold Coast. The large number of abstentions
^^Ibid.. 539th Meeting, 8 December 1955» no. 35. P. 413.
^^Ibid.. 541st Meeting, 9 December 1955» no. 35, P* 421,
^^Ibid.. 547th Meeting, 12 December 1955» no. 35, p. 462. See 
rejection of Liberian amendment number seven.
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indicated that it was a difficult choice to make. Probably the primary 
factor which tipped the scales in favor of a plebiscite for the Terri­
tory as a single unit was its greater simplicity. Either the Territory 
voted in favor of integration or it did not. There would be no frag­
mentation and no possibility of an isolated area voting differently from 
the rest.
The fifth and last major area of discussion within the Fourth 
Committee at its December 1955 considerations of a plebiscite for Brit­
ish Togoland was the choices which should be offered the natives. This 
was a problem that had bothered the United Nations since Britain's pro­
posal for a consultation of the people had first been introduced. It 
was fairly well accepted that one of the alternatives would be integra­
tion, but there was much disagreement on what other choices should be 
offered. The Mission thought the people should be given alternatives 
in the form of questions :
(1) Do you want the integration of Togoland under British admini­
stration with an independent Gold Coast? (2) Do you want the sep­
aration of Togoland under British administration from the Gold Coast 
and its continuance under trusteeship, pending the ultimate deter­
mination of its political future?^^
In other words, the Mission felt that the British Togoland people should 
be offered the alternatives of integration with the Gold Coast or admin­
istrative separation from the Gold Coast and continued British control 
until such a time that a solution could be decided upon for the Terri­
tory. The second choice, the Mission said, arose from the request of
52"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
QP. cit., p. 15.
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the Togoland Congress for such a question.-53
The Mission's proposal did not offer the people much of an al­
ternative to integration, but the Mission felt the second question an­
swered the demands of unificationists in British Togoland. The Mission 
found that the majority of leaders wanted to establish the identity of 
British Togoland as separate from the Gold Coast as a preliminary to 
choosing between federation with the Gold Coast or unification with an 
independent French Togoland and eventual federation of both Territories 
with the Gold Coast.-5̂
If the third Visiting Mission's findings were a correct ascer­
tainment of the unification leaders' position, they indicated that a 
sharp change had occurred. There is no reason to question the validity 
of the Mission's findings, since, unlike the first mission which spent 
only twenty days in both Togolands, this mission had made a six week 
tour of the T e r r i t o r i e s , 35 But the unificationists' apparent new stand 
on integration and unification was not as complete a reversal in posi­
tion as it appeared on the surface. Discussions after the plebiscite 
was completed indicate that most unificationists continued to favor To­
goland unification. True, there was a certain drawing power to inte­
gration with an independent Gold Coast, and British Togoland unifica­
tionists were not necessarily against some type of association with that
53jbid.
5^Ibid.. pp. 14-15. 
53ibid.. pp. 2-3.
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colony if they could be guaranteed protection from domination by the 
much larger country. They felt that a federal relationship would give 
them this. However, most unificationists in the British Territory clung 
to the hope of obtaining Togoland unification first, then possibly fed­
eration. Before either unification or federation took place, though, 
integration had to be stopped. The Gold Coast had a unitary government 
and the word "integration" itself implied the dissolution of the British 
Territory into the Gold Coast,
There was immediate dissension in the Fourth Committee over the 
Mission’s suggested alternatives for the people to vote upon. The Togo­
land Congress, which the Mission said had originally requested the sec­
ond alternative, now rejected it. The party's representative stated 
that his organization thought the people should be allowed to choose be­
tween independence and integration, rather than integration and contin­
ued trusteeship.-5̂
This speech of the representative did not explain his party's 
second shift in policy. A second representative hinted at the answer 
when he noted that at the moment there was a serious political crisis 
in the Gold Coast between the national liberation movement, evidently 
meaning the Northern People's Party, and the Convention People's Party. 
He stated that the Ashantis and the northern people who belonged to the 
liberation movement were demanding a federal form of government, while
^ "The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus­
teeship Council , . . op. cit.. 528th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 
35. p. 338.
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the Gold Coast Government which the Convention People's Party controlled 
favored a unitary form of government.Apparently under these condi­
tions unificationists of British Togoland, who also favored a federal 
government, were unwilling to chance any type of association with the 
Gold Coast Government. Independence would guarantee that none took 
place except under the Territory's terms. Further, independence had 
more drawing power as a slogan than the shopworn slogan "unification" 
or the vague idea of continued trusteeship pending the ultimate deter­
mination of the British Territory's future.
In contrast to the Togoland Congress, the Convention People's 
Party of the Ho District^® thought only one question should be asked,
"Do you want integration of Togoland under British administration with 
the Gold Coast?Seemingly working as one with the Convention Peo­
ple's Party, the British also advocated only the one question. They 
explained that they were reluctant to offer the inhabitants the alter­
native of continued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of 
British Togoland's future. Trusteeship was fraught with difficulties 
and was not in the best interests of the native p e o p l e . As Britain 
had said before, the administration of British Togoland as a separate
57l b i d . . p .  340 .
^®See Political Map, p. 9.
"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus­
teeship Council . . . ," O P .  cit.. 529th Meeting, 1 December 1955. no. 
35. p. 346.
60Ibid.. 528th Meeting, 1 December 1955. no. 35» p. 334.
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unit was not economically feasible.
Members of the Fourth Committee were divided on the number of 
questions that the natives should vote on and the type of question.
Most favored either one or two questions. Those who favored a single 
question generally supported the British-Gold Coast position that the 
natives should be asked if they wanted integration of British Togoland 
with the Gold Coast, They felt this was the most important single is­
sue in the Territory,
These members thought a single question was better because it 
would be easier for the natives to understand and simpler to administer. 
The Netherlands asserted that one simple question requiring an unambigu­
ous reply would enable the General Assembly to appraise the plebiscite 
results objectively before making a decision.The Israeli delegation 
thought a single question would be simpler,and Canada's representa­
tive agreed, saying that the second question suggested by the third 
Visiting Mission would invite difficulty and doubts. It would confuse 
people who had only recently been introduced to the intricacies of de­
mocracy,^^
Most members who favored two questions supported the suggestion 
of the Visiting Mission, They felt that a question on integration was 
warranted, but an alternative should also be offered. The delegation 
from Liberia believed it was important for the people of British Togoland
^^Ibid,. 5^th Meeting, 8 December 1955» no, 35. P» 4l8,
^^Ibid.. 341st Meeting, 9 December 1955. no. 35» P» 424.
^^Ibid.. 542nd Meeting, 9 December 1955. no. 35. P* 428,
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to have freedom of choice^^ and Iraq's representative a g r e e d , T h e  
United States was of the same opinion, though its delegation thought one 
clear question might suffice,These countries believed that the con­
tinuation of the Territory's trusteeship status was the most valid alter­
native to integration since it was impossible to promise unification 
without being sure of what the people in French Togoland wanted, and the 
independence of British Togoland was out of the question due to the Ter­
ritory's weak economic position,
A few countries took positions somewhat akin to the Togoland 
Congress when it demanded the choices of independence or integration, 
Lebanon felt the plebiscite should be for both Territories and the Togo- 
landers should be asked at least two questions, including whether or not 
they wanted the independence and unification of the two Togolands, 
Pakistan believed that the British Togoland people ought to be asked if 
they wanted complete independence. If not, they could vote on the fur- 
then alternatives of integration or u n i f i c a t i o n , Syria presented a 
plan whereby British Togoland would be given a separate government; then 
a plebiscite would be held for the area, offering the choices of inde­
pendence, unification or integration.^9 These proposals, which gave
^^Ibid., 544th Meeting, 10 December 1955, no, 35, P* 445. 
■̂̂ Ibid,, 539th Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35» P* 405. 
66ibid.. p. 411.
^^Ibid.. 544th Meeting, 10 December 1955, no, 35, p. 445. 
68ibid,
^9ibid.. 542nd Meeting, 9 December 1955, no. 35, p. 429,
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some recognition to Togoland Congress demands, were varied in form and 
received only negligible support.
The two suggestions for questions which had the best chance of 
being implemented were those by the British and by the Visiting Mission. 
The Indian delegation drafted a resolution to incorporate the first 
stand, submitting to the British Togoland people only the question of 
integration.70 Liberia proposed an amendment to include the Mission's 
second question which would give the natives a further choice of con­
tinued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of the Territory's 
future,71
With the introduction of the Indian draft resolution and the Li­
berian amendment, the possible plebiscite questions were narrowed to 
two. For lack of support other proposals failed to be formally intro­
duced. Thus the Togoland Congress' request for the alternatives of in­
tegration or independence were not even voted upon.
The Fourth Committee passed the Liberian amendment by a slim ma­
jority of twenty to seventeen with sixteen abstentions.72 This settled 
the problem of questions to be submitted to the people and gave them a 
choice of integration or continued trusteeship.
For the Togoland Congress, which represented most unificationists
7®"Report of the Fourth Committee," op. cit., p. 11.
71lbid.. p. 1 3.
7^"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Report of the Trus­
teeship Council . . . ," O P .  cit.. 5^?th Meeting, 12 December 1955. 110. 
35» p. 462. See Liberian amendments three and four.
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in British Togoland and many in French Togoland, the Fourth Committee's 
decision was another defeat. Their proposal for independence as an al­
ternative to integration had had little chance from the beginning. The 
party's sudden switch from support of separation from the Gold Coast and 
continued trusteeship to the demand for independence was too obvious a 
political maneuver. Further, there was a general feeling that Britain 
was correct in saying that the Trust Territory was too small to exist 
well as a separate entity. Worse, it did not even have an exit to the 
sea.
All in all, British Togoland unificationists fared poorly. The 
Togoland Congress had been defeated on every major issue. It had sug­
gested separate institutions before a plebiscite was applied. This was 
rejected. It had agreed with the third Visiting Mission that British 
Togoland should be divided into four parts for the purpose of determin­
ing each area's future separately, but the Mission’s proposal was de­
feated. The party thought the United Nations should conduct the plebi­
scite. Instead, Britain was given the task. Lastly, it requested the 
alternatives of integration or independence in the plebiscite. The lat­
ter alternative was ignored.
Conversely, the Convention People's Party and the British had 
fared very well. Their only failure was minor: the use of two questions
for the plebiscite, rather than one.
It seemed an enigma that the integrationists should have been so 
successful and the unificationists should have done so poorly. Ever 
since the Fourth Committee had taken an active role in Togoland affairs.
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it had shown a marked sympathy for the unification groups. Yet when the 
Committee members laid down the outline for a plebiscite they turned 
against the unificationists of British Togoland and initiated major pro­
grams which were favored by the integrationists. l-Jhy?
Some tentative reasons can be given, but these are probably not 
all the reasons nor necessarily the most important ones. The Fourth 
Committee would naturally put some stock in the suggestions of the Visit­
ing Mission as the body which directly examined conditions in British 
Togoland. The proposals of the Mission, a body dominated by pro-inte- 
grationists, were counter to most of the demands of the Togoland Con­
gress Party. Secondly, the strength of integration had grown steadily 
since 1951. Thirdly, the esteem held for Britain had increased consid­
erably with its decision to release control of both the Gold Coast Col­
ony and British Togoland. Lastly, there is some indication that at the 
time the plebiscite decision was made, many of the nations were courting 
the Gold Coast. In a world of political blocs and cold war activity 
they found it important to maintain an attitude of friendship and benev­
olence toward the newly emerging state, the first West African state to 
receive independence since the war.
The decision to have a plebiscite for British Togoland apart 
from French Togoland left the latter Territory in an uncertain status.
The United Nations had hoped to send a special mission to the French 
Territory, but the French rejected this. However, the regular Visiting 
Mission performed essentially the same function that a special mission 
would have undertaken. It thoroughly investigated conditions in the
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area and issued recommendations for the Fourth Committee to consider. 
This was the same mission which had made the recommendations concerning 
the plebiscite for British Togoland.
Because of the uncertainty as to what the people of that Terri­
tory wanted, members of the third Visiting Mission suggested a plebi­
scite for French Togoland. They envisaged it as a plebiscite entirely 
separate from the plebiscite planned for British Togoland. Its purpose 
would be to determine the relative strength of opposing groups within 
the Territory. The Mission claimed it was impossible to ascertain party 
strength and the relative popularity of such programs as unification and 
continuation of the status quo merely by visiting the area, A plebi­
scite would help to do this.^^
The Mission thought the plebiscite should offer the choice of 
self-government within the French Union or the termination of French 
Togoland's connection with the French Union and independence. It rec­
ommended that the plebiscite be held under the observation of United 
Nations personnel.
At the same time that the Mission recommended a plebiscite it 
took note of political discrimination by the French. It said, "The Mis­
sion has to note with regret that opposition parties in Togoland under 
French Administration do not have quite the same facilities for carrying
"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
op. cit.. pp. 17-18.
74Ibid.. p. 18,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
204
on their political activities as is the case in Togoland under British 
Administration . . . ,”75 Also, in the Mission's record of its trip 
through French Togoland there were numerous accounts of disturbances and 
rioting,7^
The French Togoland organizations and parties viewed the Mis­
sion's suggestion for a consultation of the people with mixed emotions. 
The All-Ewe Conference, which had originally called the United Nation's 
attention to the question of Ewe unification, thought any plebiscite 
should be for both Togoland Territories, The issues were integration 
versus unification and federation with the Gold Coast, The questions 
should be stated: ”Do you want integration? Do you want unification
with eventual federation with the Gold Coast?”77
The Comite de l'Unité Togolaise, which had been the major party 
in French Togoland and now formed the major opposition to the French, 
also asked for a plebiscite for all of Togoland. It suggested the al­
ternatives of "independence preceding the unification of the two Ter­
ritories" and the "independence of one Territory /British Togoland/ 
forming an integral part of another sovereign State or association of 
States,"78
A splinter group of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, the Mouve­
ment de la Jeunesse Togolaise, ignored plebiscite considerations and
^^Ibid,, p, 17, 
7^Ibid,, pp, 36-42.
77ibid,. p, 5 1.
^Qjbid,, p, 56.
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suggested instead the immediate independence of all of Tbgoland.?? This 
small militant group felt that the Comité de l’Unité Togolaise was not 
working hard enough for the freedom of French Togoland from French domi­
nation.
The pro-French parties were not completely against a plebiscite, 
but were opposed to the forms proposed by the All-Ewe Conference and the 
Comité de l'Unité Togolaise. The southern Parti Togolaise du Progrès 
stated that it was willing to accept some kind of consultation in French 
Togoland to put an end to French Togoland's trusteeship status.®^ The 
Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo took the same position.
There was a wide variety of statements by the different French 
Togoland groups concerning the Mission's reports of discrimination and 
rioting in the Territory. The All-Ewe Conference claimed that France 
was trying to swallow French Togoland into the French Union. It said 
French Togoland was being drawn in step by step without consultation of 
the people. At present the French were administering the Territory as 
if it were part of the French Republic. The All-Ewe Conference recog­
nized that reforms giving further power to the people had been made, but 
it felt these were only minor concessions to divert the people's atten­
tion from reforms in the Gold Coast, to strengthen the power of the pro- 
French groups, and to weaken the independence and unification movement. 
The primary goal of the French, the organization declared, was to remove
79lbid.. p. 58.
80lbid.. p. 53. 
Blfbid.. p. 54.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
206
French Togoland from trusteeship status and completely absorb it into 
the French Republic.®^
The Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo and the 
Parti Togolaise du Progrès of the South, both status quo and pro-French 
parties, defended French policies and blamed the United Nations and mi­
nority parties for difficulties in French Togoland. The Union des Chefs 
et des Populations du Nord Togo claimed that the French authorities were 
not to blame for rioting and other actions noted in the Mission's report. 
Agitation of minorities stimulated by the upsetting influence of the 
visiting missions created the d i f f i c u l t i e s . ^3 The Parti Togolaise du 
Progrès praised the French for the financial assistance it was giving 
the Territory and for the increase of governmental powers delegated to
the people. Like the Union des Chefs et des Populations du Nord Togo,
it blamed minorities and the United Nations for the agitation in its 
country. The party said that United Nations' supervision over the area 
gave minorities an opportunity to stir up disorders.®^
The radically pro-Togoland unification Mouvement de la Jeunesse
Togolaise, a splinter organization of the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise,
made a strong allegation against France. It accused that country of in­
stigating anti-United Nations sentiment in French Togoland. The party's
®^"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration . . . ," op. cit., 
529th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 35» PP* 349-51*
369- 70.
^^Tbid.. 530th Meeting, 1 December 1955, no. 35, P* 353* 
®^Ibid., 532nd Meeting, 2 December 1955, no. 35, PP* 3^7 and
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representative asserted that the French had h a r s h l y  criticized the United 
Nations and various United Nations officials in an article published in 
the official French Togoland newspaper, Togo Français. Further, the 
French authorities had prevented any United Nations anniversary celebra­
tions,®^
The Fourth Committee took note of each organization's comments 
on discrimination, rioting and other local disturbances, but was most 
concerned with the accusations of the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togo­
laise, It investigated these assertions, particularly those concerning 
the article alleged to have been written in the official newspaper. The 
Committee found that the article existed and had been written by a mem­
ber of the French delegation to the Trusteeship Council in an attempt 
to discredit certain member countries and the entire United Nations or­
ganization.®^
The existence of this article, the third Visiting Mission's im­
plication that there was suppression of opposition parties, and the uni­
fication parties' accusations that France was trying to dissolve the 
French Togoland Territory into the French Union, made the Fourth Commit­
tee very skeptical of French intentions. Therefore, it was not willing 
to relinquish control over the Territory, as France suggested. On the 
other hand, it was not ready to unify British and French Togolands and 
give them independence, as the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise had 
requested. There were French opinion, French Togoland native opinion
®^Ibid.. 530th Meeting, 1 December 1955» 35» PP- 357-58.
®^Ibid.. 532nd Meeting, 2 December 1955» rio. 35* P- 3&7.
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and the British Togoland integration question to be considered. The 
best answer seemed to be a separate plebiscite for French Togoland.
Various groups had expressed their opinion on the type of plebi­
scite which should take place, if it were decided one was feasible for 
French Togoland, The Fourth Committee rejected all recommendations ex­
cept that part of the Visiting Mission's report which suggested that 
some type of plebiscite should be held as soon as political reforms, 
contemplated by the Administering Authority, were in force,includ­
ing elections by universal adult suffrage and secret ballot. The Fourth 
Committee felt that the implementation of the contemplated reforms would 
play a helpful role in the ascertainment of the inhabitants' wishes at 
an early date by direct and democratic methods.®®
The struggle of the various groups for approval of their views 
on the French Togoland situation was in the most part fruitless. The 
French and pro-French native elements had been rebuked. The Committee 
was not ready to turn over control of French Togoland completely to the 
French, for it was not convinced that this would be in keeping with the 
will of the majority. In a sense, this was victory for the anti-French, 
pro-unification groups, who saw in the dissolution of French Togoland's 
trusteeship status, domination by the French and the destruction of all
^"Special Report on the Togoland Unification Problem and the 
Future of the Trust Territory of Togoland under British Administration," 
op. cit.. p. 17.
®®"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration," Res. 9 ^  (X), Gen­
eral Assembly, Official Records. Tenth Session. Supplement, no. 19
(1955). p. 25.
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hopes for unification or independence. But at the same time, the pro­
unification demands, among which were unification and independence, had 
been refused. Instead, the Fourth Committee suggested that a plebiscite 
should be held under direct and democratic means, leaving France with 
the task of suggesting the date for a consultation, the type of consul­
tation and the alternatives to be o f f e r e d . The major demands of both 
sides had been rejected and neither was enthusiastic about the sugges­
tion of a French Togoland plebiscite.
The reasoning behind the Fourth Committee's position is evident. 
The situation in French Togoland was so confused that the third Visiting 
Mission was unwilling to suggest any solution other than a consultation 
which would help determine what the people wanted. The Mission empha­
sized that the plebiscite should be conducted under guaranteed democrat­
ic means and therefore it suggested that it would be désirable to wait 
until France had established truly democratic voting procedures before 
consulting the population. The Fourth Committee felt that this reason­
ing was very sound and as a consequence incorporated the Mission's sug­
gestions in its resolution concerning French Togoland.
While the future of French Togoland was uncertain, Britain made 
preparations for the plebiscite in British Togoland. Once the prepara­
tions were completed, the future of British Togoland, integration into 
the Gold Coast or continued trusteeship, would depend in part upon the 
decision of the people. The final decision on the Territory's future
89lbid.
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depended, however, upon the General Assembly, which would rely on the 
Fourth Committee's analysis of the plebiscite results.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER IX
THE BRITISH TOGOLAND PLEBISCITE AND ITS RESULTS
In December of 1955» the Fourth Committee completed the general 
framework for a plebiscite in British Togoland. After having been 
troubled for over eight years by the Togoland problem, the United Na­
tions now had an opportunity to resolve at least part of it.
The Fourth Committee had decided that the alternatives offered 
to the British Togoland people should be integration into the Gold 
Coast, or continued trusteeship pending the ultimate determination of 
the Territory's future. These alternatives marked a real victory for 
the integrationist movement, which had only become active in 1951 with 
the realization by Britain and certain elements in the Gold Coast that 
the pending independence of the Gold Coast would separate British Togo­
land from the colony unless a demand for integration could be created, 
Integrationists now had their platform on the ballot as one of the 
choices for British Togoland's future, directly challenging the hopes of 
unificationists•
The plebiscite alternatives as formulated were very unsatisfac­
tory to unificationists, for continued trusteeship lacked the appeal 
needed to meet the challenge of integration with a new state at the time 
of that state's independence. Continued trusteeship offered the people
211
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only the status quo until such a time as a decision could be made on 
other possible alternatives.
The Fourth Committee had its reasons for offering continued 
trusteeship as one of the two choices. If felt that the people should 
be allowed some selection in voting on their future, and continued trus­
teeship seemed the only alternative to integration at the moment. An 
immediate vote on unification was impossible because of the need for de­
termining the wishes of the French Togoland people. The Fourth Commit­
tee did not want to take any steps in this direction until France ini­
tiated new voting reforms. Independence, a choice suggested by unifi­
cationists because it had immediate appeal and would leave British Togo­
land free to decide its own future, was out of the question as far as the 
Committee was concerned. The British Territory was not economically able 
to support itself as a separate unit.
Whether the alternatives offered in the plebiscite were complete­
ly satisfactory or not, it was an inescapable fact that the future of 
Togoland, which the various groups had fought so hard to direct through 
appeals to the United Nations and by activities within the Territories, 
now depended upon the outcome of the plebiscite in British Togoland,
In itself, the plebiscite was of great significance as a mile­
stone in trusteeship history. It represented the first opportunity for 
a Trust Territory to vote upon its own future. This did not mean, how­
ever, that British Togoland would immediately receive whichever of the 
two alternatives the people selected. The United Nations reserved for 
itself the right to consider the plebiscite results and decide whether
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the British Trusteeship should continue or the Territory should become 
a part of the Gold Coast when that colony gained its independence.
The importance of the United Nations in the ultimate determina­
tion of British Togoland's future was well-recognized by Britain, the 
Gold Coast and the political parties of British Togoland. After the 
plebiscite they did their utmost to influence the final verdict of the 
United Nations,
For its part, the United Nations had many factors to consider 
before reaching a final verdict, of which British, Gold Coast and the 
British Togoland party viewpoints were only one. The most important 
considerations would be the results of the plebiscite as analyzed by the 
United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and the British Plebiscite Admin­
istrator, the unsettled constitutional situation in the Gold Coast, and 
the Gold Coast and British Togoland general elections which were sched­
uled to take place after the plebiscite.
The plebiscite was held on the ninth of May 1956,^ with the 
blessings of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner, Eduardo Espi­
nosa y Prieto of Mexico. Fifty-eight percent of the people voted in 
favor of integration (now called union) and forty-two percent in favor 
of separation.2 These figures seemed to indicate clearly that the 
United Nations should release British Togoland from trusteeship control 
and turn the Territory over to the Gold Coast; however, other factors
^The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration. U.N, Doc, A/3173 
(New York: 1956), p. 63. (R.M.)
^Ibid.. p. 183.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
214
complicated the situation. A deeper analysis of the voting results re­
vealed that while a majority of the people had given their approval to 
union, the Ewes had voted overwhelmingly against such a step. Thirty- 
six thousand natives in the Ewe-dominated districts of Kpandu and Ho re­
jected union and only 15,800 had accepted it.^ Furthermore, there were 
accusations of discrimination against the people of the South during 
registration for voting and accusations of infiltration from the Gold 
Coast and French Togoland, The infiltration supposedly consisted of 
natives who hoped to get on the list of registered voters, and of polit­
ical agitators. A more important factor which complicated a decision 
to relinquish British Togoland as a result of the plebiscite was the 
regular general elections scheduled for the Gold Coast and British To­
goland immediately after the plebiscite. If the integrationist parties 
in British Togoland were defeated, the results of the plebiscite would 
be open to question. Lastly, a new constitution was being considered 
for the Gold Coast in preparation for its emergence as an independent 
state. The United Nations needed to know its content before the organi­
zation relinquished control of British Togoland to the Gold Coast Gov­
ernment. All of these factors prevented a simple decision based upon 
the natives' majority expression in favor of integration.
The accusations of discrimination and infiltration were the 
least troublesome of those elements that complicated consideration of 
plebiscite results. The Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee
3"Memorandum by the Administering Authority," Trusteeship Coun­
cil, Official Records. Eighteenth Session. Annexes, no. 12 (1956), p. 
10.
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were not particularly concerned about them. The United Nations Plebi­
scite Commissioner assured both organs that discrimination and infiltra­
tion had not been serious enough to alter the results of the plebiscite.^ 
Yet infiltration from the Gold Coast had been serious enough to 
result in a dispute between the Plebiscite Commissioner and the Governor 
of the Gold Coast, Leading personalities from both the Gold Coast and 
French Togoland visited the British Territory during preliminary stages 
of the plebiscite and made speeches. Those from the Gold Coast had in­
cluded ministers of government. The British did not consider this ille­
gal as long as such government officials represented constituencies in 
British Togoland, but the Plebiscite Commissioner felt that all ministers 
should disassociate themselves completely from any activity concerning 
the plebiscite. This matter was settled to the satisfaction of the 
Plebiscite Commissioner, though unification groups continued to com­
plain. After the plebiscite was completed he stated that neither infil­
tration from the Gold Coast nor French Togoland had been serious,^
While it is impossible to discern whether the Plebiscite Com­
missioner was justified in minimizing the amount of infiltration, there 
were indications that he was not altogether justified in downgrading 
complaints of discrimination against southern natives which centered on 
the use of tax receipts for voting registration. In preparation for the
^U.N. Doc. A/3173, OP. cit.. p. 8 5.
^’Report of the Plebiscite Administrator on the Plebiscite held 
in Togoland under British Administration on 9 May 195&," Trusteeship 
Council, Official Records. Eighteenth Session. Annexes, no. 12 (1956), 
p. 3.
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plebiscite, new registration rolls were prepared for all of British To­
goland. Registrants were required to be twenty-one years old and resi­
dents in British Togoland for an aggregate of twelve months in the past 
two years. The British decided that tax receipts should be used as the 
primary means of establishing whether a native had been a resident, 
though the receipts were supposed to be regarded by registration admini­
strators as contributory and not conclusive evidence.^ The southern na­
tives stated that the administrators insisted too much on the presenta­
tion of tax receipts as proof of residence and that two years' tax re­
ceipts were being required. If true, these accusations were quite seri­
ous, Southern natives were less inclined to pay their taxes and there­
fore many were without tax receipts. To register they would have to pay 
their taxes in order to be able to present the receipt needed as proof
of residence.7
In the British Plebiscite Administrator's report to the Trus­
teeship Council, the British denied that there had been an overemphasis 
on the use of tax receipts. They said that the presentation of tax re­
ceipts as proof of citizenship for registration had not been compulsory. 
An examination of twenty wards in the Ewe district of Kpandu had re­
vealed that thirty-five percent of the registrants had been able to 
register without the presentation of tax receipts and another forty-two
^Ibid.
7u.N. Doc. A/3173, OP. cit.. pp. 148-49.
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percent had presented tax receipts for only one year,® The British said 
this was indicative of the fact that natives had been able to register 
in the South without tax receipts, particularly two years' receipts. 
However, they failed to comment on the fact that twenty-three percent of 
the natives who registered in the Kpandu District had presented tax re­
ceipts for two years,9
The United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner recognized the tax 
receipt problem in his report to the United Nations, but regarded dis­
crimination as inconsequential. He noted that Britain had rather strict­
ly enforced the use of two years' tax receipts as proof of citizenship, 
but in the North as well as in the South. Furthermore, such practices 
had only occurred during the early stages of registration. He agreed 
that this enforcement had had the effect of forcing the natives to pay 
their taxes in order to become registered voters, and he acknowledged 
that the requirement of receipts would have a more adverse effect in the 
South where the people were less inclined to pay their taxes. But he 
felt that the tax problem had been solved by later stressing that there 
were other means of proving residence when a person could not or was not 
willing to produce tax r e c e i p t s . S o  far as he could tell, all eligi­
ble voters had had a chance to register,^
® "Report of the Plebiscite Administrator on the Plebiscite held 
in Togoland under British Administration on 9 May 195&," loc. cit,
9lbid,. p. 8 .
lOu.N. Doc. A/3173, OP. cit.. pp. 148-51. 
l^Ibid,. p. 467.
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The Plebiscite Commissioner's conclusion was questionable, though 
there is no doubt that he honestly believed all eligible voters had been 
given an opportunity to register. The United Nations was mistaken in 
accepting his observations at face value, for a study of the registra­
tion and voting statistics reveals a strange contradiction. Though the 
natives of the southern areas of British Togoland were politically more 
mature than the northern people^^ and were very concerned about the in­
tegration question, only fifty-six percent were on the registration 
lists compared to seventy-four percent in the N o r t h . T h i s  could be 
taken to indicate a deeper interest in the plebiscite among the north­
ern people. But if so, why did a larger percentage of southern regis­
tered voters cast their ballots than northern registered voters— eighty- 
five percent as compared to seventy-eight p e r c e n t T h i s  contradiction 
may not mean that there was discrimination in the South during registra­
tion, but it was significant enough to warrant consideration.
The first of the complicating factors to have a direct effect 
upon the United Nations' consideration of the plebiscite results was the 
voting pattern of the plebiscite. The Trusteeship Council and the Fourth 
Committee ignored infiltration and discrimination, feeling they had 
little consequence in the voting results and therefore were unimportant 
in the question of integrating British Togoland into the Gold Coast :
"Togoland," James 5. Coleman, International Conciliation, Sep­
tember 1956, p. 1 3.
"Report of the Plebiscite Administrator on the Plebiscite held 
in Togoland under British Administration on 9 May 1956, op. cit., p. 8.
l̂ Tbid.
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but they found the voting pattern in the plebiscite more significant. 
Though most of the Territory had voted in favor of integration, that is, 
union, the southernmost districts rejected it. Sixty-nine percent of 
the natives in the Ewe-dominated Ho and Kpandu districts were against 
i ntegration,
The Plebiscite Commissioner was very impressed by the anti-inte- 
grationist Togoland Congress Party's showing in these two districts. He 
said about the party, "Seeing the enthusiasm and faith with which their 
people flocked to the polls on the ninth of May, it was not difficult to 
recognize in the greater part of their voters the live flame of a pros­
pect that had failed to make headway at the General Assembly, Ewe and 
Togoland unification." He believed that the recommendation of the third
Visiting Mission for a division of British Togoland might be proposed
/
again to give these southern people satisfaction.^^ The Commissioner was 
speaking of the proposal whereby British Togoland would be divided into 
sections, allowing each section to decide whether it wanted to integrate 
with the Gold Coast or remain a British Trusteeship until such a time 
that its future could be decided. United Nations members who had origi­
nally favored the defeated proposal for division were now loath to ig­
nore the pattern of voting or the tentative proposal of the United Na­
tions Plebiscite Commissioner.
The Togoland Congress made an effort to win the support of these 
and other members who favored British Togoland division. Speaking
^^Ibid.. p. 5.
l^u.N. Doc. A/3173. OP. c i t .. p. 6 3.
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before the Fourth Committee in November of 1956, its representative 
noted that although the northern part of British Togoland favored inte­
gration, thé South was against it. He could not see how this justified 
the integration of the entire T e r r i t o r y . ^7
This argument did not receive the support hoped for. Britain 
was adamant in its rejection of division,in contrast to its rather 
conciliatory tone on other matters. Members of the Committee were not 
anxious to risk its ire on such an issue. Moreover, many members were 
already in agreement with Britain. Perhaps most important, the Fourth 
Committee members were concerned with winning the good will of the Gold 
Coast, which maintained the same viewpoint as Britain, As one of the 
first black African colonies to receive independence, the Gold Coast 
would probably wield a powerful influence on the other colonial areas 
of Negro Africa and ultimately in world affairs.
The Fourth Committee had two other matters to consider before 
reaching a conclusion on British Togoland's future, the general elec­
tions in British Togoland and the Gold Coast, and the formulation of a 
constitution for the Gold Coast. The United Nations Plebiscite Commis­
sioner brought the elections to the attention of the United Nations.
He reported that the political coalition which won the Gold Coast and
^^"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Reports of the Uni­
ted Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and of the Trusteeship Council (A/ 
3169 and Corr.l, A/3173 and Add.l, A/3323, A/C.4/332 and Add.l, A/C.4/ 
334, 336, 337; A/C.4/L.435 and Add.l and 2)," General Assembly (11th 
sess.), 4th Committee, Official Records. 554th Meeting, 26 November 
1956, no. 39, pp. 18-21.
"Memorandum by the Administering Authority," loc. cit.
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British Togoland election would be in a legal position to formulate a
constitution for the Gold Coast.^9 it seemed strange that British Togo­
land should take part in Gold Coast elections when the decision on its
integration with the Gold Coast was still pending, but Britain adminis­
tered the Territory as part of the colony and as a consequence British 
Togoland sent representatives to the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly.
The Plebiscite Commissioner believed that the election returns 
might alter the plebiscite results. At the present time there was a 
dispute between adherents of the federal and unitary forms of govern­
ment. The Convention People's Party, which controlled the Gold Coast 
Government, favored a constitution which would formulate a central, uni­
tary form of democratic government. A coalition of British Togoland 
parties and northern groups in the Gold Coast opposed unitary govern­
ment. They felt that a new constitution should create a federal form 
of government, which would give some autonomy to British Togoland and 
the northern Gold Coast. If the coalition forces, of which the Togoland 
Congress was a part, won, the Plebiscite Commissioner thought the re­
sults of the plebiscite might be reversed. The architects of the plebi­
scite had foreseen integration to mean union under a unitary form of 
government. Federalists would probably devise a constitution whereby 
the Gold Coast, including British Togoland, would be a loose federation 
of states.20
It was a paradox that the Togoland Congress of southern British
19u .n . Do c . A/3173, o p . cit.. p. 469. 
ZOlbid.
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Togoland united with natives of the North on the issue of federation, 
when only recently the two areas had been at odds on integration. It 
was even more paradoxical that natives of northern British Togoland 
should begin to look askance at integration. The Togoland Congress' 
reason for joining with the northern groups was simple enough. IVhile a 
majority of its members were still against integration, the results of 
the plebiscite made them realize that integration might be imminent.
They felt that a federation would at least guarantee some autonomy to 
British Togoland. They would have preferred Togoland unification first 
and then possible federation with the Gold Coast, but the results of the 
plebiscite had destroyed that hope. Therefore, the Togoland Congress 
joined with the northern groups, which already favored federation, to 
secure added support.
Why the natives of the northern areas of the Gold Coast and 
British Togoland favored a federal form of government and why those in 
British Togoland had become wary of integration were more complicated 
questions. The answers lay in the Gold Coast. There the more highly 
advanced natives of the South dominated the colony. Through the Conven­
tion People's Party they governed the Gold Coast, except in fields where 
Britain maintained control. The northerners of both the Gold Coast and 
British Togoland feared the political strength of the southern Gold 
Coast natives. 'Æile natives in northern British Togoland still wanted 
integration with their brothers in the Gold Coast Northern Territories, 
they were unwilling to accept integration with all of the colony unless 
they had some assurances that integration did not mean domination by the
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southern Gold Coast people. Therefore, they united with tribes in 
southern British Togoland and the northern Gold Coast to demand a fed­
eral form of government and to defeat the Convention People's Party.
The British Togoland-Gold Coast election was held in July of 
1956 during the Trusteeship Council's eighteenth session. Despite heavy 
opposition, the Convention People's Party won a majority of the seats. 
This meant that the Plebiscite Commissioner's apprehensions had not been 
fulfilled and the results of the plebiscite were not reversed. In the 
eyes of the Trusteeship Council the election results warranted immediate 
integration. It recommended that the General Assembly take appropriate 
steps to terminate the trusteeship agreement for the Territory, effec­
tive when the Gold Coast attained independence,^^
The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly was of a more skep­
tical temperament and was not willing to accept the election returns at 
face value. Furthermore, they were lobbied by anti-integrationists, who 
had ignored the Trusteeship Council completely, viewing its membership 
as hopelessly reactionary.
The Togoland Congress was not willing to give up the fight, even 
though it had been defeated in the plebiscite and the general election. 
After all, the Togoland Congress' platform against integration had won
^^"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration : Reports of the Uni­
ted Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and the Trusteeship Council . . . , " 
op. cit.. 55^th Meeting, 26 November 195^, no. 39, P» 26.
"The Future of Togoland under British Administration," Res. 
1496 (XVIII), Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Eighteenth Session, 
Supplement. no. 1 (1956), p. 2.
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a majority of votes in the Ewe-dominated districts of the South in the 
plebiscite. And while the Convention People’s Party had captured a 
large majority of the seats in the general election that followed the 
plebiscite, there was some question as to whether or not it had received 
a majority of the vote in British Togoland,
Britain had cut up the voting districts in such a way that some 
districts included natives from both British Togoland and the Gold Coast. 
These voters were handled as if they all came from the same country and 
no effort was made to separate their ballots. To complicate the situa­
tion further, no official tabulation was available on the voting, even 
in constituencies that were entirely within British Togoland. It was 
impossible to know the exact percentage of British Togolanders who had 
voted for the Convention People's Party candidates, though guesses could 
be made by considering the number of constituencies that had been won by 
the Convention People's Party and by its opposition, of which the Togo­
land Congress was a part. In those voting districts lying entirely with­
in British Togoland, the Convention People's Party seated four candi­
dates and the opposition seated three. Of the seven districts that in­
cluded both Gold Coast and British Togoland territory, the Convention 
People's Party seated two candidates and the opposition five.^^
The division of seats indicated a fairly even split of voting 
among the British Togoland people and left the Togoland Congress with
23«The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Reports of the Uni­
ted Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and of the Trusteeship Council . .
. op. cit.. 559th Meeting, 28 November 195&, no. 39» PP* 41-42.
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some basis for arguing that the majority of the Territory's people were 
against the Convention People's Party and its belief in a unitary form 
of government. The Togoland Congress still had a fighting chance to pre­
vent the integration of the southern part of British Togoland into the 
Gold Coast; or if this was not possible, it had a chance of preventing 
the integration of British Togoland under a unitary form of government.
It was not willing to concede defeat as long as it had these possibili­
ties.
It appears that the Togoland Congress Party was interested pri­
marily in defeating the integration of the South, but it did not hold 
to this position consistently. Each of its three representatives ap­
pearing before the Fourth Committee had somewhat differing views and ar­
guments, The first of the Togoland Congress' representatives spoke di­
rectly against integrating the South into the Gold Coast. He said that 
the area should not be forced to unite with the Gold Coast when fifty- 
eight percent of the southern natives participating in the plebiscite 
had voted against integration.24
The second of the representatives also spoke against integrating 
British Togoland. She thought no decision should be based on a simple 
majority, but on a two-thirds majority. She seemed to accept the fact 
that integration was inevitable, however, and insisted that it should 
not take place until the constitutional proposals presented by the Gold 
Coast and the United Kingdom governments were adequate to insure the
24Ibid.. 554th Meeting, 26 November 1956, no. 39, p. 18.
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people of the Trust Territory self-government or independence.^5
The third Togoland Congress representative thought that integra­
tion was wrong because its validity was based on the results of a plebi­
scite that had not offered the people a decent alternative to integra­
tion. But as integration seemed likely, he further argued that the trus­
teeship agreement should not be terminated until the United Nations 
could be certain that the constitutional proposals devised by the Gold 
Coast and United Kingdom governments were adequate to insure the peoples 
of the Trust Territory either self-government or independence. Under 
the unitary system of government proposed by the Convention People's 
Party, power lay with the central government, in which British Togoland 
representatives would only be a small minority dependent upon the de­
cisions of the Gold Coast. Furthermore, the Togoland Congress represen­
tative argued, there were basic weaknesses in the present proposals for 
a constitution, such as the failure to incorporate a declaration of hu- 
man rights and necessary checks and balances.
Each of the Togoland Congress Party's speakers used somewhat dif­
ferent arguments, but about one thing they were in accord: the trustee­
ship agreement should not be terminated until the constitutional pro­
posals for the Gold Coast and British Togoland guaranteed the Territory 
either self-government or independence.
Representatives of the Convention People's Party spoke immediate­
ly after the Togoland Congress representatives finished. They tried to
^3ibid,. pp. 18-21, 
^%bid,, pp. 21-22,
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convince the Fourth Committee that no one was really against integra­
tion, They declared that their major opponent, the Togoland Congress, 
actually favored integration, if it were under a federal form of govern­
ment. Because the Convention People's Party, which controlled the gov­
ernment under the Gold Coast's parliamentary system, favored a unitary 
constitution, the supporters of the Togoland Congress had voted against 
integration at the time of the plebiscite. Now they were trying to per­
suade the United Nations to establish a federal constitution, a type of 
government rejected by the populations of the Gold Coast and British 
Togoland during the general election following the plebiscite,^7
These assertions were not true. A majority of Togoland Congress 
members still wanted unification over anything else. It was true that 
the party supported federation, but only because its members realized 
that union of British Togoland with the Gold Coast was now almost in­
evitable and they wanted to assure some autonomy for the Territory,
The Convention People's Party argued further that since the 
majority of people at the general elections had voted for candidates who 
favored a unitary government, any demands for a federal constitution 
should be rejected. Moreover, as the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly 
had decided in favor of the unitary system of government and had author­
ized the Gold Coast Government to enact a constitution embodying it, the
pQquestion of a unitary or federal government was settled.
The Convention People's Party may have felt the question was
Ibid,, p, 24.
^^Ibid,, 55?th Meeting, 27 November 195&, 39» P« 31*
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settled, but Britain knew it was not. The British realized that the To­
goland Congress had raised doubts in the minds of Fourth Committee mem­
bers as to the desirability of a unitary system of government. Any 
hesitation on the part of members could delay and possibly threaten in­
tegration.
Representing Britain were îfeclay and Gbedemah. Maclay was from 
Great Britain, but Gbedemah was a native of the Gold Coast and Minister 
of Finance in the Gold Coast G o v e r n m e n t , However, since the Gold 
Coast was still a colony he was officially listed as a representative of 
the United Kingdom. Both men were effective speakers. Using moderate 
and diplomatic language, the two representatives urged the acceptance 
of the unitary form of government. They explained that the general 
elections had been based on the issue of a federal constitution versus 
a unitary constitution. The Convention People's Party, backing a uni­
tary system of government, had defeated its opposition, capturing seven­
ty-two seats out of 104, and had won four out of seven seats in constit­
uencies wholly in the Trust Territory, It was true, the representa­
tives agreed, that the opposition had captured five out of seven seats 
in constituencies which included territory of both the Gold Coast and 
British Togoland, but three of these had a much greater percentage of 
their area in the Gold Coast, This, the British and Gold Coast repre­
sentatives asserted, indicated that a majority of the British Togoland 
people had voted for the Convention People's Party and a unitary form 
of constitution. As a majority of the Territory's voters had rejected
^9ibid,. 559th Meeting, 28 November 1956. no. 39. p. 1̂*
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the demand for a federal constitution, the Fourth Committee should agree 
to the formation of a unitary constitution. Whatever merits members of 
the Committee might see in federal constitutions, they must concede that 
the people of the Gold Coast and British Togoland have the right to de­
termine the constitution most appropriate to their own needs and circum­
stances,
After urging the acceptance of a unitary constitution, Maclay 
and Gbedemah urged an immediate decision to release the British Terri­
tory from its trusteeship status and permit it to become a part of the 
Gold Coast when the Gold Coast received independence. They assured the 
Fourth Committee that it need feel no hesitation about releasing the 
British Territory from trusteeship, just because the constitution was 
not yet formulated. The speakers claimed that when the constitution was 
completed it would guarantee "true" independence. It would give the 
Gold Coast, to be known as Ghana, control of its own affairs and a 
status equal to that of Canada, Australia and the other Commonwealth 
nations. Within Ghana all of the natives would enjoy equal rights and 
have equal obligations, with no discrimination between former Gold Coast 
people and British Togoland people. The British and Gold Coast repre­
sentatives stated further that the constitution would be a democratic 
d o c u m e n t T h e r e  was no need to hesitate in releasing British Togoland 
to the Gold Coast when the colony became independent, simply because the 
constitution was not yet completed.
^Qjbid.. pp. 41-42. 
^^Ibid.. p. 42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
230
The arguments and assurances of the British and Gold Coast gov­
ernments effectively dispelled the doubts of a large majority of members 
within the Fourth Committee. The Committee was convinced that it was 
feasible to make an immediate decision in favor of integration and passed 
a resolution to this effect. ^2
Many of the Committee members acknowledged that their present 
position in favor of integration resulted from the speeches presented by 
Britain and the Gold Coast, The Israeli delegate said he had listened 
with interest to the representative of the Gold Coast and thought the 
Gold Coast and British Togoland should be free to make any decisions re­
garding their future once they became united and independent.33
The Belgian delegate was satisfied by British indications of the 
manner in which independence would be granted to the Gold Coast and how 
the constitution for the new state would be established. Therefore he 
would support union of the Trust Territory with the Gold Coast.3^
The Canadian representative expressed his satisfaction with the 
constitutional proposals and believed that British Togoland should be 
released from trust status as soon as the Gold Coast received its inde­
pendence, He based his assurance that the constitution would be satis­
factory on the pledge of the Gold Coast Government that the people of 
the Trust Territory would enjoy equal rights with and have the same
3^Ibid.. 567th Meeting, 5 December 1956, no. 39, P* 90. 
33it>id.. 562nd Meeting, 3 December 1956, no. 39, p. 59. 
3^Ibid.. 560th Meeting, 29 November 1956, no. 39, p.
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obligations as their fellow-countrymen residing in the Gold Coast.35 
Yassein of the Sudan thought it was time to make a decision.
He believed that British Togoland should be united with the Gold Coast, 
since the British Togoland minority in the future state of Ghana had 
been guaranteed equal rights by the Gold Coast Government.3&
The influence of the British and Gold Coast's assurances was 
apparent in each of these delegate's comments and exemplified the effect 
the two governments made upon the Fourth Committee. Yet, ironically, 
the Togoland Congress Party had to accept a certain amount of credit for 
the success of Britain and France, Some of the Committee members said 
in effect that they appreciated the party's position, but had not found 
its arguments convincing, Canada declared that despite the Togoland 
Congress' skillful presentation it had failed to make a valid c a s e . 37 
The Ceylon delegate felt that the importance of safeguards for inhabi­
tants of southern British Togoland had been exaggerated, though he con­
gratulated the Togoland Congress on the considerable skill with which it 
had submitted its v i e w s . 3® Apparently the Togoland Congress could not 
blame the opposition alone for the defeat of its position on the consti­
tution.
However, the party did have some influence. Several of the 
Fourth Committee members echoed Togoland Congress' contentions that
^^Ibid.. 562nd Meeting, 3 December 1956, no. 39, p. 59. 
^^Ibid.. p. 61.
3?Ibid.. p. 59.
^ ^ I b i d . . p .  6 0 .
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British Togoland should not be turned over to the Gold Coast, either be­
cause of the general election results or because the constitution had not 
yet been formulated. Venezuela felt that the federal form of government 
had received more favor in British Togoland than the unitary form. The 
area should not be forced to accept the unitary government favored by the 
Gold Coast. Furthermore, there was no constitution. Under these cir­
cumstances, Venezuela's delegate wondered if the General Assembly should 
renounce its right of supervision over the Territory.39 The delegate 
from El Salvador was convinced that the majority of the people in Brit­
ish Togoland were against a unitary government and thought this should 
be recognized before any decision was made.^® Uruguay's representative 
believed it was clear from the documents before the Committee that the 
South desired a federal form of government,While the Committee mem­
bers who joined with the Togoland Congress against integration in a uni­
tary form were in the minority, their position indicated that the Togo­
land Congress* viewpoint was not without support.
On the fifth of December 1956, the Fourth Committee voted on the
draft resolution to end trusteeship control of British Togoland at the
moment the Gold Coast became independent, scheduled for March 6 , 1957.
The resolution was accepted by an overwhelming majority of fifty-eight
42to none, with eleven abstentions.
39ibid.. 561st Meeting, 30 November 1956, no. 39, p. 5̂ «
^^Ibid.. 564th Meeting, 4 December 1956, no. 39, p. 73.
^^Ibid.. 565th Meeting, 4 December 1956, no. 39, p. 75.
^^Ibid.. 567th Meeting, 5 December 1956, no. 39, p. 90.
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This was a bitter moment for the Togoland Congress and unifica­
tion groups in French Togoland. Because the same countries were in the 
General Assembly as were in the Fourth Committee, it was a foregone con­
clusion that the General Assembly would accept the Fourth Committee's 
recommendations; for all practical purposes the issue of integration was 
settled and British Togoland would become a part of the Gold Coast when 
it became independent. The Togoland Congress said nothing after the vote 
was taken, but immediately before the vote one of their representatives 
asserted that if the Fourth Committee adopted a resolution automatically 
attaching the southern part of the Territory to the Gold Coast through 
integration the southern people would resist. None of the laws enacted 
under such conditions would be recognized by the Togolanders as binding, 
now or in the future. Southern British Togoland would never of its own 
free will agree to integration, and would take steps to repudiate the 
union at any moment that it was in a position to do so. The Togoland 
Congress' representative further said that states which intended to sign 
agreements with the Gold Coast affecting any part of British Togoland 
were therefore given due noti ce. The re was deep resentment on the 
part of Togoland Congress' officials who had fought so hard for what 
they believed. Only time could heal this very real resentment felt by 
them and by their supporters.
The settlement of British Togoland' s future in the form of inte­
gration was the result of many factors. From the first consideration of 
the Ewe problem by the Trusteeship Council until 1951 the unificationists
^^Ibid.. 566th Meeting, 5 December 1956, no. 39, P» 83.
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had been in a good position. Their movement was by far the most popular 
among the politically articulate people of southern French and British 
Togolands, Moreover, they held the sympathies of the United Nations,
Had the unificationists been able to agree on one form of unification 
they probably would have been successful in their efforts.
From 1951 on the strength of the integrationists grew rapidly 
and the unification position weakened. The evolution of the Gold Coast 
toward independence was important in this alteration of relative 
strength. Significant constitutional reforms in the Gold Coast made it 
possible for the Convention People's Party to divert part of its atten­
tion from the Gold Coast to British Togoland, Through the extension of 
its party organization and through the Gold Coast Government in which 
it was the majority party, the Convention People's Party promoted the 
idea of integration, emphasizing that it would make British Togoland part 
of an independent African state. This argument was enhanced by economic 
aid from the United Kingdom through the Gold Coast Government and by 
constitutional amendments which allowed British Togoland people to par­
ticipate in the government of the Trust Territory and the Gold Coast.
By 1954, the integration movement was so strong that it was able to cap­
ture a majority of British Togoland seats in the Gold Coast Legislative 
Assembly.
The integrationist victory in the 1954 elections left the gates 
open to substantive demands for integration. Britain was able to pro­
mote a plebiscite in which integration was one of the main choices on 
the ballot. The plebiscite was held in June of 1956* Returns indicated
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that a majority of the natives favored integration, except in the South 
where the majority still wanted unification with French Togoland.
Even after the plebiscite these southern people clung to the 
hope of unification. They contended that the South should be allowed 
to decide its future separately from the rest of British Togoland. When 
the Fourth Committee rejected this contention, unificationists sided with 
forces which feared domination by the southern Gold Coast to demand a 
federal constitution as the prerequisite of union with the Gold Coast. 
Unfortunately for unificationists, their bid for a federal state failed 
when the Togoland Congress and its allies were unable to capture a ma­
jority of seats during the general elections of 1956.
The only alternative left to unification groups in British Togo­
land was to present the Fourth Committee with a strong case for a fed­
eral government. They failed when the Togoland Congress arguments were 
countered by British and Gold Coast assurances, augmented by the feeling 
of many countries that it was important to court the Gold Coast. The 
significant position it would hold as a newly independent Negro state 
amidst colonies was not lost on United Nations members.
The decision to integrate British Togoland left French Togoland 
unificationists without a cause, unless they wanted to promote French 
Togoland unification with the Gold Coast or independence. The momentary 
confusion among unificationists made it an opportune time for France to 
initiate a plebiscite in French Togoland, an action considered desirable 
by the General Assembly once France initiated election and other reforms, 
France realized that this was the timely moment for a consultation of
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the French Togoland people and informed the Trusteeship Council that it 
would hold a referendum in October of that year, 1956. This led to fur- 
ther plebiscite considerations in the United Nations.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER X 
A PLEBISCITE FOR FRENCH TOGOLAND
At the same time that the United Nations was working toward a 
solution of the British Togoland problem, it continued to be troubled by 
problems concerning French Togoland. The move toward a separate solu­
tion for British Togoland left the French Territory to solve its fate as 
a separate unit. Having failed to bring about a closer relationship be­
tween British and French Togolands, the United Nations had suggested in 
December of 1955 a plebiscite for the French Territory in the near fu­
ture.
The French accepted the plebiscite suggestion of the United Na­
tions, but without introducing universal adult suffrage and other re­
forms also suggested. It was an opportune time for a plebiscite from 
France's viewpoint. The decision to integrate British Togoland left 
French Togoland unificationists without a platform with which to appeal 
to the people and counter French moves to make the Trust Territory part 
of the French Overseas Territories. France arbitrarily informed the 
Trusteeship Council that it was planning a referendum for October of 
1956 and asked that United Nations observers be sent to witness the 
referendum or plebiscite,^
^"The Future of Togoland under French Administration," Trusteeship
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The French told the Trusteeship Council that the Territorial 
Assembly of French Togoland had unanimously decided that it was time to 
terminate the trusteeship agreement for French Togoland. Their repre­
sentative said that as France was anxious to satisfy the will of the 
people, it thought there should be an inquiry of the people to determine 
if the Territorial Assembly mirrored the people's opinion. The French 
stated that the inquiry would take the form of a choice between the con­
tinuation of the trusteeship system and a new statute for the Territory. 
The statute would permit the Togolanders to govern themselves and to 
manage their own affairs democratically. It guaranteed, the French said, 
administrative, territorial and financial autonomy.^
The Trusteeship Council did not receive the French proposals 
with much enthusiasm. The Council members were not sure that the stat­
ute offered the autonomy that France asserted it did. France spoke in 
generalities. Moreover, France conceived of French Togoland's continued 
representation in the French Parliament and the Assembly of the French 
Union,^ If the people voted for the statute and against continued trus­
teeship they might ultimately find themselves as other French colonies, 
part of overseas France. The Trusteeship Council's lack of enthusiasm 
also stemmed from its poor regard for France as a colonial power.
Council, Official Records. Eighteenth Session. 737th Meeting, 2 August 
1956, no. 12(b), p. 299.
^Ibid.
^"The Future of Togoland under French Administration," Trustee­
ship Council, Official Records. Eighteenth Session. Annexes, no. 12(b) 
(1956), p. 12,
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The skepticism of the Trusteeship Council members was expressed 
in many different ways. The Guatemalan delegate said he was not sur­
prised that the Territorial Assembly of French Togoland had voted unani­
mously in favor of ending trusteeship control. He was speaking of an 
earlier assertion made by France that trusteeship over French Togoland 
should be ended, partly because all members of the Territorial Assembly 
were in favor of such action. The representative from Guatemala stated 
that both the pro-unification Comité de l'Unité Togolaise and the radical 
Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise ( Juvento) had boycotted the 1955 
election in protest against electoral manipulation and therefore the 
Territorial Assembly consisted only of pro-French elements. The dele­
gate was not impressed by France’s statute of reforms, either. He felt 
that they were inadequate to justify the termination of the trusteeship 
agreement, and it would be inadvisable to associate the Council with a 
step towards termination by sending observers to follow the operation of 
the referendum.^
The United States was also skeptical. It was disappointed with 
the choices offered to the people, continued trusteeship or self-govern­
ment under France. It felt that the people should be offered the alter­
natives of independence outside the French Union or self-government with­
in it.5
Syria was completely disillusioned with France's proposals. Its
^"The Future of Togoland under French Administration, " op. cit., 
742nd Meeting, 9 August 195&, no. 12(b), pp. 323-26,
^Ibid.. p. 328.
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representative thought the French formula was unfortunate in its timing, 
conception and presentation. The restrictions placed upon the autonomy 
to be granted to the Togolese under the statute might undermine the very 
foundations of that autonomy and turn it into a fiction. The Syrian 
delegate said the statute was to comply with the principles of the French 
Constitution, which linked French Togoland with the future of the French 
Overseas Territories, It seemed that the final introduction of the re­
forms contemplated by France was contingent upon the integration of the 
Territory into the French Union. Moreover, the long list of powers re­
served to the French Government and the French Commissioner in Togoland 
made the promises of self-government and reforms illusory. Lastly, the 
representation of French Togoland in the French Parliament and the Assem­
bly of the French Union would limit the powers of the Togolese institu­
tions,^ Because Syria felt these weaknesses existed in the statute, it 
would not condone the French decision to give the natives a choice of 
continued trusteeship or severance from trusteeship status and govern­
ment under the new statute.
So many of the Trusteeship Council members were dissatisfied 
with the French proposals for a plebiscite, that a resolution to send 
observers was defeated by a tie vote,^ Those who voted against the 
resolution felt that to send observers would be to sanction the plebi­
scite, when they were not sure that such a referendum offered the natives 
a fair choice or could be effectively carried out under the confused
^Ibid,. 744th Meeting, 13 August 1956, no. 12(b), p, 335. 
?Ibid.. p, 342,
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circumstances that existed within French Togoland.
The French angrily informed the Trusteeship Council that the ref­
erendum would take place even though United Nations observers would not 
be present. Their representative said that the French government ex­
plicitly reserved the right to determine its future course of action in 
light of the results of the native consultation.®
The referendum was held during the fall of 19^6 in time for dis­
cussion within the Fourth Committee's winter session. The results in­
dicated that 71.515  ̂of the French Togoland people favored the termina­
tion of the trusteeship agreement and establishment of the statute.^
This was an overwhelming majority, but the All-Ewe Conference, 
which had fought so hard for Ewe unification and later Togoland unifi­
cation, told the Fourth Committee in November of 195^ that the vote 
could be attributed to irregularities and to discrimination by the 
French. Its representative quoted a Nigerian reporter as saying that 
the plebiscite had been a sham, glaringly irregular in some areas and 
rowdy beyond conception in others.
The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise (Juvento), which was 
radically anti-French, tried to explain the voting by saying that
^Ibid.. p. >3.
9"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration: Reports of the Uni-
ted Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and of the Trusteeship Council (A/ 
3169 and Corr.l, A/3173 and Add.l, A/3323; A/C.4/332 and Add.l, A/C.4/ 
33 4)," General Assembly (11th sess,), 4th Committee, Official Records. 
556th Meeting, 27 November 1956, no. 39, p. 27.
lOlbid.. pp. 25-27.
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undoubtedly a certain number of voters had been compelled to vote for 
France, others had been deliberately deceived and some had been guided 
in expressing their views. The party claimed that every possible means 
had been used by the French to bring about the annexation of French To­
goland, This included the old colonial methods of corruption, pressure, 
ambiguity, deprivation of freedom, intimidation, the manipulation of 
electoral lists and repression.
The pro-French parties, Union des Chefs et des Populations du
Nord Togo and Parti Togolaise du Progrès, spoke in opposition to the
All-Ewe Conference and the Juvento. They said that they were pleased
with the splendid work France had done in French Togoland.Part of
the reason why the two parties supported the French stems from their 
leadership. Many of the leaders were civil servants and members of the 
government who benefited from continued French control and who would 
undoubtedly lose their position if they spoke against the French. Ap­
parently, however, many were convinced of the need and desirability of 
French assistance, which a continued relationship with France would 
probably bring. Further, they felt that French reforms were a definite 
step towards self-government.
It is surprising, however, that these two parties, with the 
assistance of the French, were apparently able to secure the support of 
the masses in the vote for the dissolution of French Togoland as a trus­
teeship. At least certain factors were significant, though they do not
^^Ibid.. pp. 28-29.
^^Ibid.. 585th Meeting, 3 January 1957, no. 39, pp. 177-78.
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entirely explain the tremendous support given the proposal for trus­
teeship dissolution and the initiation of a statute of reforms. There 
was considerable appeal to the idea of instituting an "autonomous state," 
which the French asserted would be established under the reform statute. 
Credit could also be given to France's campaign to brand the United Na­
tions as bunglers and interventionists in French Togoland affairs. 
Further, the French had chosen a moment for the plebiscite when anti- 
French party strength was at its lowest ebb, lacking any platform with 
which to counteract French efforts. Lastly, there was some indication 
that France had made an effort to affect the outcome of the plebiscite 
by direct discrimination against the opposition parties.
The plebiscite vote, nevertheless, indicated that France's plan 
for an "autonomous state" was fairly popular among the native people.
The vote, plus the support of the majority parties in French Togoland, 
enabled France to make a very strong bid for release of the Territory 
from its trusteeship position by the United Nations and for its estab­
lishment as an "autonomous state." France told the Fourth Committee 
that the statute which the people had accepted would allow them to ad­
minister their own affairs; therefore the French had achieved the goals 
of the trusteeship system, self-government or independence, and all that 
remained to be done was for the General Assembly to release the Terri­
tory. It would be strange, said the French representative, if the French 
Government were accused of having hastened political development in 
French Togoland too much. The trust of the people in the General 
Assembly should not be disappointed by thwarting their desire for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
244
independence.
Once France had made its plea based on the plebiscite results, 
it rejected arguments against a change in French Togoland*s status. Its 
representative said there should be no hesitation about releasing French 
Togoland from its trusteeship status. The accusation that France had 
discriminated against the opposition parties and had suppressed voting 
was false. The people had voted in complete freedom. Of course, it had 
been necessary to maintain order, but this had not led to illegal acts 
by the government.France hoped to dispel any doubt among Fourth Com­
mittee members with these assurances, but it was not entirely successful. 
The Fourth Committee was impressed by the referendum results, 
and listened intently to arguments submitted by the French. However, the 
Committee was not ready to commit itself until it had become thoroughly 
acquainted with the actual conditions in French Togoland, This reluc­
tance forced the French to rescind their own request that the United 
Nations immediately relinquish control over the Territory, The French 
delegation said that France was willing to abandon its request for ter­
mination of the trusteeship agreement in 1957» if the further course of 
discussion and the substance of the resolutions were acceptable to it,^^ 
With the withdrawal of French demands for immediate relinquish­
ment of all United Nations control, the considerations of the Fourth 
Committee altered. The Committee turned to a discussion of the means
^^Ibid,. 584th Meeting, 2 January 1957» no, 39, pp. 173-75.
^^Ibid,. p. 176.
^^Ibid., 592nd Meeting, 9 January 1957» no. 39, p. 213.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
245
whereby a more thorough knowledge of the French Togoland situation could 
be acquired. Within a few days agreement was reached on a draft resolu­
tion to be forwarded to the General Assembly,The draft recommended 
that the General Assembly dispatch a commission of five members to 
French Togoland to examine the entire situation in the Territory result­
ing from the application of French reforms, which had been enforced by 
the French without waiting for the United Nations decision on the re­
lease of French Togoland from its trusteeship status. This commission 
would submit its observations and suggestions to the Trusteeship Council 
for the Council's consideration. In turn, the Trusteeship Council would 
study the French question, using the report of the commission. It would 
submit the results of this study to the General Assembly.
The General Assembly accepted the resolution with slight altera­
tions and decided to send a commission of six members rather than five 
to the Territory in order to achieve a more balanced geographic repre­
sentation,^® This is where the French Togoland problem stood as of Feb­
ruary 1957.
The French had not been nearly so successful in their demands 
for the dissolution of French Togoland's trusteeship status as the
^^Ibid,. 599th Meeting, 14 January 1957» no, 39» pp. 253-54.
17"Report of the Fourth Committee— Part II; The Future of Togo­
land under French Administration," General Assembly, Official Records. 
Eleventh Session. Annexes. no, 39 (195&-57)» p. 57.
^8"The Togoland Unification Problem and the Future of the Trust 
Territory of Togoland under British Administration," General Assembly, 
Official Records. Eleventh Session. Plenary Meetings. Vol. II, 643rd 
Meeting, 23 January 1957» no, 39, p. 965,
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British had been in similar demands concerning British Togoland, The re­
fusal of the Trusteeship Council to send observers to the French refer­
endum was a most important obstacle to achievement of French aspira­
tions, It left France without the sanction it desired in order to press 
the Fourth Committee for immediate dissolution of the Territory's trus­
teeship status.
The failure of the Trusteeship Council to support French inten­
tions cannot be attributed so much to the nationalistic groups in French 
Togoland who made allegations against the French as it can be attributed 
to France's own colonial reputation. Particularly among those nations 
which only recently had become independent, there was a deep suspicion 
of France's intentions. This attitude, coupled with reports from na­
tionalistic groups, prevented France from receiving the Trusteeship Coun­
cil's support.
If France had been successful in attaining some sanction from the 
Council to carry out the referendum in French Togoland, it is possible 
that the Fourth Committee would have accepted the referendum results as 
a valid reason for releasing the Territory from its trusteeship status. 
While many members of the Fourth Committee looked upon the Trusteeship 
Council as somewhat pro-colonialism because one-half its membership was 
trusteeship-controlling nations, they felt bound to give some recogni­
tion to Council actions. IVhen the Council refused to sanction the ref­
erendum, its action worked as a detriment to French aspirations. If the 
Council were not willing to support France, the Committee members felt 
there was good reason for the Fourth Committee to hesitate before
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accepting the referendum results.
Of course, the importance of the Trusteeship Council's refusal 
should not be overestimated. Even if the Council had given its bless­
ing to the consultation of the people, a number of Fourth Committee mem­
bers would have been skeptical about dissolving the trusteeship agree­
ment. They were uncertain what France meant by "autonomy” for French 
Togoland, and whether the referendum results were a true indication of 
native opinion. Their misgivings were fed by accusations of native or­
ganizations such as the All-Ewe Conference, which exploited France's 
reputation of being conservative in colonial matters.
It was humiliating to French pride, when for the sake of diplo­
matic prudence, France was forced to withdraw its demand for French To­
goland 's autonomous status independent of the United Nations. Yet, be­
cause of the critical tone of the Fourth Committee discussion, France 
could not with good judgement do anything else. However, the withdrawal 
of French demands for immediate dissolution of French Togoland's trus­
teeship status, while painful to France, did not signify a lasting de­
feat. The resolution drawn up and accepted by the Fourth Committee was 
moderate, and it left open the possibility of disposing of French Togo­
land 's trusteeship status in the near future.
French Togoland's future was now partly dependent upon the find­
ings of the United Nations Commission scheduled to visit the Territory 
sometime in the near future. It was also dependent upon the activities
^̂ ''The Future of Togoland under French Administration," Res.
1046 (XI), General Assembly, Official Records. Eleventh Session. Supple­
ment. no. 17 (1956-1957). pp. 24-25.
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of France and upon the ability of the various groups in the Territory 
to influence the United Nations.
The Commission visited French Togoland in June of 1957. It was 
composed of representatives from Liberia, Canada, Denmark, Guatemala, the 
Philippines and Yugoslavia. After a four week tour of the Territory, the 
Commission, under the chairmanship of C, T. King of Liberia, presented 
its report to a special session of the Trusteeship Council in September 
of 1957. In its conclusions, the Commission stated that French Togoland 
possessed a large measure of internal autonomy as a result of the French 
statute. While the Administering Authority retained certain reserve 
powers, the Commission found that the statute represented a significant 
step toward the independence of the country,^®
The Trusteeship Council decided to transmit the Commission’s 
report to the General Assembly, "in order to set in motion an appropriate 
procedure for the early attainment of the final objective of the trus­
teeship s y s t e m , t h a t  is, self-government or independence.
The French and various other groups interested in French Togo­
land 's future were represented at the Fourth Committee during its con­
sideration of the French Togoland problem late in 1957. France presented 
its arguments first. Its representative urged the conclusion of French 
Togoland's trusteeship status.^2 He argued from a position of strength.
^®"A Fomiula for Togoland," United Nations Review. IV, No, 7 
(January 1958), p. 17.
"The Future of Togoland under French Administration," Res. 
1785 (S-VII), Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Seventh Special 
Session. Annexes (1957), no, 2, p, 32,
^^"A Formula for Togoland," op, cit.. pp. 17 and 43.
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The French Togoland Legislative Assembly's unanimous approval of the 
cessation of the trusteeship agreement for French Togoland carried some 
weight, though the present representation was generally discredited, 
Anti-French forces had refused to participate in the election of repre­
sentatives to the body, accusing the French of persecution and discrimi­
nation; therefore, all seats had been filled by pro-French forces. More 
important was the support of the French position from the United Nations 
Commission, which had visited the Territory in the summer of 1957, and 
from the Trusteeship Council, The Commission found that French Togoland 
possessed a large measure of internal autonomy as a result of the French 
statute. The Trusteeship Council felt that the Commission's report, as 
well as the statements made before the Council by the French and Togo­
lese representatives, provided a useful and constructive basis for con­
sideration and action by the General Assembly toward a satisfactory 
solution for the Trust Territory,
The French representative took note of the strong support given 
to the statute which made many governmental changes in French Togoland, 
Since the statute had been well received in the Territory and by the 
Commission and the Trusteeship Council, he felt there were now only 
three points in dispute and preventing the Territory's release from its 
trusteeship status: the renewal of the Togolese Legislative Assembly by
universal adult suffrage, the transference of new powers to the French 
Togoland Legislative Assembly through a revised statute, and the relin­
quishment of residual powers by the French, Speaking of universal
^^"The Future of Togoland under French Administration,” loc. cit.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
250
suffrage first, the French delegate said that its application in the 
coming election of members to the Legislative Assembly was now in the 
hands of that legislative body and France could not interfere in the 
matter. The transfer of new powers to the Togolese Legislative Assem­
bly, offered in a modified statute, would occur immediately upon the 
termination of the trusteeship agreement. The French delegate stated 
that this step was agreed upon by the Togolese Government. Turning to 
what he considered the last of the three points still in dispute, resid­
ual powers, the French representative assured the Fourth Committee that 
those powers which he called residual were the ones needed by France to 
carry out its responsibility as a trust-administering nation and would 
also be relinquished with the termination of the trusteeship.^
The French representative was not clear in his discussion of the 
powers which would be turned over to the French Togoland Government at 
the time the Territory was released from its trusteeship status. He de­
fined the new powers, which would be given under a revised statute, as 
those in the fields of public freedoms, the judiciary, and constitution­
al r e v i s i o n . 25 gut the representative did not define the residual pow­
ers needed for maintaining its trusteeship control. Other nations felt 
that France had been vague on several issues concerning transference of 
power. This led to further explanations by the French delegate.
Without defining residual powers. Jacquet told the Fourth Com­
mittee that all internal powers, new and residual, would be given to the
^^"A Formula for Togoland," op, cit., p. 43.
25ibid,
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French Togoland Government at the time the trusteeship agreement was 
dissolved, France would reserve for itself only those concerning exter­
nal affairs, defense, currency and foreign exchange,
The Fourth Committee also heard the views of Robert Ajavon, 
President of the Legislative Assembly in French Togoland and a member of 
the French delegation, Ihe Togolese minister supported the termination 
of French Togoland as a trust territory. He asserted that self-govern­
ment was now an undisputable fact in the Territory, After a year under 
the new statute the people of French Togoland thought it was time to 
complete their self-government by asking for the dissolution of the 
trusteeship agreement so that the French Government could transfer re­
maining powers to the Togoland Government,
The minister added that, in a spirit of conciliation with its 
opposition, the French Togoland Government had decided four operations 
should be effected consecutively in order to facilitate the termination 
of the trusteeship. These were consideration and acceptance of the 
modified statute, new elections for the Legislative Assembly on the ba­
sis of universal adult suffrage, application of the modified statute 
and, lastly, the automatic termination of the trusteeship agreement as 
soon as the new Legislative Assembly met for the first time,^®
After these speakers finished, the Committee devoted several 
meetings to listening to the views of representatives from the three
^^Ibid,, p, 48. 
"̂̂ Ibid.. p, 44. 
28lbid,
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opposition parties in French Togoland, The first to speak was Sylvanus 
Olympio, representing the All-Ewe Conference, which had worked so hard 
for Ewe and later Togoland unification. He agreed that the French stat­
ute had been a step forward, but did not think that the other plans sub­
mitted by the French and Togoland governments were suitable. He felt 
that the first thing to do was to hold regular elections for the Legis­
lative Assembly in an atmosphere of complete freedom, with each stage 
supervised by the United Nations. Once the elections were held and a 
truly representative assembly elected, the French Togolanders should in­
sure the workability of the present institutions. After this, the new 
Assembly, or a commission of inquiry established by it, should examine 
the present statute thoroughly and make recommendations for amending it 
into a constitution which would allow the people to achieve independence 
by whatever means they chose. Olympio felt that many of the provisions 
in the statute could only be retained on a provisional basis. For exam­
ple, should French Togoland continue to be represented in the French 
Parliament and should the Territory's people continue to have a citizen­
ship tantamount to French citizenship?^^
Similar sentiments were expressed by the two other anti-French 
parties, the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise and the Mouvement Popu­
laire Togolaise, The Mouvement de la Jeunesse Togolaise, a radical or­
ganization vigorously promoting independence, was adamant against 
France's move, through the restrictive application of democratic princi­
ples, to substitute a system of internal self-government for the right
29lbid.
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of all peoples to have independence,^®
During the question and answer period following the speeches, 
Olympio of the All-Ewe Conference stressed that participation of the 
opposition parties in the new election would depend upon assurance that 
the French Government would not interfere in any way and that the elec­
tion would be held under United Nations supervision. He declared that 
the importance of United Nations supervision could not be overempha­
sized, as the administration had interfered so flagrantly in all past 
elections that nobody in the Territory believed an election conducted 
exclusively under its auspices would be truly free.^^
Various delegates expressed opinions on the speeches by the 
French delegate, by the President of the French Togoland Legislative 
Assembly and by the various parties. D, Chapman of Ghana (formerly the 
Gold Coast) felt it was preferable to exclude the question of termina­
ting the trusteeship agreement from the election campaign. Rather, it 
should be the subject of a White Paper to be published by the new gov­
ernment. The election itself should be held under the supervision of 
the United Nations to avoid any complaints,
Syria agreed that general elections should take place under Uni­
ted Nations scrutiny and without any consideration of terminating the 
trusteeship. When reforms had been introduced by the Legislative As­
sembly, the French Togoland people could be consulted on the future
30lbid.. p, 4 5, 
31lbid,. p. 46,
32ibld.. p. 4 7,
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status of the Territory.
The British supported France, Sir Andrew Cohen thought it was 
clear from the statements of France and from the Commission's report 
that Togoland would have effective autonomy in internal affairs with the 
powers France intended to transfer under the revised statute. Further, 
if certain powers were retained by France for the moment, it would be 
with the agreement of the Togoland Legislative Assembly. The transfer 
of powers which had already taken place, together with those proposed 
upon the termination of the trusteeship agreement, would fulfill the 
objective of self-government mentioned in the Charter.
The final resolution by the Fourth Committee was hammered out 
only after protracted negotiation and compromise on the part of the dif­
ferent groups. General agreement was reached on the advisability of 
United Nations supervision of the election of representatives to the 
Legislative Assembly, an All-Ewe request. The resolution sidestepped 
the issues of how and when the transfer of powers from the French to the 
Togoland Government would take place. It merely invited the Administer­
ing Authority to inform the Trusteeship Council on the action taken con­
cerning these powers, the results of the election and other matters.
The resolution did not reject the dissolution of the trusteeship agree­
ment, but left it up to the new Legislative Assembly soon to be elec­
t e d . T h i s  was a compromise between the position of the French and
33ibid.
3^Ibid.
35xbid.. p. 4 9.
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French Togoland governments and that of the anti-French forces. The 
resolution rejected the anti-French demands for a decision on indepen­
dence by the forthcoming Legislative Assembly and demands by France and 
the French Togoland Government for automatic dissolution of the trustee­
ship agreement with the first meeting of the new Legislative Assembly,
The Fourth Committee deserved a good deal of credit for its success in 
devising a compromise resolution acceptable to the hostile forces in­
volved in this struggle to determine French Togoland's future.
The election of representatives to the French Togoland Assembly 
occurred in April of 1958, It was under the supervision of the United 
Nations Commissioner, Max Dorsinville of Haiti, and a team of United 
Nations observers. This election, the first in French Togoland to em­
ploy universal adult suffrage, was directed by the French Togoland Gov­
ernment, in consultation with the United Nations Commissioner.^^
The election was a tremendous upset, a complete reversal of the 
elections in 1955, when the opposition parties had refused to take part 
and only pro-French members were elected to the Assembly, Of the forty- 
six seats in the Legislative Assembly, twenty-nine were won by the anti- 
French, pro-unification Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, Pro-government, 
status-quo parties received thirteen seats : the Union des Chefs et des
Populations du Nord Togo, ten, and the southern Parti Togolaise du Pro­
grès, three. In addition, four seats were won by independent candidates,37
^^"Election Day in Togoland," United Nations Review. IV, No, 12, 
June 1958, p. 44.
Ibid,. p, 4 3,
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These results were very significant, with far-reaching ramifica­
tions, They portended a sharp change in the attitude of French Togo- 
land's Government, The anti-French organizations which only recently 
had spoken against French plans for self-government and strongly in 
favor of independence now controlled the Legislative Assembly. Imme­
diately after the election, Sylvanus Olympio, presently the leader of 
the Comité de l'Unité Togolaise, proclaimed that the Togolese people 
were now masters of their own house,indicating that he had indepen­
dence in mind.
The election results forced the status quo parties to face one 
bare fact : to remain among the major parties they would have to revise
their stand. They had received a stunning defeat when they were confi­
dent of victory in an election which one United Nations observer was 
quoted as having said was "so crooked you could walk along it without 
going in the same direction t w i c e , T h e  status quo position must have 
been very unpopular for the status quo parties to lose after being given 
assistance through questionable activities of the French and Togoland 
governments before and during the election.
The French reversals in the election put France in an awkward 
position. To concede to the demands of the new anti-French majority for 
independence would mean the defeat of all French plans for the Terri­
tory and might cause further dissatisfaction in French colonial areas
"Togoland; Free by I96O," Time, October 18, 1958, p. 32.
^^Russell Warren Howe, "Togoland: The Election That Wouldn't
Stay Fixed," The Reporter. July 10, 1958, p. 19.
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where large elements of the population wanted freedom. Yet for France 
to reject the will of the Togolese majority would bring the wrath of the 
United Nations and native people down upon it. France's solution to 
this dilemma was a great concession on its part, but at least prevented 
the Togoland situation from having an immediate effect upon sensitive 
areas elsewhere in the French colonial empire. The De Gaulle Government 
told Sylvanus Olympio, after considerable discussion, that the French 
would train the Territory's people to take full control of currency, de­
fense and diplomacy by I96O, those areas in which France had not yet re­
linquished control. In return, Olympio was asked not to reveal these 
terms until France and all its overseas territories had voted on the new 
constitution for France and the overseas territories. Thus, after the 
colonies had made a decision for or against the constitution, in effect 
voting against or for independence, Olympio told his people that they 
would be free in 1960.^®
What had begun in 19^7 as a simple demand for Ewe unification 
under one administration, in ten short years ended in dissolution of 
British Togoland's trusteeship agreement and the Territory's inclusion 
in the new state of Ghana, and also resulted in the promise of indepen­
dence for French Togoland in I96O. None of the native groups had fore­
seen this future for the Togoland Territories and indeed none had ori­
ginally agitated for such goals. But because of the various activities 
within the Territories and because of the conflicting demands made upon 
the United Nations by the native groups and Administering Authorities,
Togoland: Free by I96O," loc. cit.
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the future of British and French Togolands was resolved in this fashion. 
Without the power of the United Nations to receive and discuss petitions 
and without its defined ultimate goals of self-government or independence 
for the trust territories, the position of British and French Togolands 
would undoubtedly be much different today.
With the present status of British and French Togolands, is the 
shop-worn goal of unification now doomed? Without a doubt it is in the 
forms of a Togoland or an Eweland. However, a possible federation be­
tween Ghana and French Togoland could occur. Nkrumah, who is prime- 
minister of Ghana, has spoken of a West African federation since the re­
cent voting on September 28, 1958 on the new constitution for France and 
its overseas territories, in which French Guinea rejected the constitu­
tion and in effect voted for independence.^^ At the same time, Sylvanus
Olympio, who now heads the French Togoland Government, has also spoken
Ll"?of Ewe unification "in some form of West African federation."
But even if unification does not occur, unificationists can take 
pride in the fact that their efforts had a part in speeding the evolu­
tion of the two Territories. Particularly important had been the role 
of the All-Ewe Conference, which first brought some of the problems of 
British and French Togolands to the attention of the United Nations.
^^Christian Science Monitor. October 26, 1958* P* 
^%owe, op. cit.. p. 21.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION
Through the efforts of the various opposing forces concerned
with the Togolands* future to impress their views upon the United Na­
tions, the Togoland Territories have progressed rapidly toward independ­
ence. The evolution of the Togolands would assuredly have been much 
slower if it had not been for the nature of the trusteeship system. The 
trusteeship system is not a new concept in the history of the relation­
ship between the ruled and the rulers. It was preceded by the mandates 
system, established by the League of Nations Covenant, However, the 
trusteeship system is distinctly different from the mandates system in 
its powers of surveillance, avenues of protest by natives, and its goals.
The mandates system allowed the Permanent Mandates Commission
only two primary means whereby it could determine conditions in the non­
self -governing countries under its surveillance. These were the annual 
reports of the Administering Authorities^ and petitions from the natives, 
which were conveyed to the League of Nations by the Administering Au­
thorities at their discretion,^ In contrast to this, the trusteeship
l"The Covenant of the League of Nations," League of Nations 
Official Journal. 1st Year (1920), p. 10,
^William Edward Du Bois, Black Folk Iben and Now; An Essay in 
the History and Sociology of the Negro Race (New York ; Henry Holt and 
Co,, 1939). p. 339.
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system allows the United Nations to secure information from annual re­
ports, petitions sent by the natives directly to the Secretary General, 
periodic visiting missions which are sent at times agreed upon with the 
Administering Authorities, and by special commissions which may investi­
gate conditions in the Trust Territory with permission of the Adminis­
tering Authority,3
Under the mandates system, the only means by which the native 
people could protest to the League of Nations or bring matters to the or­
ganization's attention was through petitions which were forwarded to the 
League by the administering countries. Presently, the natives have three 
methods through which they may present grievances to the United Nations : 
by written petitions sent directly to the United Nations, by oral peti­
tions to either the Trusteeship Council or the Fourth Committee of the 
General Assembly, or by communications and speeches to the Visiting Mis­
sions or any commissions which may be sent from time to time.
The trusteeship system also differs from the mandates system in 
its goals. The mandates system emphasized "just treatment"^ of the de­
pendent peoples involved, whereas the goals of the trusteeship system 
are "self-government or independence,Thus while the League of Na­
tions was concerned mainly with insuring that natives in the mandates 
were treated decently by the mandatory countries, the United Nations has
^Yearbook of the United Nations. 1946-47, Dept, of Public Infor­
mation, U,N, Doc, 1947,1 ,1 8 (Lake Success: 19^7), pp. 840-41,
^"The Covenant of the League of Nations," loc, cit.
%.N. Doc, 1947.1 ,1 8, O P .  cit.. p. 8 3 9.
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been primarily concerned with the progressive development of the trus­
teeship countries toward either self-government or independence.
Natives of British and French Togolands have been particularly 
active in taking advantage of the lines of communication open for them 
to communicate with the United Nations, and it is their interaction with 
the Administering Authorities upon the United Nations which has helped 
to bring about the independence of British Togoland as part of Ghana and 
the promise of independence for French Togoland in I96O.
The Togoland natives have used extensively all three channels of 
approach to the United Nationsi written petitions, oral petitions, and 
attempts to influence the visiting missions to the Trust Territories,
In the Togoland situation written and oral petitions lost much of their 
significance with the advent of the first Visiting Mission to the Togo­
lands in 1949, and had their strongest influence upon the United Nations 
from 1947 through most of 1949. Daring these first three years of Uni­
ted Nations consideration of the Togoland problem, the unificationists 
and particularly the All-Ewe Conference used petitions effectively. The 
unification groups were without effective native opposition and sent a 
preponderance of the petitions which the United Nations depended upon 
for information. But with the advent of the first Mission the United 
Nations found less need to depend upon the petitions for information. 
Generally, too, the petitions lost some significance as the United Na­
tions became aware that both unificationists and their opposition tended 
to exaggerate in the petitions in order to strengthen their arguments, 
and in some instances presented arguments that appeared to be outright
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fabrications. However, the petitions still served to call the United 
Nations' attention to pressing problems on which some action should be 
taken. In this sense, the unificationists were able to use petitions 
more effectively than their opponents, as they continually brought prob­
lems to the attention of the United Nations, whereas the other native 
groups were more concerned with denying the existence of such problems.
In their efforts to influence the United Nations through oral 
and written petitions, the unificationists were assisted by the atti­
tudes of United Nations members. Until part of the non-permanent mem­
bership of the Trusteeship Council changed in 1950,^ the Council con­
tained a large liberal minority which greatly influenced the supervisory 
organ's attitude toward the unification demands. After 1950, with con­
tinual changes in the non-permanent membership as the three-year terms 
were completed, the organ gradually acquired a more conservative member­
ship, But almost simultaneous with this change, the Fourth Committee, 
little by little, became the center of United Nations action on the To­
goland problem. This seems to have been partly due to the attitude of 
the majority in the Fourth Committee, who came to feel that the Trustee­
ship Council was dominated by the trust-administering nations. The ex­
panding role of the Fourth Committee was to the advantage of the unifi­
cationists since the Committee, which consisted of all United Nations 
members who wished to participate, showed a stubborn insistence on some 
form of unification even when it became apparent that integration was
^"Place of Meeting of the Sixth Session of the Council (T/386)," 
Trusteeship Council, Official Records. Fifth Session, 29th Meeting,
22 July 1949, no. 62, p. 366.
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strongly supported in British Togoland. The Committee's position was 
apparently an outgrowth of its fairly large anti-colonialist membership, 
which had an innate distrust of any movements, that is, integration and 
the status quo, supported by either the British or the French,
Generally, oral petitions were more effective than written peti­
tions in influencing the United Nations organs because of the psycholog­
ical effect of personal contact and also because the native groups had 
flooded the United Nations with so many written petitions that they had 
become somewhat meaningless. However, even oral petitions were used so 
extensively that they too gradually lost much of their effectiveness.
Though the oral and written petitions, as means of communication 
with the United Nations, have been vastly overused, they have had a very 
important part in bringing about the drastic changes in the political 
position of British and French Togolands and in stimulating political 
activity within the Territories, The third means of communication be­
tween the native groups and the United Nations, the Visiting Missions, 
has had a similar effect.
The Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee have been very 
dependent upon the findings of the three Missions that have visited the 
Togolands in the years between 194? and 1958, Realizing the significance 
of the Visiting Missions, the native organizations have made strong ef­
forts to influence the findings of these bodies. From 194? to 1954 the 
unificationists were the most militant and articulate of all groups in 
the Togolands, Facing two fairly sympathetic Missions, they were quite 
successful in convincing their members that unification had the support
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of the majority of Togolanders. However, after 1953» when the integra­
tion movement became so strong that it could dispute this contention, 
attitudes changed, and the third Visiting Mission in its conclusions and 
recommendations served to enhance the prospects of integration. The 
third Visiting Mission was also somewhat more conservative in composi­
tion than the preceding two Missions,
Status quo groups were never able to make a favorable impression 
on the Missions, Even after the status quo parties controlled the French 
Togoland Legislative Assembly, the Missions were not convinced that these 
parties' platforms represented the desires of the majority of people.
The French were regarded with suspicion by the United Nations, and their 
close association with the status quo parties only served to weaken the 
status quo position.
The British and French have had access to the United Nations 
through four channels. These are the annual reports, membership in the 
United Nations, proposals submitted in the form of documents and at­
tempts to influence the Visiting Missions, The annual reports apparent­
ly had little effect upon the decisions of the United Nations on the fu­
ture of the Togolands, for they have dealt more with the economic and 
social problems of the Territories than directly with the problems of in­
tegration, unification and a closer relationship between French Togoland 
and France,
However, the British and French found that proposals submitted 
in the form of joint observations and joint memorandums were very ef­
fective methods of promoting their views. The repeated referral of
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Togoland problems to the Administering Authorities for solutions gave 
them an opportunity to express their opinions and at the same time pre­
sent tentative solutions which tended to check the activities of the uni­
ficationists.
The membership of Britain and France in the Trusteeship Council 
and the Fourth Committee has given these countries a most opportune po­
sition from which to guide decisions of the two United Nations organs 
on the Togolands, They have been particularly successful in the Trus­
teeship Council where there are only twelve members, of which four 
others are also trust-administering countries. Britain has been able to 
use its position on the Council and the Fourth Committee more effective­
ly than France, which has been hindered by its dubious reputation as a 
colonial power.
Neither Britain nor France made much impression upon the Visit­
ing Missions, which were the fourth means of access the Administering 
Authorities had to the United Nations. But indirectly, through active 
promotion of the integration movement, Britain was able to make its po­
sition felt, and the third Visiting Mission came to the conclusion that 
there was a strong desire among many British Togolanders for the inte­
gration of British Togoland into the Gold Coast,
The integrationists' eventual success in gaining the United Na­
tions approval of British Togoland integration and the unificationists' 
ability to sustain the support of the United Nations until 195& must be 
attributed in part to the trusteeship system's goals of self-government 
or independence. Further, the present status of French Togoland is
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partially a result of these goals. United Nations members are well 
aware of the ultimate aims of the trusteeship system, and most of them 
have been concerned with finding the best methods whereby independence 
or self-government might be achieved. It is for this reason, to a large 
degree, that they gave such earnest consideration to unification and, 
nevertheless, finally found it desirable to accept integration which 
made British Togoland part of a free African state. The goals of the 
trusteeship system are also an important reason why the Trusteeship 
Council and the Fourth Committee were unwilling to relinquish French To­
goland to France until they could be sure that French Togoland would 
have genuine self-government once the trusteeship agreement was dis­
solved.
While the United Nations has played a major part in the evolu­
tion of the Togolands, the Togoland problem has also had its effect upon 
the trusteeship system, either temporarily or permanently. The ill-de­
fined roles of the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee have al­
tered slightly. The Fourth Committee has played an increasing part in 
considerations of the Togoland problem since 1950. Without studying 
Trusteeship Council and Fourth Committee considerations of difficulties 
in other trust territories, it is difficult to say whether this phenome­
non has carried over into other fields of discussion, but some members 
of the Fourth Committee have been quite concerned about the decreased 
role of the Trusteeship Council and have hoped that it will only be 
temporary.
Also, the Togoland problem has apparently made the United Nations
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more cautious about accepting petitions at face value and more inclined 
to depend upon the findings of the Visiting Missions. Lastly, the Uni­
ted Nations considerations of the Togoland problem have resulted in an 
increasing role for the oral petitioners. Originally, oral petitioners 
only presented speeches and answered questions which were directed to 
them. In later sessions of both the Fourth Committee and the Trustee­
ship Council, the Togoland petitioners have actually taken part in the 
organs* discussions for short periods of time.
Though the organs of the trusteeship system have on the one hand 
been accused by the French and British of perpetuating the Togoland prob­
lem by giving too much attention to arguments and claims by dissident 
minorities, and have been accused by unificationists on the other hand 
of being too willing to accept British and French proposals, they seem 
to have handled a very difficult situation fairly well. It is quite 
true, however, that the Trusteeship Council and the Fourth Committee 
allowed the Administering Authorities to stall for almost three years on 
re-implementation of the Joint Council, until such a time as integration 
appeared more popular than unification and re-implementation of the 
Joint Council was no longer feasible. This incident points out the 
weakest link in the trusteeship system, the inability of its organs to 
do more than suggest steps that should be taken. However, there is no 
definite proof that Togoland or Ewe unification would have been more de­
sirable than British Togoland*s integration, and self-government for 
French Togoland with the promise of independence in i960. In fact. Ewe 
unification would have had some adverse effects, leaving all of northern
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French and British Togolands without a seacoast, and without the rich 
taxable areas of the South. As it is, the Togoland Trust Territories 
have quickly reached the goals of self-government or independence, with 
the possibility of a West African federation looming in the future.
This could eventually bring former British Togoland and the semi-self- 
governing French Togoland together. Heads of both the Gold Coast and 
French Togoland governments have tentatively proposed a federation of 
West African countries. Indeed, the trusteeship system may have brought 
about the evolution of these Territories too quickly, leaving them with­
out the training, traditions and economic development needed for a 
stable government.
The methods of investigation under the trusteeship system have 
been moderately successful in dealing with the Togoland problem. The 
Visiting Missions usually have analyzed situations correctly, but the 
first two Missions were given too little time to make a thorough survey 
of conditions and were too dependent upon materials, such as statistics 
on the relative strength of party groups, provided by the Administering 
Authorities. Moreover, the Missions were quite susceptible to influence 
by well-planned, well-organized native demonstrations. Further, on one 
occasion the United Nations found itself temporarily blocked from in­
vestigation when France refused to allow the establishment of a special 
commission to make a study of conditions in the French Territory, This 
again points out the inability of the organs of the trusteeship system 
to compel the trust-administering countries to adhere to decisions made 
by organs of the United Nations.
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The Trusteeship Council may be another weak link in the trus­
teeship system. In the Togoland situation at least, it has been highly 
susceptible to influence by the various trust-administering countries 
and to changes in the nonpermanent membership. These administering na­
tions naturally unite on many issues. In such instances with the assis­
tance of one other nation they can control the Council, as the adminis­
tering countries comprise half of the membership. The non-trust-admin­
istering nations are only members for three years, except for Russia and 
China who, as permanent members of the Security Council, are also perma­
nent members of the Trusteeship Council.? The attitude of the non-per­
manent membership varies of course as terms are completed and new mem­
bers are selected by the General Assembly, The character and changing 
membership of the Council can and has affected its policies, as they did 
in 1950 when a change in the nonpermanent membership upset the liberal- 
conservative relationship, resulting in a less friendly attitude toward 
either Ewe or Togoland unification.
Of the various Charter provisions regarding trusteeships, the 
most successful have been those giving the natives an opportunity to 
express themselves. These have been almost too successful, for the 
second Visiting Mission to the Togolands alone received 2899 communica-
Otions,° However, it was through the channels provided under the trus­
teeship system that the native groups of the Togoland Trust Territories
?U.N, Doc. 1947.I.18, op, cit.. p. 840.
^Vernon McKay, "Impact of the United Nations on Africa," Africa 
Today, ed. Charles Grove Haines (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, I9 5 5),
p. 380,
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were able to call attention to their problems and, as the result of their 
interaction with the Administering Authorities upon the United Nations, 
to bring forth the independence of British Togoland, albeit as a part of 
Ghana, and the pending independence of French Togoland, both milestones 
in trusteeship history.
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